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Abstract
This thesis critically examines the idea of ‘globalisation’ in the New Labour discourse 
over the period 1996- 2001, challenging the version articulated by key members of 
the party. This task involves contesting and reinterpreting the implications imputed to 
the process both at the domestic and international levels. The understanding and 
implications o f  ‘ globalisation’ have changed o ver time. I therefore distinguish two 
phases. The first phase I associate exclusively with Tony Blair. This understanding 
focuses on the domestic significance of globalisation, and conflates the process with 
liberalisation. In this phase globalisation functions to de-politicise a ‘third way’ 
agenda, which is presented as if it were the only logical alternative for a party of the 
centre left. A second phase, the chief contributors to which are Tony Blair and Robin 
Cook, concentrates on the international significance of globalisation. Both argue for a 
move beyond traditional realist approaches to foreign policy, stressing instead the role 
globalisation plays in creating a ‘global interest’. Drawing upon developments in the 
literature, the thesis challenges the New Labour position firstly b y questioning the 
implications of globalisation drawn out by them, as empirically untenable. 
Globalisation does not necessarily limit the room for manoeuvre in the way suggested 
by Blair, nor does it imply an increased harmony of interests forming around the idea 
of a global interest. However, in offering an alternative interpretation this study 
highlights that globalisation should not merely be understood in terms of whether its 
usage is right or wrong. In addition, the thesis argues for a critical hermeneutic 
approach to be taken on the topic. It is argued that the current form globalisation takes 
is reproduced because it functions in particular contexts to serve a political agenda 
within the party. This reveals an ideological dimension in the discourse, drawing 
attention to the ways in which the meaning of globalisation is manipulated in order to 
serve an alternative set of interests not declared in the discourse itself, thereby 
manifesting itself in a particular form over time.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“The political debate today, is shaped as much by how a country sees its place in the 
world as by internal ideological debate”.1
“Globalization should not be seen as ineluctable... often, it serves as afallacious pretext 
for harmful, disastrous policies... [so] fatalism must give way to will”.
This thesis critically examines the idea of ‘globalisation’ in the New Labour discourse 
over the period 1996-2001, challenging the version articulated by key members of the 
party. In this chapter, I outline the orientation of the argument, and introduce some of 
the key ideas that structure it. I begin by discussing why such a study is necessary, 
locating the discussion of globalisation in the context of the 1997 general election. I then 
outline the manner in which I approach the analysis of globalisation, before going on to 
qualify its nature and focus, drawing attention to some of the limitations inherent in the 
approach.
New Labour and Globalisation.
Much has changed since that fateful night in May 1997 when New Labour was 
emphatically swept into power. The day after the election, Blair’s new government sat
1 Tony Blair, ‘Doctrine of the International Community’, speech to the Club of Chicago, 22nd April 1999.
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on a one hundred and seventy eight majority. The Conservatives had lost 178 seats and 
Labour had gained 145, with the swing from Conservative to Labour of 10.3%, a post- 
war record. The Conservatives seemed to be at an impasse, stricken by internal 
squabbles and bedevilled by charges of corruption, their ideas no longer appeared to 
have their original innovative or revolutionary quality. Thus, whereas during the 
eighteen years of Conservative rule it had seemed that Labour might never again govern, 
by 2000, similar doubts were being aired about the Conservatives.4
However, though victory was emphatic, it would be wrong to conclude that all was well. 
Days had barely passed before some began to voice disquiet. There concern: had New 
Labour perhaps offered up too much, or perhaps too little, in their hunger for power?5 
Such a concern overlaid a deeper worry: had New Labour sold out in order to secure 
victory? Had the Financial Times got it right when they suggested that ‘Labour sets out 
to make similar look different’?6 Was the party in fact ‘labouring under false 
pretences’?7
Blair was certainly sure of his case, and not about to forget whom the e lectorate had 
voted in. Following a bitter process of internal party changes, Blair and his inner circle
2 Final text o f the National Convention on Mondialisation, Europe, France, in Vedredi, No. 276. Quoted in 
Ben Clift, ‘Labour’s Third Way and European Social Democracy’, in Steve Ludlum and Martin J. Smith 
(eds.), New Labour in Government. (Basingstoke: MacMilllan Press Ltd, 2001), p.63.
3 D. Denver, ‘The Results: How Britain Voted’, in Andrew Geddes and Jonathon Tonge, (eds.), Labour’s 
Landslide: The British General Election. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p.9.
4 Anthony King, (ed.), Britain at the Polls. (London: Chatham House, 1992). Anthony Heath, Roger 
Jowell & John Curtis, (eds.), Labour’s Last Chance? The 1992 Election and Beyond. (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1994).
5 Polly Toynbee, Did Things Get Better? (London: Penguin Books, 2001).
6 Financial Times, 21st May 1996.
7 Colin Hay, The Political Economy of New Labour: Labouring Under False Pretences? (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999).
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saw their victory as a triumph for a process of modernisation begun by Neil Kinnock in 
the 1980’s, and as a mandate to pursue a policy agenda considerably different to days
o
gone by. Thus, ‘Old Labour’ was definitely out. As he was to reiterate countless times 
following the election ‘we won as New Labour and we will govern as New Labour’. 
And yet there is a certain irony here, in that such a resounding victory in favour of a 
government so enamoured of the idea of change should nonetheless find that they are 
criticised by so many for their reluctance to break free of the conservative legacy.
In the first instance, Blair answers many of his detractors on this point, by locating New 
Labour in a period that is presented as being genuinely new. The demise of the Cold 
War, ever-greater levels of economic integration and unprecedented technological 
advances all combine to explain the new times, and thereby justify New Labour’s 
position. And centrally, the process understood to be driving this change is the process 
of globalisation. Hence this thesis.
Whether business, political, or cultural (or academic), no self-respecting guru has missed 
the opportunity to wax lyrical on the subject, and New Labour, like so many, have not 
been immune from being caught up in this wave. In fact the idea of globalisation 
actually underpins the approach of New Labour. New Labour wards off criticism 
because, they say, new times require new approaches, and this applies no less to a party 
of the left. We live in an age of ‘globalisation’. And as Blair is keen to point out, “no
8 Jon Sopel, Tony Blair: The Moderniser. (London: Michael Joseph, 1995). On the process of 
modernization see Stephen Driver & Luke Martell, New Labour: Politics After Thatcherism. (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1998).
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country is immune from the massive change that globalisation brings”.9 So significant is 
globalisation that it is now possible to credibly talk of a ‘third way’ position in British 
politics.
The question therefore, is what of these new times, and what status do we afford their 
analysis? What is this thing, ‘globalisation’? In the following chapters I will examine the 
function, significance and limitations of ‘globalisation’ in the New Labour 
understanding over time, and in challenging the interpretation contained in the New 
Labour discourse, offer an assessment that attaches a new significance to ‘globalisation’, 
one that draws attention to the ideological and constitutive role that it plays in the New 
Labour discourse.
The argument will take the following form. In interpreting ideology in the New Labour 
discourse, I distinguish between two phases, roughly coinciding with the timing of 
speeches on the topic, and more importantly, coinciding with what might be regarded as 
a shifting set of interests. The first period, from around 1996 through to the end of 1999, 
is on the whole dominated by the ideas of Blair, who makes sense of the implications of 
globalisation judged in terms of the domestic impact that it is perceived to have. A 
second period, though overlapping, generally develops from 1999 onwards, and 
concerns itself with thinking about globalisation judged against that backcloth of the 
international realm and its consequences for foreign policy. In addition to Blair, 
contributors to this second phase include notably Robin Cook and Clare Short. In the
9 Tony Blair, ‘Facing the Modem Challenge: The Third Way in Britain and South Africa’, speech at the 
Old Assembly Dining Room, Parliament Building, Cape Town, South Africa, 8th January 1999.
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final section of the thesis, I trace how an altered understanding of globalisation posited 
by the non-governmental sector and new social movements has also played an important 
role, in effect challenging the New Labour understanding in both areas. In this respect 
one might qualify this development as potentially harbouring the demise of the term as a 
significant feature of the New Labour corpus, and depending on the direction that this 
debate takes, as ultimately representing a challenge to the entire project. The reaction to 
this challenge will draw me to an examination of the response of Clare Short, Gordon 
Brown and Robin Cook.
I now turn to what I mean by the function, significance and limitations of 
‘globalisation’, and the means by which an evaluation can and ought to be made.
Thinking about the Consequences of Globalisation
For New Labour “certain key consequences flow from accepting globalisation and 
working with it”.10 This is what I refer to as ‘the function of globalisation’ in the New 
Labour discourse, that is the significance as accorded by New Labour. Such a view 
relates to how globalisation operates as explanans, in other words ‘that doing the 
explaining’. This involves an examination of how it is conceptualised and how it is used 
to validate action in the political realm.
Undoubtedly, ‘globalisation’ has an important function to play in the New Labour 
discourse. As an idea it has captured the imagination of the New Labour ‘top brass’, and 
particularly Blair. The New Labour intellectual corpus contains frequent references to
10
the subject, stressing its significance and profundity as witnessed by the challenge that it 
represents. Of course, New Labour is not alone in treating the topic seriously. Like so 
many other western mainstream parties, it is ‘globalisation’ that is seen to harbour ‘new 
times’. However, what is perhaps unique about New Labour discourse is the way in 
which globalisation functions in validating a new political philosophy.11 According to
1 9Blair, “[t]he driving force behind the Third Way is globalisation”. And yet it is by no 
means clear just what ‘Third Way’ politics is. As Wickham-Jones points out, “[t]he term 
itself is frustratingly elliptical and vague”; being used “in different contexts with 
different meanings”.13 So it is with globalisation.
And globalisation does not just function as the ‘driving force behind the Third Way’. It 
is also important to recognise the sense in which it is significant as a result of its 
evocative and populist nature. As will become clear, this fits well with the Blairite desire 
for modernisation and radical change. Its widespread currency lends a populist 
connotation to the broader New Labour programme. Blair is keen to tap into this, as it 
holds out the opportunity of a transformed and improved future. Thus talk of ‘new 
times’ is made all the more palatable given the wider context of ‘global speak’.14
10 Tony Blair, ‘The Global Economy’, speech to the Keindanren, Tokyo, 5th January 1996.
11 See Noreena Hertz, The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy. (London: 
William Heinemann, 2001), p.31.
12 Blair, ‘Facing the Modem Challenge’, op.cit. See also Anthony Giddens, The Third Wav. (Oxford, 
Polity Press, 1998).
13 Mark Wickham-Jones, ‘Labour’s Trajectory in Foreign Affairs: The Moral Crusade of a Pivotal Power’, 
in Richard Little & Mark Wickham-Jones (eds.), New Labour’s Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 14.
14 What Susan Strange refers to as ‘globaloney’.
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However, and as will be examined in chapter 4, globalisation also has more specific 
consequences. Blair argues that in light of globalisation, “the key issue facing all 
governments of developed nations is how to respond\ 15 This highlights how policy is 
re-prioritised, and reoriented along particular lines. ‘Globalisation’ determines an agenda 
that, first and foremost, compels a set of responses that are presented as unavoidable. 
Hence the political program is presented as if its prescriptions are unavoidable 
‘necessities’ associated with the ‘new times’. The programme, as a result, takes on the 
status of being pragmatic. Such a stance allows New Labour to posit a move “beyond 
the old boundaries between left and right altogether,” which by their nature are now seen 
as being ‘dogmatic’, ‘ideological’ and ‘conservative’.16 In place of the ‘old left’ and 
‘new right’ positions, the New Labour orientation is instead ‘progressive’, because it 
embraces a new agenda that derives from the new times.
The consequences of this new setting then are far reaching, in that this relocation holds 
out the opportunity of ‘de-politicising’ politics. ‘Ideology’, in an age of globalisation, 
becomes a thing of the past: “[t]he era of grand ideologies... is over”.17 Emptied of 
ideological content, with its policies now seen as unavoidable, domestic politics are 
pursued in the ‘national interest’, and given meaning vis-a-vis the world ‘out there’. 
Politics thus becomes increasingly technocratic, “what matters is what works”; there no
15 Tony Blair, ‘The Global Economy’, in Tony Blair, New Britain: Mv Vision of a Young Country. 
(London: Fourth Estate, 1996), p.l 18, emphasis added.
16 Tony Blair, speech to the News Corporation Leadership Conference, Hayman Island, Australia. 17th 
July 1995. Quoted in Hertz, The Silent Takeover, op.cit., pp28-29.
17 Tony Blair ‘Security in a World of Change: The New Politics of the Left’, in Blair, New Britain, op.cit., 
p.213.
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1 ftlonger being any “right or left politics in economic management today”. Previous 
controversies are apparently resolved and antagonistic themes now reconciled.
The function and significance of globalisation extends beyond the domestic realm. As 
will be examined in chapter five, globalisation is also significant for New Labour 
because it presents a set of experiences that are universal in content. This in effect 
challenges the problematic of ‘incommensurability’; the idea that different points of 
view ultimately preclude the possibility o f agreement on certain issues.19 For New 
Labour, globalisation gives rise to a collective experience, which in turn spurs a logic 
that encourages an evolving consensus on issues traditionally seen as antagonistic. It 
encourages the possibility of a consensus developing, and validates a particular dialogue 
as universal, thanks to the objective conditions brought about by globalisation. Not seen 
as either divisive or dialectical (i.e. at once unifying and divisive), globalisation is rather 
a process that opens the way for a hitherto nascent set of universal values and interests to 
develop. Thus in addition to a third way in domestic politics, globalisation also gives 
rise to the possibility, indeed the need, for a ‘third way’ in international affairs; in this 
case suggesting a move beyond ‘idealist’ and ‘realist’ positions.
So what does all this imply for foreign policy? To begin with, on this view, the national 
interest and ‘global interest’ increasingly becomes one and the same thing. This means 
that the active pursuit of certain values and interests in the international arena becomes 
less controversial, in fact allowing New Labour to articulate an agenda in foreign affairs
18 Tony Blair, ‘The Third Way’, speech given to the French Assembly, 24th March 1998.
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that can be described as ‘solidarist’ in orientation.20 That is to say, the active realisation 
of issues of global justice must now be pursued in the national interest if international 
order is to be secured in the long term.
Given the ‘world as it is’, increasingly unified in the face of the challenge and 
opportunity globalisation presents, New Labour details a foreign policy that confidently 
places the active pursuit of ‘British values’ -  now posited as ‘global values’-  at its heart. 
This is the sense in which New Labour are able to articulate and validate its much 
vaunted ‘ethical dimension’, a dimension that, according to Cook, does not significantly 
compromise other issues deemed to be in the national interest. Respect for human rights, 
for example, becomes a sin qua non of success in a global economy. The need to qualify 
the norm of non-intervention becomes increasingly necessary and yet, given greater 
interconnectedness, is also now less problematic, thanks to a set of universal values.
By pursuing a policy of ‘critical engagement’, one that encourages dialogue with all 
regimes, the British national interest can therefore be maximised, and aided by the 
possibility of exploiting its ‘pivotal’ status, Britain moreover, can have a significant 
hand in realising this shared destiny.
,9See Mark A. Neufeld, The Restructuring o f International Relations Theory. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995).
14
Limitations of the Understanding: Globalisation as a Contested Term
Though we see that it plays an important function in the discourse, in evoking 
globalisation, New Labour nevertheless court considerable controversy. A key 
limitation, it will be seen, is that Blair and others have in effect articulated an account of 
dubious worth and questionable staying power; particularly given the increasingly 
negative connotations associated with globalisation by a wide variety of ‘civil society 
groups’ united under the catchall term ‘anti-globalisation’.21
At first sight, it is quite surprising that New Labour should lend such credence to the 
idea ‘globalisation’, when a cursory examination of the literature quickly attunes one to 
the fact that it is a highly contested and indeed emotive issue. Nonetheless, in that they 
do opt for the term as a key explanans, an important part of this thesis will concern itself 
with some of the empirical and theoretical limitations to their understanding.
For some time now, a debate about the status of ‘globalisation’ has been unfolding in 
which writers have increasingly questioned many of the assumptions attending to the 
concept. In order to utilise this debate, and so make sense of the concept of globalisation 
itself, I conduct a critical examination of the globalisation ‘literature’ in chapter 3. On 
the basis of this examination, I argue that the position staked out by New Labour is in 
the first instance untenable, in that it draws heavily upon a conceptualisation of 
globalisation that has now largely been shown to be erroneous.
20 Hedley Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, in Herbert Butterfield & Martin Wight 
(eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory o f International Politics. (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1966), pp35-50.
21 This will be examined in chapter seven.
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This conceptualisation relates to what I refer to as the ‘strong thesis’. Constituting a 
‘first wave’ of thinking on the topic, the ‘strong thesis’ contains a series of assumptions 
that have subsequently been shown to be unsupportable. Essentially, this thesis holds out 
that there now exists a ‘global economy’, entailing a ‘global logic’ that assumes an 
increasingly circumscribed agenda for any government. Though of course containing 
elements of truth, the general thrust of the argument, I suggest, is overly simplistic 
because it fails to recognise the considerable room for manoeuvre that governments still 
retain. I argue that this view of globalisation, though still influential, mistakenly 
conflates ‘globalisation’ for ‘liberalisation’.22
To develop this part of the argument, I draw upon the ‘sceptical’ critique of globalisation
O'Xposited by a number of prominent writers on the ‘left’. This ‘second wave’ response to 
the initial understandings of globalisation can be seen as a challenge to the ‘strong 
thesis’, and as such, their approach presents a challenge to many of the assumptions 
about globalisation made by New Labour.
‘Sceptics’ such as Hirst and Thompson, begin by debunking an understanding of 
globalisation that they believe has solidified into a sort of ‘common sense’. In this 
respect, the critique is important in that it challenges what might be referred to as a
22 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction. (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2000).
23 Paul Hirst & Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the 
Possibilities of Governance, second edition, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
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‘hegemonic view’.24 In challenging this understanding, the sceptical critique questions 
what globalisation is, or must be, by offering a conceptualisation of the process in the 
abstract, thereby distinguishing it from other processes. This allows them to then apply 
an empirical means of judgement.25
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly for my own purposes, the sceptical literature 
questions the idea that globalisation entails certain consequences. In challenging the idea 
of a ‘global logic’ unfolding out of the process of globalisation, the sceptical literature 
dismisses the assumption that a particular set of policy responses must accompany the 
process. As such the sceptical approach rejects the idea that these measures are 
unavoidable and inevitable. Such a position is seen to be untenable, in that it is founded 
upon empirically suspect information, and it should be said, sustained by a neo-liberal 
outlook that need not be accepted.
It is possible to identify just such a ‘global logic’ operating in the New Labour 
discourse. Talk of an inevitable and unavoidable policy programme in response to 
globalisation constitutes a key tenet of the New Labour position. Either one accepts the 
‘inevitable’ or suffer the consequences. Animated by a neo-liberal orientation, this 
global logic subsequently provides a strong justification on the part of New Labour for 
adhering to this circumscribed policy agenda. Therefore, in questioning any ‘logic’, at
24 See Stephen Gill, ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism’, in Millennium: 
Journal o f  International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1995, p.403.
25 For example, such empirical indicators as the level of Foreign Direct Investment, the size and number of 
‘multi-national’ or ‘trans-national’ companies, and the degree of factor price equalisation.
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least in the form to be found in the strong thesis, the sceptics provide an important 
counter argument, that can also be read as a challenge to the New Labour adumbration.26
However, and additionally, the sceptical approach is also significant in that it suggests 
that there is more to the problems of the initial understanding than just empirically 
untenable assumptions. The sceptical response also draws attention to what it sees as 
being a series of ‘myths’ surrounding this approach, in effect recognising that there is a 
sense in which ‘the idea of globalisation’ has an important independent role to play in 
any analysis. This highlights the need for a more ‘self reflexive’ approach to be taken 
towards the topic, drawing attention to the importance of thinking about how one ought 
to go about understanding globalisation. Importantly, the sceptical approach opens the 
way for thinking about globalisation, not just as a ‘thing-in-itself, but also as a 
discourse. Such an insight has important consequences for thinking about New Labour.
Focusing predominantly on the consequences of globalisation, and the appropriate 
admixture of responses, rather than ‘globalisation’ itself, New Labour have in fact 
maintained a rather fuzzy and under-theorised understanding of globalisation, generally 
conflating globalisation with ‘liberalisation’. This view erroneously considers 
globalisation as existing ‘out there’ as it were. The problem with such a 
conceptualisation is that it fails to recognise the importance of ‘the idea of globalisation’
261 also examine alternative ‘second wave’ approaches to ‘globalisation’ that highlight some inadequacies 
to the sceptical approach itself. Nonetheless, I maintain that the nature of these subsequent criticisms are 
such that they do not call into question the validity o f the sceptical critique vis-a-vis the New Labour 
position.
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as a constitutive feature, and the role that this plays in sustaining and reproducing a 
particular set of processes over time.
This last point, involves developing my critique of globalisation at a more abstract level. 
Based on certain hermeneutic postulates outlined in chapter 2, I argue that the New 
Labour approach to the topic is also untenable because it commits certain positivist 
‘fallacies’. By this I mean that their approach makes an erroneous distinction between 
the object of study, in this case globalisation, and the subject operating on the basis of 
this understanding. The nature of this distinction is such that it precludes any recognition 
of the constitutive role played by the subject. In failing to recognise this dimension 
‘globalisation’ is understood as if it were a ‘process-without-a-subject’. This is a 
mistake. As Blair himself recognises (though in a different context), “how a country sees 
its place in the world” is paramount.27
This approach - based on a particular ontological position concerning the nature of the 
social realm as partly constituted by the interpretation held by social actors - forms a key 
element for this thesis. Not only does it provide a means of assessment concerning the 
limitations of any account of what globalisation is, or can be, but it also provides an 
important insight about the nature and significance of ‘meaning’ and ‘power’ that is 
relevant to an examination of the role globalisation plays in the New Labour discourse.
19
Re-interpreting the Significance of Globalisation.
New Labour’s vague and imprecise interpretation of globalisation might seem surprising 
given the significance and function that it is accorded in underpinning so much of the 
New Labour approach. This all the more so, considering that the ‘debate’ surrounding 
the nature and significance of globalisation has itself become increasingly complex and 
controversial. Why should New Labour p ersist with a reading that is contrary to the 
sceptical reading of globalisation, and instead hold to a view that tends to obscure the 
complex nature of contemporary change?
A key argument made in the thesis is that one should not be at all surprised. 
Globalisation, I argue, is accorded such a central significance because of its tendency to 
obscure, and thanks to its ‘fuzzy’ nature. In this respect, I posit that an alternative 
interpretation of globalisation can be validated in the context of the New Labour 
discourse, referring to the ‘real significance’ of globalisation. This connotes an 
‘ideological’ dimension to the discourse, in that it can be argued that the meaning of 
globalisation is in fact manipulated in order to serve certain ‘masked’ interests. These 
alternative interests I explain in terms New Labour’s concern for ‘electoral expediency’, 
and latterly their concern to articulate a moral purpose to foreign policy whilst still 
acting in accordance with the ‘national interest’.
In drawing attention to the ‘idea of globalisation’, and the constitutive role it has to play, 
I draw attention to the importance of ‘reification’; how globalisation is made real as a 
result of people assuming that it is real and acting accordingly. ‘Reification’ in this
27 Blair, ‘Doctrine of the International Community’, op.cit.
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context refers to how globalisation is “established and sustained” by being represented
-no
as if it were “permanent, natural and outside of time”. In alluding to the process of 
‘reification’, I draw attention to one way in which globalisation might be thought as 
operating ‘ideologically’. Though globalisation is often considered to be in some way 
ideological, what is often not clear is the validity (or even sense) of making such a 
statement. Hence, in order to validate the position of this thesis, I build on the initial 
tenets of the hermeneutic orientation in order to develop a particular conception of 
ideology.
Of course, to dub something as being ‘ideological’ is to enter into a difficult and 
contested terrain since it is a concept no less problematic than globalisation. Often 
dismissed as untenable, it is nonetheless a concept that I shall argue has continued 
validity. It remains a useful and valid critical tool of analysis, provided that it is 
formulated along particular lines, one that defines ideology as “meaning in the service of
„  29power .
In chapter 2 I examine this particular conception, which will involve an examination of 
the work of John Thompson, since it is he, I argue, who most thoroughly develops this 
position. I locate his work in terms of the various controversies surrounding the meaning 
of ideology, in order to draw out the strengths (and weaknesses) of this approach. The 
strength of Thompson’s formulation, it will be seen, relates to the fact that he is able to 
maintain a ‘critical’ (or pejorative) conception of ideology - thus retaining its usefulness
28 John B. Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era o f Mass 
Communications. (Oxford: Polity Press and Blackwell Publishers, 1990), p.65.
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as a critical tool of analysis -  whilst nonetheless answering to the ‘problem of 
epistemology’. This relates to the difficulty of criticising a position as ideological, 
mindful of the fact that one’s own perspective is itself socially embedded.
Following a discussion of these premises, chapter 2 goes on to outline a set of modus 
operandi of ideology. These modus operandi refer to five general modes of operation of 
ideology that can be applied to an analysis of the New Labour adumbration. Each of 
these general ‘modes’ contains certain strategies. For example one strategy associated 
with ‘reification’ is ‘passivization’, and involves the rendering of verbs into the passive 
form. In this respect, New Labour will allude to how ‘globalisation’ is rewriting the 
rules of trade, rather than specifically identifying the institutions and individual 
representatives that collectively come together to rewrite these rules. Thus promulgated 
so, the mechanics of the process are obscured, and the underlying mechanisms de­
politicised.
In addition to reification, another strategy is legitimisation, whereby ‘relations of
a  I
domination’ are portrayed as “just and worthy of support”. The associated strategies 
here include ‘rationalisation’ and ‘universalisation’, the latter for example, referring to 
how the discourse is able to persuade others that “institutional arrangements which serve 
the interests of some individuals serve the interests of all”. Thus, returning to the idea 
that globalisation gives rise to an experience that is depicted as universal; this can now
29 Ibid., p.7.
30 This draws attention to the problem inherent to Marx and his idea of ‘false consciousness’.
31 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.60.
32 Ibid., pp61-62.
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also be interpreted as ideological, in that it purposely denies the possibility that 
globalisation (as liberalisation) in fact only favours some (in this case the UK). 
Consequently, thanks to a strategy of ‘universalisation’, legitimacy is achieved by 
masking the possibility that its current form is made manifest in part thanks to the ability 
of certain key agents to determine its form, (reflecting the power of some agents to 
determine outcomes in certain forums).
It will be seen that in a number of respects, the New Labour discourse, as it relates to 
globalisation, contains many of these modus operandi, which will be more thoroughly 
examined in chapter 6.
The Function. Significance and Limitations of the Thesis.
It is important at this stage to clearly demarcate what this thesis is not attempting to do. 
Firstly, and most importantly, this thesis is not an attempt to invalidate the entire New 
Labour programme.
As outlined at the beginning of this introduction, this thesis does indeed challenge the 
New Labour interpretation concerning globalisation. Accordingly it can be classified 
amongst the (growing) body of work that challenges their Third Way approach. 
However, the nature of this challenge is such that it does not preclude an acceptance that 
certain, highly significant changes in contemporary society are currently underway. 
Rather, the author believes that understanding the plurality of changes in terms of a 
generic concept like ‘globalisation’ is unhelpful. ‘Globalisation’, rather than clarifying 
issues, in fact performs the opposite function. It obfuscates what is a complex area.
Given that significant changes are indeed underway, New Labour is right, indeed it is 
their responsibility, to re-examine their position in order to take account of this dynamic 
changing environment. All governments must in part respond to altering circumstances. 
Nonetheless, it is necessary to question how accurate their depiction is, given the extent 
to which they rely upon ‘globalisation’ to explain and validate what they do. As a 
substitute for more complex thinking about the variety of changes that characterise the 
contemporary environment, New Labour exploits the idea. This is not simply a mistake 
on the part of New Labour. I argue that it is possible to go one step further and suggest 
that such a position does have broader ideological connotations.
What this means is that a policy position can be challenged where it has been validated 
on an erroneous understanding of globalisation. Highlighting this however, does not 
necessarily invalidate the particular policy, but rather means that the policy must instead 
be validated according to a new position. This may of course be possible. Yet justifying 
a policy in terms other than globalisation, will, I argue, once more involve ‘ideological’ 
differences coming to the for. For example, validating increasing ‘flexibility’ in the 
labour market in terms of globalisation is invalid. That ‘flexibility’ is important can of 
course nonetheless be sustained, though only in terms of a more specific contextual set 
of claims relating to the economy (both domestic and international). This is important 
because it draws attention to options, which in turn, will in part have to be located within 
the spectrum of left and right.
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Secondly, this thesis does not suggest, in some conspiratorial fashion, that New Labour 
is trying to dupe the public in order to realise certain dubious ends. Rather, I would 
suggest that it is in the way of politics that ideas are often almost subconsciously evoked 
for their rhetorical value, and as such manipulated in the process. E.H.Carr makes a 
profound point when, in relation to the doctrine of the harmony of interests, he posits 
that it “serves as an ingenious moral device invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged 
groups in order to justify and maintain their dominant position”. The degree of 
sincerity is not quantifiable in this context. Nonetheless, the point I would make is that 
New Labour, (and particularly its leader), is so enamoured of the idea of globalisation 
because it validates a particular strategy that they could not more candidly disclose.
In addition to outlining what this thesis does not attempt to do, it is also helpful to 
outline a number of inherent problems. Of particular significance are problems 
associated with ‘contemporaneity’ and ‘unity of outlook’.
The contemporary nature of the subject matter of this thesis poses a number of 
difficulties. To begin with, there exists an ever-burgeoning material that is concerned 
with globalisation. In chapter 3 ,1 discuss what I refer to as the ‘globalisation literature’ 
in order to locate and critique New Labour’s own understanding. I make this claim even 
though it would be an impossible task to include all of this literature, or even a sizable 
amount. Thus it might be argued that, lacking any definitive understanding of the term
33 Edward Hallet Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study o f International 
Relations. (MacMillan & Co. Ltd.: London, 1962), p.42. Emphasis added.
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precludes any valid and definitive critique. Nevertheless, there remain a number of 
reasons why the literature is central.
Firstly, it is possible to identify certain key texts that capture the essentials of the various 
approaches to globalisation. In chapter 3 ,1 distinguish ‘two waves’ of thinking about 
globalisation. A first wave connotes the strong thesis as alluded to previously. In 
addition, there exists a second wave of thinking, broader and more sophisticated in 
scope. This second wave can be further distinguished in terms of its aims and objectives. 
One strand, preoccupied with the strong thesis, remains economic in its focus, and is 
largely geared towards debunking many of the claims associated with the strong thesis. 
This strand I have labelled as the sceptics. Additionally, a more varied and complex 
literature on globalisation can also be identified, which is perhaps more ambitious in its 
scope. This strand of globalisation I generically label complex globalisation theory. This 
set of distinctions are generally made by others also writing about the topic, and I 
believe, with certain qualifications, are valid.34
34 These qualifications relate to timing and secondly, the extent to which there has actually been a 
‘debate’. Firstly, in positing that certain ‘waves’ of thought have developed one essentially assumes a 
chronological development to the literature. This in turn implies a debate o f sorts; that the literature on 
globalisation has developed as subsequent writers on the topic have entered the fray, aware o f initial 
writings and keen to point out problems in order to stake a new claim. However, there are strong reasons 
to be sceptical, or at least qualify this position. Firstly, key texts do not engage with the strong thesis, and 
develop in separate disciplines, reflecting the concerns and approaches o f these disciplines. For example, 
key initial texts can be ascribed to Ohmae (strong thesis/ economistic concern), but also Robertson, 
(sociology o f religion). Thus ‘globalisation’ as an idea does not originate solely in the economic (business) 
literature. Nonetheless, it is this former field, (the business/economic literature) that subsequently 
popularised the term, coining a particular meaning that came to be the orthodoxy. As a result, hitherto, 
most literature recognising this to be the case, has thus responded by first qualifying its position vis-a-vis 
the strong thesis; usually in the initial pages of the argument, before moving on. Keneiche Ohmae, The 
Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy. (London: Collins, 1990). Roland 
Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. (London: Sage Publications, 1992).
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Secondly, any methodological difficulties that follow from the contemporary nature of 
the discussions as to the nature of globalisation, do not present a significant problem 
with respect to an analysis of the New Labour position, because it is not actually 
necessary to arrive at a definitive meaning to ‘globalisation’. The quest to arrive at a 
definitive understanding of globalisation (whether actual or theoretical) is something 
that most globalisation research has unsurprisingly concentrated on. However, 
successive waves of thinking on the topic have increasingly problematised previous 
assumptions and positions. I draw on this ‘negative’ side to the evolving literature in 
order to critique the New Labour adumbration, which, it will be seen, largely rests on an 
account that will be shown to be out of date.
The contemporary nature of the subject matter is also reflected in the fact that the New 
Labour position has not itself remained entirely static. Indeed, an important part of this 
thesis w ill be to highlight this development. As a result, the role and significance of 
globalisation to New Labour has altered, most recently in response to the development 
of an increasingly vocal and widespread ‘anti-globalisation’ lobby.
Following the events of Seattle in late 1999 for example, a number of key speeches on 
the topic place a new emphasis on the need to ‘manage’ globalisation. As will be seen, 
this is significant in that it re-introduces agency into the process of globalisation, 
something that i s on the whole missing in the initial approaches that characterise the 
New Labour position. Thus in contrast to the idea that globalisation underpins the New
35 According to Gordon Brown, in a significant departure from Tony Blair, “[gl]obalization can be for the 
people or against the people.. .Badly managed, globalization will lead to wider inequality, deeper division
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Labour project, the novel direction taken by this new understanding -  to the extent that it 
takes on board the criticisms expressed by the new social movements -  represents a 
particular kind of challenge to the project as originally formulated. The significance of 
globalisation here connotes a potentially critical (as opposed to ideological) role. Certain 
methodological problems may therefore be said to arise as a result of the fact that the 
position necessarily changes.
There are however, a number of ways in which I deal with this difficulty. The first way 
is to organise the thesis in accordance with a rough chronology that, it will be seen, 
reflects the development of thinking on globalisation. Secondly, I also contain the 
analysis here, to an examination of New Labour’s first term of office (1997-2001). 
Finally, and thirdly, I actually utilise the changing position in order to reinforce both the 
method and conclusions arrived at in the thesis.
My argument, it will be remembered, is that during its first term of office, the New 
Labour discourse develops and evolves in line with a differing set of circumstances that, 
given the context, allow for ‘opportunistic’ responses. In order to make sense of this, a 
critical hermeneutic approach is argued for, exactly because i t draws attention to the 
centrality of time, meaning, power, and individuals and their circumstances.
Thus understanding ‘globalisation’, requires an appreciation of how it has embedded 
itself in particular circumstances, explaining how it is made manifest as a result of
and a dangerous era of distrust and rising tension”. Gordon Brown, ‘Spreading Social Justice Across the 
World’, 16th Nov 2001.
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certain underlying conditions. This approach, I argue, helps us to understand an 
important facet of globalisation by conceptualising it as an idea that can only be properly 
understood when considered in an inherently changeable context. In this case that of the 
UK. Hence the changing position held too by New Labour actually functions to 
reinforce a deeper set of conclusions as to the real significance of ‘globalisation’, 
explaining how a particular reality is constituted over time.
And this also applies in considering the future significance of globalisation. That is, we 
must consider the altering circumstances of both New Labour, as well as the way the 
term is itself altering in the broader context of the UK, in order to make sense of its 
future significance. It is this that draws attention away from any objective account, 
highlighting instead its relative nature; relative that is to interests, circumstances and its 
general acceptance in a particular form.
I develop this argument in the final section of the thesis, and suggest that contemporary 
developments reinforce the challenge to the interpretation of globalisation hitherto made 
by Blair and Cook, in a way that poses a potential threat: undermining the very position 
that ‘globalisation’ was once meant to underpin. In this respect, in the final section of the 
thesis I move beyond the time period set here, but only in order to offer a tentative set of 
conclusions as to the future function and significance of ‘globalisation’.
Finally, this last point draws attention to an additional difficulty concerning what I refer 
to as the problem of ‘unity of outlook’, something closely related to the problems 
associated with contemporaneity. This refers to the fact that there are differing
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viewpoints on ‘globalisation’ within New Labour and over time. Hence, whereas Tony 
Blair stresses the need to respond to globalisation, Robin Cook and Claire Short also 
stress the need to manage the process. Gordon Brown on the whole refrains from using 
the term, and so it does not constitute a term of great significance in his speeches.
In answer to this, I have limited my analysis in the main, by concentrating on a few key 
figures within the party, chiefly Tony Blair, Robin Cook and latterly Clare Short. Each 
has spoken extensively on the topic, with the content of their speeches capturing all the 
essential elements of the New Labour approach. Additionally, and given the time period 
examined here, each figure concerns themselves with the three key areas that play a 
crucial role with regards to ‘globalisation’: Blair, the Prime Minister, overseeing and 
determining domestic policy; Cook, the Foreign Secretary, charged with developing and 
articulating foreign policy; and Short the Overseas Development Minister at the 
Department for International Development, concerned with development and poverty 
eradication.
Secondly, the assumption is made that there in fact exists a certain hierarchy of 
importance as to the varying views, with Blair being the most important. It is he, in 
Labour circles, who almost alone until the end of the 1990’s developed thinking on 
globalisation. Of course, he draws on others in his application of the term, yet most 
significant in this respect, is the fact that Blair, as leader, is the key figure and locus of 
power. Cook nevertheless, also constitutes a key figure. As Foreign Secretary, he plays 
an important role in developing the idea of globalisation and its implications in foreign 
policy terms. Moreoevr, and whereas the New Labour ‘machine’ keeps a very tight hold
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on the reigns on domestic policy, explaining perhaps why any dissenting voices are not 
heard on the topic, Cook is given considerable scope to develop his ideas in  foreign 
policy because it is seen as a less electorally important.
This also holds for the views of Clare Short at the Department for International 
Development. But additionally, Short is also an important figure because she is forced to 
deal with the international consequences of ‘globalisation’ for economic growth and 
development. She is therefore, more sensitive to the development and direction that 
thinking on globalisation takes in this important area.
In recognising a need for redistribution, Short in fact reflects a changing position as a 
result of an altered perspective of globalisation, one brought about by those groups 
concerned with poverty alleviation and development. This intervention, forcing on the 
agenda questions of equity and redistribution, can generally be interpreted as reflecting a 
return to the left, rather than a move beyond it. In assessing this development, the 
prognosis as to the required solution, and the actual possibility of this solution coming 
about means that I arrive only at a qualified conclusion. And in this respect, a nascent 
third phase, or disjunctive in thinking on globalisation in the New Labour Discourse can 
be at least be detected, something that I examine in the final chapter, concerned as it is 
with the future significance of globalisation for New Labour. Nonetheless, the point 
made in this respect, reinforces the central contention of this thesis -  that globalisation 
has been, and will doubtless continue to be, manipulated according to one’s perspective 
and interests.
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Conclusion.
In sum, chapters 2 and 3, concerned respectively with the concept of ideology and 
hermeneutics and an understanding of the concept of globalisation, provide the 
subsequent method and means by which to judge the function and significance of 
‘globalisation’ in the New Labour discourse. Chapter 4 will be concerned with an 
analysis of the function and limitations of globalisation for thinking about the domestic 
realm, and chapter 5 the international realm, before relating the two in chapter 6 in order 
to critique this position in terms of the ideological elements that can be said to reside in 
the discourse. In this chapter an alternative interpretation will be offered concerning the 
‘real significance’ of globalisation, which is validated according to a set of assumptions 
about the circumstances of New Labour in power. In the final chapter, chapter 7 ,1 draw 
attention to the nature of the contemporary challenge represented by the ‘new social 
movements’, in order to suggest what the future significance of globalisation may be. 
This introduces a converse significance to globalisation, moving away from an idea 
capable of underpinning the New Labour, to a set of processes that may ultimately 
undermine the project.
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Chapter 2
A Methodology for Understanding ‘Globalisation9 in Specific
Circumstances
Introduction
‘Globalisation’ is a social phenomenon, made real by the active and ongoing 
interpretations of humans, it is not just a spatial phenomenon amenable to understanding 
in analytical non-interpretative terms. In being understood in a non-interpretative 
manner, globalisation is ‘de-politicized’ in the sense that it i s presented as if it were 
inevitable and ineluctable. Policy is formulated in response to it. Understanding 
globalisation exclusively in terms of this orientation has made possible the erroneous 
assumption that its current manifestation does not in fact reflect the vested interests of a 
minority. Thus, a failure to recognise the non-positivist connotations to ‘globalisation’ 
has significant consequences, in effect silencing important lines of inquiry.
In this chapter I develop this line of argument by discussing the nature of ideology and 
what it means to refer to something as being ‘ideological’. To begin, I elaborate upon the 
particular meaning I ascribe to the concept, one that is synonomous with the work of 
John Thompson.1 I locate his work within the broader debate concerning the nature of
1 John B. Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era o f Mass 
Communication. (Oxford: Polity Press & Blackwell Publishers, 1990). See also John B. Thompson,
Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricouer and Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge:
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the concept, in  order to highlight the strengths and weaknesses o f  this approach. The 
strengths of Thompson’s (re)formulation it will be seen, are twofold, and stem from the 
manner in which he is able to maintain a critical function for ideology at the same time 
as dealing with the ‘problem of epistemology’.
Firstly, in arguing for a particular orientation, Thompson vitiates the need to either 
‘neutralize’ or reject the concept, the latter tendency currently being in vogue. Thompson 
is therefore able to retain an interpretation of ideology as a pejorative thing. The result of 
this is that the concept of ideology remains a useful critical tool of analysis. However, 
and secondly, Thompson’s position is also important as a result of the hermeneutic 
perspective that he is led to adopt, offering an important alternative orientation in 
approaching ‘globalisation’ in general. As I shall go on to argue in chapter 3, a 
hermeneutic approach to ‘globalisation’ allows for a set of novel insights as to its actual 
nature, and consequently its actual significance. Therefore, in discussing the concept of 
ideology, I also examine the hermeneutic tradition, and the role that meaning and power 
plays in the constitution of ‘reality’.
In the final section of the chapter I examine the critical inflection Thompson lends to the 
hermeneutic tradition, which, it will be seen, is distinct from the more conservative 
orientation associated with the work of Gadamer and his particular brand of 
philosophical hermeneutics. This will involve focussing on the specific methodology 
that Thompson outlines, one that he labels ‘depth hermeneutics’. In combination with a
Cambridge University Press, 1981); John B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology. (Cambridge:
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series of modus operandi of ideology, this will provide a methodology for understanding 
globalisation in specific circumstances. I therefore outline the essential features of each 
of these issues, and briefly discuss their relevance to my own stated interests.
Conceptualising Ideology: Thompson’s Typology
Thompson has widely gained recognition over the last twenty years as one of the 
preeminent theorists of ideology. At the heart of his work has been the aim of 
rehabilitating a critical conception of ideology. This revival has been undertaken with the 
intention of countering the tendancy, common to contemporary theorising on the topic, 
of rendering the concept either redundant or stripped of its pejorative and critical 
association.
Thompson defines ideology in terms of the “the ways in which meaning serves, in 
particular circumstances, to establish and sustain relations of power which are 
systematically asymmetrical".3 This definition is explicitly critical in its formulation 
which distinguishes it from a more neutral conception. In addition it posits a particular 
notion of meaning, one associated with the hermeneutical tradition. To begin this 
discussion, I examine the countertendancies of Thompson's own orientation, starting 
with the arguments positing a neutral formulation.
Polity Press, 1984).
2 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction. (London: Vero. 1991). p.5.
3 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.7.
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The tendancy to ‘neutralise’ the concept is typified by the conflation of ideology with 
“‘systems of thought’, ‘systems of belief or ‘symbolic systems’”.4 On this view, 
ideology is construed in terms of ‘isms’, for instance ‘Marxism’, ‘Liberalism’, 
‘Conservatism’ etc. For Thompson, “ [njeutral conceptions are those which purport to 
characterize phenomena as ideology or ideological without implying that these 
phenomena are necessarily misleading, illusory or aligned with the interests of any 
particular group.”5 This ascription of neutrality assigns ideology to all political 
programmes, be they revolutionary or conservative, propogated by ‘sub-ordinate’ or 
‘dominant’ groups.
A sophisticated variant of this conceptualisation occurs in the definition offered by 
Martin Seliger.6 Seliger defines ideologies as “sets of ideas by which men [sic] posit, 
explain and justify ends and means of organised social action, and specifically political 
action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a 
given social order.”7 He contrasts this comprehensive definition, which he labels a ‘total’ 
account, with ‘partial’ accounts which by their nature deny that they are themselves 
ideological. On this view, it is only by being partial that they are able to be critical of
4 Ibid., p.5.
5 Ibid., p53.
6 In addition to Martin Seliger, Thompson also considers, Alvin Gouldner, Louis Althusser and Karl 
Mannheim in this 'neutral' category. Alvin B. Gouldner, The Dialectic o f Ideology and Technology: The 
Origins. Grammar and Future o f Ideology. (London, MacMillan, 1976). Karl Mannheim, Ideology and 
Utopia. (London: Routledge, 1991, c l936). Martin Seliger, Ideology and Politics. (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1976),
7 Seliger, Ideology and Politics, op.cit., p.l 1.
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another account. Thus any account which is critical, must accordingly be partial; and so
o
by implication must be unsatisfactory.
As Eagleton has argued, such a formulation has both advantages and disadvantages.9 On 
the plus side is the fact that such a formulation remains ‘faithful’ to a common sense 
understanding of what ideology is. Such a view avers the disadvantage of considering 
which ‘sets of ideas’ are and are not ideological at any one time. This therefore avoids 
the problem of epistemology, in that it does not postulate that one account is ‘true’ 
whilst another is false. What matters is that they are essentially a coherent ‘set of ideas’ 
which are in some ways understood to be political in content, and purport as a result to 
answer questions concerning the appropriate ends and means with regard to attaining the 
good life.
Nevertheless, in severing any conceptualisation from its social context, Selliger, and the 
neutral conception in general, fails to recognise what Thompson would consider to be 
essential to any definition of ideology, and that is the centrality of power. The question 
of power, occurs only when one is willing to factor in the prevailing social context. A 
neutral account does not do so. Thus, to associate 'ideology1 with a set of ideas, as will be 
demonstrated, fails to recognise the more diffuse sense in which meanings in a society 
actually operate.10 They may in fact not have the sort of coherence that Seliger suggests, 
nor may they be so easily identified.
8 This classic distinction first occurs in the work of Mannheim. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, op.cit.
9 Eagleton, Introduction to Ideology, op.cit., p.7.
10 See Pierre Macherey, A Theory of Literary Production. (London, 1978).
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Why particular meanings prevail, perhaps at the expense of others, requires a broader 
appreciation of the social order in which they exist. Meaning cannot be severed from, or 
understood in isolation of historical context. A neutral conception considers ideology to 
be about any set of beliefs motivated by social interests. In so doing the approach 
jettisons the importance of power, as well as contextual considerations relating to the 
given social order. The result of this view, is that the 'pejorative' connotation of ideology 
is rejected, in favour of a more open and neutral understanding of the term. It is for these 
reasons, considered strengths from a neutral standpoint, that Thompson does not accept a 
neutral conceptualisation. Thus, if we are to retain the concept of ideology as a critical 
tool of analysis, then we must reject the neutral position.
An alternative response to this neutral conception of ideology has been to dispense with 
the concept altogether. As Thompson argues, this has come about because the concept is 
considered “too ambiguous, too controversial and contested, too deeply marred by a 
history in which it has been hurled back and forth as a term of abuse”.11 This 
development can be further differentiated. Firstly, there is the ‘end of ideology’ thesis, 
adumbrated forcefully by Daniel Bell et.al.12
11 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.6.
12 On the ‘end of idelogy debate’ see Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion o f Political 
Ideas in the Fifties. (Glenco Ill.:Free Press, 1960). Chaim I. Waxman, The End of Ideology Debate. (New 
York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968).
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In essence, this thesis (first posited in the 1950s), postulated that the intensity of
11ideology was inversely correlated to the degree of economic development. As countries 
became increasingly ‘developed’ then so ‘ideology’ would demise. Ideology, on this 
view, was associated with ‘totalizing’ and ‘comprehensive’ doctrines (for example 
Marxism and Communism). As such, it was argued that, based on empirical research, it 
was in fact possible to envisage and indeed discern that the age of ideology was coming 
to an end.
Nevertheless, the ‘end of ideology’ debate has largely been dismissed as unsatisfactory 
on a number of counts.14 To begin with, this view understood ideology in a particularly 
limited and contradictory way.15 The view failed to recognise that the pejorative manner 
in which ideology was understood was too restrictive, as they were simply equated with 
such 'totalizing' doctrines as Marxism and Leninism. However, not only did the approach 
erroneously restrict what constituted an ideology, but also suffered from the technocratic 
and ‘objective’ approach to the social which it advocated. This was itself inadequate and 
not, as it purported to be, 'value free'. In fact, as Eagleton points out, the totalizing (read 
Marxist) views which they sought to replace were inspired by a particular political 
orientation, reflecting the cold war situation of the late 1950’s.16
13 Walter Carlsnaes, The Concept of Ideology and Political Analysis: A Critical Examination o f its Usage 
by Marx. Lenin, and Mannheim. (London: Greenwood Press, 1981), p.237. See also Seliger, Ideology and 
Politics, op.cit., p i9.
14 For a discussion centering around this debate see the series o f essays contained in Waxman, The End o f  
Ideology Debate, op.cit.
15 Gouldner, The Dialectic o f Ideology and Technology, op.cit., p.4. Quoted in Eagleton, Introduction to 
Ideology, op.cit., p.4.
16 Ibid., p.8.
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The second strain of thought, synonomous with Foucault, advocates replacing the 
concept of ideology with the more capacious term ‘discourse’, reflecting a more diffuse
17appreciation of power. In opting for a more capacious term to replace ideology
Foucault saught to reflect the more diffuse and ubiqitous identification of power with
knowledge. Power, in this Foucauldian sense, “is not something confined to armies and
parliaments: it is, rather, a pervasive, intangible network of force which weaves itself 
• 18mto our slightest gestures and most intimate utterances.” This generates a problem for 
the continued use of the concept, should one wish to retain its critical, that is its 
pejorative, association. The problem rests upon the premise that to retain a critical 
association ideology must relate to the social context and so be concerned with relations 
of power and dominance.
Power in the sense in which Foucault uses it is ubiquitous.19 Therefore, as Eagleton 
points out, “if there are no values and beliefs not bound up with power, then the term 
ideology threatens to expand to vanishing point.”20 True to task Foucault drops the term 
opting instead for ‘discourse’.21 Nevertheless Foucault’s problem remains, in that the 
question remains as to how one might legitimately discern between the relative 
significance of power in differing circumstances. In opting for the term discourse, 
Foucault is still unable to provide a means of discriminating between the significance of
17 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. (New York: Pantheon books, 1977).
18 Eagleton, Introduction to Ideology, op.cit. p.7. See also Umberto Eco, Travels in Hvper-Realitv: Essays. 
(San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p.244.
19 See Tim Dant, Knowledge. Ideology and Discourse: A Sociological Perspective. (London: Routledge, 
1991), pp199-201.
20 Eagleton, Introduction to Ideology, op.cit., p.7.
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different power struggles. The relativist connotations of Foucault's account entail no 
guidance as to which struggles should be deemed the weightier. As Eagleton wryly 
comments, "[a] breakfast-time quarrel between husband and wife over who exactly 
allowed the toast to turn a grotesque shade of black need not be ideological; it becomes 
so when, for example, it begins to engage questions of sexual power, beliefs about
*}*} i •gender roles and so on". Thus insightful as Foucault’s theory is, his analysis of power 
at the 'micro level' nonetheless fails to link up ultimately with the 'macro level'.23 Failing 
to bridge this gap significantly weakens the critical potential of his project.
Thus both the neutral and dismissive options, each formulated in response to perceived 
limitations to the concept of ideology, are themselves limited in certain crucial respects. 
The neutral conception, though valid, comes at the price of severing the concept from 
any contextual considerations. This strips the concept of its critical associations and 
pejorative character. The ‘end of ideology’ thesis is also unsound, in that is based on an 
unacceptable epistemology. Finally, the ‘Foucauldian’ response, sensitive to the 
problems of epistemology, nonetheless is problematic in that its rejection of the concept 
ultimately leads to an inability to analytically distinguish between power struggles and 
their relative significance.
21 For an informative introduction to the concept of ‘discourse’ as used by Foucault, see Alec Me Houl & 
Wendy Grace, A Foucault Primer: Discourse. Power and the Subject. (New York: New York University 
Press, 1993), Ch. 2.
22 Eagleton, Introduction to Ideology, op.cit., p.8.
23 Stephen Gill, ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism’, in Millennium: 
Journal o f  International Studies, Vol. 24, No.3, 1995, p.403.
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Four Critical Formulations of Ideology.
In addition to the neutral conception of ideology, there are what Thompson labels the 
critical conceptions which have lent the concept its traditionally pejorative association.24 
Thompson classifies these into four categories according to their criteria of negativity, 
these being either: abstract and impractical; erroneous and illusory; expressing dominant 
interests; and sustaining relations of domination.25 Some formulations contain more than 
one of these criteria, for instance Thompson argues that Marx's writings contain all four 
elements. Thompson himself retains only one of these criteria of negativity, 'the criterion 
of sustaining relations of domination'. For Thompson, this stems from the inherent 
inadequacies of each and from the hermeneutical premises of his approach. I therefore 
briefly outline each criterion, and consider some of the associated problems that each 
faces, before then going on to consider in more depth the hermeneutical position that 
Thompson takes.
The first criteria of negativity outlined by Thompson, is found in the position Napoleon 
takes in response to the work of the ideologues, such as Destutt de Tracy. This position 
sees ideology as being abstract or impractical.27 Thus on this view, to criticise a position 
as ideological, is to denigrate it as a result of its unrealistic pretensions. In Napoleon's 
words:
24 For an alternative, more limited understanding o f ideology as inherently pejorative see Jorge Larrain,
The Concept o f Ideology. (London: Hutchinson, 1979). Larrain understands negativity to refer to those 
forms "of false consciousness or necessary deception which somehow distorts men's understanding of 
social reality". P. 14.
25 See Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.54
26 Seliger, Ideology and Politics, op.cit., p.22.
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[i]t is to the doctrine of the ideologues- to this diffuse metaphysics, which in a 
contrived manner seeks to find the primary causes and on this foundation would 
erect the legislation of peoples, instead of adapting the laws to a knowledge of 
the human heart and of the lessons of history- to which one must attribute all the 
misfortunes which have befallen our beloved France.
In coining the term ‘ideology’, Destutt de Tracy had in mind a science of ideas, which he
considered to be the ‘first science’.29 Based on the assumption that we cannot know a
thing ‘in itself but only have an idea of these things passed onto us through our senses,
Destutt de Tracy posited that an analysis of ideas and sensations along scientific grounds
was possible, and as such would provide the basis for rethinking how one might
refashion the social order.30 As Larrain points out, this is the initial positive (neutral)
connotation of ideology: “it is the rigorous science of ideas which, by overcoming
1 1
religious and metaphysical prejudices, may serve as a new basis for public education”.
It is in reaction to such a project that Napoleon, particularly as his own position became 
more tenuous, responds. Napoleon considered the pretensions of the ideologues such as 
Destutt de Tracy to be unsatisfactory due to their overly abstract and by implication 
unrealistic nature. For Napoleon, ideology was “the pretentious philosophy that incited
27 For an account of Napoleon on this topic see Eagleton, Introduction to Ideology, op.cit., pp.66-69. For 
an account o f the life of DeStutt de Tracy, see Emmet Kennedy, Destutt de Tracy and the Origins of  
'IdeoloeV: A Philosophe in the Age of Revolution. (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1978).
28 Quoted in Arne Naess, Democracy. Ideology an Objectivity: Studies in the Semantics and Cognitive 
Analysis o f Ideological Controversy. (Oslo: Norwegian Research Council, 1956), p. 151.
29 See Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.30.
30 On the influence of Enlightenment thinkers in the work of Destutt de Tracy, particularly Bacon and 
Condorcet, see Larrain, The Concept o f Ideology, op.cit., Ch. 1.
31 Ibid., p.28.
43
rebellion by trying to determine political and pedagogical principles on the basis of 
reasoning alone”.32
The point to make in relation to the argument here is that essentially, this critical 
conception of ideology is nonetheless inadequate, primarily because of what it is critical 
of, that is the definition offered by Destutt de Tracy.33 In other words, ideology qua 
science of ideas, does not stand up to scrutiny, as it contains an unsatisfactory 
epistemology. Thus only if one conceives of ideology in this way does it make sense to 
be critical of it in the manner of Napoleon. Though this may seem a rather curious 
argument, the significance of this initial set of arguments stem from its consequences. As 
Larrain posits, the consequences of these beginnings are of significance because the 
pejorative association attached to the term remains, orienting the manner in which the 
concept is to be considered throughout its controversial history.34
It is this initial pejorative association which is taken up by Marx and modified to become 
one of the central planks of his entire corpus of work. This is important because it is the 
writings of Marx, more than any other, who entrenches the term in the modem setting; as 
a concept that ought to be considered indispensible for any understanding of modem 
society. However, it is not my purpose here to evaluate in detail Marx's conception of 
ideology. Such a task is beyond the scope of this thesis. Moreover, the author appreciates
32 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.33.
33 In fact Destutt de Tracy came to recognise this in his later writings. See Roland N. Stromberg, European 
Intellectual History Since 1789. 5th Edition, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1990).
34 For an account o f the development o f the concept in addition to those already cited, see George 
Lichtheim, The Concept o f Ideology and Other Essays. (New York: Random House, 1967), pp3-46; Hans 
Barth, Truth and Ideology, (trans. Fredrick Lilge), (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1976).
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that such an undertaking would involve engaging in a contoversial area, in which there 
exists a variety of interpretations concerning Marx's account of ideology. I use Marx 
here in order to contrast some of his explicit writings on ideology to those contained in 
Thompson's account. This is done in order to demonstrate the novelty of Thompson's 
reformulation, as well as its strengths and weaknesses. It is undertaken because 
Thompson's account explicitly seeks to retain the critical and pejorative associations to 
be found in Marx himself.
In brief, there are a number of positions taken on Marx and his account of ideology. 
Most numerous are those who take up Marx's initial ideas and then seek to modify them 
on the basis of perceived inadequacies. In the Marxist tradition, writers including Lenin, 
Lukacs, Gramsci, Althusser and Callinicos each share the conviction that Marx’s 
epistemological position on the nature of ideology is unsustainable. Each switches from
a ‘negative’ to a ‘neutral’ account of the term in response. This response can in large
I
part be seen as a result of the epistemological problems that beset the next critical 
conception of ideology.
35 See Martin Seliger, The Marxist Conception of Ideology: A Critical Essay. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977); Jorge Larrain, Marxism and Ideology. (London: MacMillan, 1983).
36 In this context, Lenin speaks of a ‘socialist ideology’ and Lukacs o f a ‘proletarian ideology’. V.I.Lenin, 
What is to be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement. (New York: International Publishers, 1969), 
p.41. Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. (Trans. Rodney 
Livingstone), (London: Merlin Press, 1971), p.76. See also Rosalind Coward & John Ellis, Language and 
Materialism. (London: Routledge & Paul Kegan, 1977), p90; Goran Therbom, The Ideology o f Power and 
the Power o f Ideology. (London: NLB, 1980), p5; Alex Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy. (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1985), pl34.
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This second critical conception of ideology refers to ideology as being something
7^essentially 'illusory1 or 'erroneous', “as an inverted or distorted image of what is ‘real’”. 
In criticising this view, Thompson draws attention to the unsatisfactory formulation in 
which the ‘realm of ideas’ is seen to reflect social ‘reality’ in a distorted fashion. Such a 
view erroneously contends that ‘social reality’ “exists prior to and independently of these 
images or ideas”. Writing in the ‘German Ideology’, Marx and Engels argue that “[t]he 
phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material 
life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises”. 39
As with Lenin, Lukacs and those writers that are critical of this aspect of Marx’s 
writings, Thompson also takes issue with this epistemology. For Thompson, “[t]he 
symbolic forms through which we express ourselves and understand others do not 
constitute some ethereal other world which stands opposed to what is real: rather, they 
are partially constitutive of what, in our societies ‘is real’”.40 The problem therefore is 
that at the heart of criticisms about ideology being 'illusory1 are a set of presuppositions 
concerning knowledge. Marx's account posits the primacy of the physical world 41 It is 
this 'materialism' which, in distinction to 'idealism', enables such a view; in Marx's 
words "the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in  the mind o f  man, and
37 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.9.
38 Ibid., p.9. See also Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977), p.60.
39 Karl Marx & Fredrich Engels, The German Ideology, (ed. C.J.Arthur), (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1996), p.47.
40 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p. 10.
41 See Karl Marx & Fredrich Engels, 'Theses On Feurbach1, in Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, 
op.cit., ppl21-123. It should be noted that Marx nonetheless qualifies his materialist premises; "[t]he chief 
defect o f all hitherto existing materialism (that o f Feurbach included) is that the thing, reality, sensuosness, 
is conceived only in the form o f the object or o f  contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, 
practice, not subjectively". Empasis in original, p. 121.
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translated into forms of thought". 42 However for Thompson, this is mistaken, and it is 
for this reason that he does not ally himself with such a position.43
In examining Marx, Thompson in fact identifies a number of conceptualisations of 
ideology, which correspond to his own critical categorisations, and are thus worth briefly 
outlining. These are the ‘polemical’, the ‘epi-phenomenaT and the ‘latent’ 
conceptualistion. The polemical conception sees ideology as being “a theoretical 
doctrine and activity which erroneously regards ideas as autonomous”, a doctrine which 
“fails to grasp the real conditions and characteristics of s ocial life”.44 This obviously 
corresponds to the above category, and in as much as Thompson takes issue with it, he 
can be seen as critiquing 'materialism' and its epistemology.
The second conceptualisation Thompson identifies in Marx, the ‘epi-phenomenal’
conception, sees ideology as being reduceable to the ideas of the dominant class, which
nonetheless are illusory, and serve their interests. This view corresponds, not only with
the ideas of ideology as something inherently illusory (the second of Thompson’s critical
conceptualisations), but also associates ideology with a 'dominant' class. This is well
illustrated in the following quote:
[t]he ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class 
which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling 
intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its 
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so 
that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental 
production are subject to it... . The individuals composing the ruling class... rule
42 Karl Marx, Capital. I, Postface to the second edition, p. 102. Quoted in Edward Reiss, Marx: A Clear 
Guide. (London: Pluto Press, 1997), p.88.
43 This point will be taken up at a later stage, in the section on hermeneutics.
44 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.35.
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also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and 
distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the 
epoch.45
The problem with this view however, is that it restricts any analysis of relations of 
domination to class relations, even though it might be said that there are a variety of 
forms of domination -  such as gender relations, ethnic relations and so on. Therefore, to 
restrict any analysis to class relations is unsatisfactory.
The final conception associated with Marx, the ‘latent’ conceptualisation, occurs where
the system of ideas “orients individuals towards the past rather than the future” 46 This
latent c onceptualisation figures in M arx’s famous p assage t aken from The E ighteenth
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte:
[t]he tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of 
the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolution using themselves and 
things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods 
of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirit o f  the past to their 
service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to 
present the new scene of world history in this time honoured disguise and this 
borrowed language 47
Here Marx laments as to the difficulty for the living to “face with sober senses”, their 
“real conditions of life”. In addition to the problematic epistemology already discussed, 
there is an added complication concerning the function of tradition and history in the 
thought processes of people. Contained in Marx and Engel’s writings, is the belief that
45 Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, op.cit, pp.64-65. Emphasis in original.
46 Ibid., p41.
47 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1976), plO.
48 Karl Marx & Fredrick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in Selected Works in One Volume 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1968), p.38. Quoted in Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., 
p.40.
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tradition and prejudice are negative and avoidable. Such an approach is typical of 
Enlightenment thinking in this regard, in which reason and method are contrasted with 
prejudice and tradition.49
Thompson gives the label 'latent' in this context, as Marx was not explict about 
accounting for this range of social phenomena - 'spirits', 'customs' and 'traditions' - in a 
more precise fashion. Thompson points out that Marx recognises that "[tjhese traditional 
symbols and values are not swept away once and for all by the constant revolutionising 
of production; they live on, they modify and transform themselves, indeed they reappear 
as a potent reactionary force on the eve of revolution itself'.50 In effect one could 
interpret Marx’s writings in  one of two ways concerning this point. Firstly one could 
argue that Marx is frustrated by this fact but does not consider it to be a profound point, 
as the past is not indispensable to the future - one can free one-self from the yoke of the 
past. This position is in line with other parts of his theory, and perhaps resonates more in 
his later writings.51
Alternatively one might adopt a different position and argue that in fact Marx had 
recognised, though for reasons of expediency perhaps played down, a very significant 
indeed profound point concerning the essential historicity and development of man in 
society. This point is taken up in the section on hermeneutics further into the chapter.
49 On this point see Georgia Wamke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics. Tradition and Reason. (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1987), chapter 2.
50 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.41.
51 A distinction is often made between the ‘early’ and Tate’ writings of Marx. The late writings are 
generally considered to be more ‘objectivist’ in tone and aspiration. On this point see Alvin Gouldner, The
49
The point that needs to be made here concerns the validity of the second reading of 
Marx, and how it relates to a hermeneutical position.
This second reading disputes the possibility of 'clean breaks', or ruptures occuring in the 
development of societies. Only gradual accretions of change are permissable, though the 
rate of that change perhaps can vary. This position follows from a hermeneutical 
interpretation of man and society, and thus Thompson is more sympathetic to it. On this 
account, prejudice and tradition are 'rehabilitated', and in stark contrast to objectivist 
aspirations, not given a necessarily pejorative connotation. History on this account is 
considered to be operative in the present, and essential to it, because a person is always 
embedded in his or her tradition.
So, in summary, the differences with Marx stem from a number of limitations. For Marx, 
ideology ‘distorts’; it presents the ‘real conditions of life’ in an ‘illusory’ form. From this 
perspective, what is required is a recognition of this illusory form. Fundamentally, ‘the 
real’ can be got at as its status exists seperately from the interpretation of it. All that 
perpetuates the illusion is ‘ideological’. The ruling class is assigned agency in this 
regard, and one ought therefore to be suspicious of their account of things. All that is 
ideological is therefore inherently negative. As Larrain points out, ideology is eminently 
negative because the concept “means a form of false consciousness or necessary 
deception which somehow distorts men’s understanding of social reality”. Assuming
Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anomolies in the Development o f Theory. (London: Macmillan Press, 
1980), Ch.3; ‘Appendix One’, ppl55-163.
52 Larrain, The Concept o f Ideology, op.cit., p. 14.
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this position enables Marx to deny (or indeed not even consider) that his own account is 
itself a form of ‘ideology’.
And the problem with this account, in essence, boils down to the shortcomings of the 
epistemology. Because it fails to take into account one’s own viewpoint, subsequent 
thinkers like Mannheim are lead to consider his conceptualisation as being only partial 
and so ultimately unsatisfactory. As Mannheim argues, “[a]s long as one does not call 
his own position into question but regards it as absolute, while interpreting his 
opponents’ ideas as a mere function of the social positions they occupy, the decisive step 
forward has not been taken”.54 Mannheim himself, adopts a neutral posture with regards 
to ideology as a result, which he argues constitutes that ‘decisive’ step. However for 
Marx this is not a problem, and therefore not a necessary step, because his epistemology 
is essentially ‘materialist’. This vitiates any problems concerning the status of ‘social 
reality’. The problem is merely to facilitate a recognition of this reality.
The position Thompson takes, begins from the premise that the concept of ideology 
requires reformulation as a result of the inadequate epistemology hitherto orienting 
critical ideologies. The approach that has resulted - one leading towards its dismissal, the 
other leading to the neutralization of the concept - is nonethless understandable. 
However such a view is considered to be unsatisfactory because it lacks a critical and 
pejorative association. It is the critical legacy of Marx which Thompson seeks to retain.
53 Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, op.cit., p.68. Quoted in Carlsnaes, The Concept o f  Ideology and 
Political Analysis, op.cit., p. 184.
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This brings us to the fourth criterion of negativity: whether or not it ‘sustains relations of 
domination’. As has been argued, the first three criteria are unsatisfactory. We can reject 
arguments that reduce ideology to that which is illusory or erroneous because it places 
too heavy a burden on the analyst to demonstrate “that the phenomena so characterised 
are in some sense ‘false’”.55 However in taking such a position Thompson does not deny 
that “ideology may operate by concealing or masking social relations, by obscuring or 
misrepresenting situations”.56 Rather, he argues that such a position is not essential to 
any definition. As has been argued, the criterion of negativity that associates ideology 
with a dominant class is also considered unsatisfactory because this is too limited in its 
scope, failing to recognise alternative dimensions to inequalities in power, such as 
gender or ethnicity for example. And finally the association of ideology with that which 
is impractical or abstract has been dismissed as this was merely formulated in response 
to an erroneous understanding of ideology as a ‘science of ideas’ in the first place.
This in  effect leaves Thompson with the fourth criterion which refers to ‘relations of 
domination’. His concern is with how they are established and how they are sustained. 
This concern with relations of domination places ideology into the social context, and 
therefore enables questions of power and dominance to be re-introduced to the concept, 
which in turn enables a critical/pejorative association to be maintained. As a result this 
formulation at once distances itself from Marx’s formulation and maintains some key
54 Ibid. For an evaluation of Mannheim see Larrain, The Concept o f  Ideology, op.cit., chapter 4; A.P. 
Simonds, Karl Mannheim’s Sociology o f Knowledge. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); Susan J. 
Hekman, Hermeneutics and the Sociology of Knowledge. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986).
55 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.57.
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aspects. To argue in more detail why a critical rehabilitation is superior, I now turn to an 
examination of the problem of epistemology for any conceptualisation of ideology.
Hermeneutics and the Problem of Epistemology: Thompson’s Fourth Critical 
Conceptualisation.
Thompson argues that the problem of epistemology and conceptualisation is best 
addressed by the hermeneutic tradition of thought. This tradition, it is argued, can 
provide an adequate framework which maintains the critical dimension to the concept, 
and yet also furnish an adequate ‘method* for study. This method thus enables an 
interpretation of ideology to be undertaken. I therefore now elaborate in more detail upon 
the broader hermeneutical orientation that informs his (and my) work, as this will enable 
a more thoroughgoing evaluation of the validity of a critical ideology, and its pertinence 
to the examination of the discourse of globalisation.
Thompson's approach to the task of reformulating the concept of ideology has been 
oriented by his commitment to hermeneutics, and more particularly to a method known 
as depth hermeneutics. In adopting a hermeneutical framework, Thompson draws upon a 
tradition whose lineage stems back to the Greeks, though it is a tradition which has 
evolved in a decisive direction nonetheless.57 In essence hermeneutics is concerned with
CO
“the relationship between meaning, interpretation and understanding”. Contemporary
56 Ibid.
57 For a historical overview of the development of Hermeneutics see Richard Palmer, Hermeneutics: 
Interpretation Theory in Schleirmacher. Dilthev. Heidegger and Gadamer. (Evanston: North Western 
University Press, 1969).
58 Richard Shapcott, ‘Conversation and Coexistence: Gadamer and the Interpretation of International 
Society’, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, Spring Vol.23, 1994, p.70.
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hermeneutics, as Rabinow and Sullivan point out, recognise that “[cjultural meaning as 
intersubjective and irreducibly fundamental to understanding is the base-point of the 
whole interpretive project”.59
However, this was not always the case. Traditionally, hermeneutics merely refered to a 
canon of rules or methods concerned with illiciting the meaning of a text, usually legal 
or biblical.60 It was assumed that the biblical (or legal) ‘text’ contained an essential (true) 
meaning, explicitly penned by the author. Hermeneutics, as a result, was concerned with 
establishing an appropriate method in order to arrive at a definitive understanding of the 
text. Hence hermeneutics was chiefly concerned with refining its method of 
interpretation.
As time passed a succession of thinkers broadened the scope of hermenetics, such that 
the ‘text’ or object of inquiry (die sache), became more than just the biblical and legal 
text, to include history as well as literary texts.61 Thus by the time Dilthey tackled the 
subject in the late nineteenth century, hermeneutics could be conceived as providing “a
ft}general methodology for the human sciences [Geisteswissenschafteri\”.
Distinguishing between explanation and understanding, Dilthey posited that the latter 
were the concern of the human sciences as this realm was intrinsically concerned with
59 Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan, (eds.), Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look. (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1987), p.6.
60 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, (Trans Joel Weinsheimer), Truth and Method. 2nd revised edition, (London: 
Sheed and Ward, 1989), p.505.
61 See Wamke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason, op.cit., p.2. Alan How, The Habermas -  
Gadamer Debate and the Nature of the Social. (Avebury: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1995), pp7-10.
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meaning. In addition to distinguishing the natural sciences and human sciences 
according to the methods of explanation and understanding, Dilthey also provided the 
insight “that knowledge which is derived from the human sciences is intrinsically 
historical”, raising the difficult question of epistemology.63 However, for Dilthey this did 
not preclude the possibility of objectivity.64
It is with Gadamer, drawing upon the insights of Heidegger and phenomenological 
thinkers such as Husserl, that hermeneutics is reformulated in a radical way.65 This 
radical shift centres on hermeneutics being at once ‘universalised’ and given an 
ontological basis.66 In so doing, hermeneutics is no longer associated with being a mere 
‘method’ of interpretation. The reformulation explicitly involves a disassociation with 
any ‘objectivist’ aspirations that had hitherto been a part of the hermeneutical enterprise. 
As Wamke points out, “[f]or the whole of his [Gadamer’s] philosophical career... his 
concern has been to overcome the positivist hubris of assuming that we can develop an
fn‘objective’ knowledge of the phenomena with which we are concerned”.
In breaking with its traditional preoccupation with method, Gadamer reorients
/ • o
hermeneutical studies, focusing instead upon understanding and ‘how it is possible’.
62 Shapcott, Conversation and Coexistence, op.cit., p.70.
63 Ibid.
64 See Ilse Nina Bulhof, Wilhelm Dilthey. a Hermeneutic Approach to the Study of History and Culture. 
(London: Nijoff, 1980).
65 For an understanding of the influence o f Heidegger and Husserl on Gadamer’s work see Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Truth and Method, op.cit., part III.
66 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem’, in Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Philosophical Hermeneutics. (London: University of California, Berkeley, 1976), pp3-17.
67 Wamke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason, op.cit., p .l.
68 Shapcott, Conversation and Coexistence, op.cit., p.71.
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As Giddens points out, “[w]hereas for earlier authors verstehen was treated primarily as 
a method which an historian or social scientist uses to gain a systematic access to his 
‘subject matter’, Gadamer regards it as the condition and mode of human 
intersubjectivity as such”.69 It is to this insight - that our object of investigations are 
(already) a meaningful domain making possible understanding in the first place - that 
Gadamer, following Heidegger, is able to conclude that as such, all understanding 
presupposes an already existing interpretation. This preinterpreted domain constitutes 
our tradition, into which we are bom and which enables us to make sense of the world. 
Gadamer posits that one’s tradition is what makes possible understanding in the first 
place; reflecting our essential historicity. Thus it is important to recognise that "[l]ong 
before we understand ourselves in retrospective reflection, we understand ourselves in 
self-evident ways in the family, society and state in which we live".70
However, and contrary to the enlightenment tradition, the role of ‘prejudice’ and 
‘tradition’ must be understood in a particular (non pejorative) way. Prejudices qua ‘pre­
judgments’ are as a result unavoidable; how else are we able to make sense of our 
world? The key question becomes how to discriminate between legitimate and
71illegitimate prejudices?
69 Anthony Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory. (London: Hutchinson o f London, 1977) , 
p.136.
70 Gadamer, Truth and Method, op.cit., p.245.
71 In Gadamer's words, it is crucial to discriminate between "the true prejudices by which we understand 
from the false ones by which we misunderstand". Ibid., p.266. Quoted in Wamke, Gadamer: 
Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason, op.cit., p.82.
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In reformulating the hermeneutical task in this way, hermeneutics is no longer associated 
with being a mere ‘method’ of interpretation. In the first instance, the emphasis is placed 
on ontology rather than questions of epistemology and method. Nonetheless, questions 
of epistemology still arise. Gadamer’s concern is to explicitly purge hermeneutics of any 
remaining ‘objectivist’ pretensions. Yet his account is significant because it also raises 
the question of epistemology (which as discussed strikes at the heart of ideology) 
offering a novel ‘solution’ to problematic issues relating to the nature of truth.
A philosophical hermeneutical position denies the possibilty of recovering any 
essentially ‘true’ meaning in a text, i.e., the position denies that there exists an objective 
meaning. As a result, this orientation takes issue with the idea of there existing any 
'foundations’ to knowledge. However, hermeneutics denies that knowledge without 
foundations must ultimately be 'relativist'. Bernstein associates this position with what he 
labels the ‘Cartesian anxiety’.72 Such a view erroneously presents the debate surrounding 
objectivity in an ‘either/ or’ way: “[ejither there is some support for our being, a fixed 
foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop
‘7*5
us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos”.
To take a relativist position is to preclude the possibility of discerning at all between one 
interpretation and another. As Gadamer argues, "the naive belief in  the objectivity o f  
historical method was a delusion. But what replaces it is not a simple relativism. Indeed,
72 See Richard Bemstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science. Hermeneutics, and Praxis. 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).
73 Ibid., p. 18.
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it is not chance and not arbitrary who we ourselves are and what we can hear from the 
past."74 It is this non-arbitray position which is at the hub of the argument here. As 
Thompson argues, "there is a great deal of room on the spectrum between incontestable 
demonstration and arbitrary choice, and the interpretation of ideology, like all forms of 
interpretation, lies in the region inbetween".75 For philosophical hermeneutics, it is the 
dialogical nature of truth that vitiates the problem of relativism.
A dialogical approach in this context, posits that claims to truth are "...contingent upon
7 f \an intersubjective consensus rather than upon a transcendental subject". Embedded in a 
tradition, and therefore unable to distance ourselveles from it, truth is continuously 
disclosed through a 'process o f  application'. This process of application concerns "the 
expectation of encountering both meaning and truth in that which is to be interpreted".77 
Therefore the understanding of truth, is better conceived in terms of ‘disclosure’ rather 
than correspondence.
What is more, one's tradition does not constitute a rigid framework. Gadamer argues that
no
traditions are not static, nor do they preclude an openness to otherness. As such 
Gadamer's formulation escapes the criticisms of Popper, who in discussing the 'myth of 
the framework', dismisses this position, as it assumes that we are "prisoners caught in the
74 Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Wahrheit in den Geisteswissenschaften', in Kleine Schriften, J.C.B. Mohr: 
Tubingen, 1967, Vol. 1, Philosophic, Hermeneutik, p.42. Quoted in Wamke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, 
Tradition and Reason, op.cit., p.81.
75 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., pp71-72.
76 David C. Hoy, The Critical Circle. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), p.l 10. Quoted 
in Shapcott, Conversation and Coexitence, op.cit., p.73.
77 G.B. Madison, The Hermeneutics of Post-Modemitv: Figures and Themes. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1988), p.l 15. Quoted in Shapcott, Conversation and Coexitence,op.cit., p74.
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framework of our theories; our expectations; our past experiences; our language".79 Such 
a view precludes the possibility of communicating or judging others outside of our 
framework (culture).
Depth Hermeneutics and the Interpretation of Ideology
The insights of contemporary hermeneutics inform the manner in which Thompson 
reformulates the concept of ideology: “the study of symbolic forms is fundamentally and
Q A
inescapably a matter of understanding and interpretation”. For Thompson, ‘symbolic 
forms’ covers “a broad range of actions and utterances, images and texts, which are 
produced by subjects and recognised by them and others as meaningful constructs”.81
The sense in which Thompson understands ideology therefore begins from a recognition 
that ‘words and symbols’ are “a creative and constitutive feature of a social life which 
[is] sustained and reproduced, contested and transformed, through actions and 
interactions which include the ongoing exchange of symbolic forms”. However, the 
concept of ideology adds a twist to this, referring “to the ways in which meaning serves, 
in particular circumstances, to establish and sustain relations of power which are 
systematically asymmetrical”.
78 Ibid., p.74.
79 Karl Popper, 'Normal Science and its Dangers', in Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave, (eds.), Criticism and 
the Growth of Knowledge. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p.56.
80 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.271.
81 Ibid., p.59.
82 Ibid., p. 10.
83 Ibid., p.7.
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The influence of hermeneutics begins with Thompson’s explicit recognition of the 
constitutive role that meaning plays in the social world. But in addition to the 
recognition of meaning and its constitutive features is a recognition of power also. As 
Thompson argues “social life is, to some extent, a field of contestation in which struggle
Q A
takes place through words and symbols as well as through the use of physical force”. 
This formulation incorporates novel features which distinguish critical hermeneutics 
from the philosophical hermeneutic understanding articulated by someone like Gadamer. 
This follows because ideology, understood as meaning functioning “in the service of 
power”, must formulate a critical stance vis-a-vis the existing social mileu.85 As such 
the analysis of ideology involves a concern with the various “ways in which meaning is 
mobilized in the social world” and how this serves the interests o f  groups occupying 
positions of power.86 It is questions of power and dominance that give a critical thrust to 
his formulation and this is an area not examined by Gadamer, whose concerns were of a 
more philosophical nature.
This departure is significant because it anticipates a problem with the philosophical 
hermeneutical formulation, and that is its apparent conservativism. Gadamer's 
rehabilitation of tradition and prejudice are inherently conservative. The dialogic 
position on truth functions as a result of one being prepared to accept that the 'text' or die 
sache, has something to say which is of worth. This anticipation in a sense eclipses the
84 Ibid., p. 10.
85 Ibid., p.7. Emphasis added.
86 Ibid., p.55
87 In this vain Paul Ricoeur distinguishes between two ‘poles’ in the modem hermeneutic tradition; a 
‘hermeneutics o f suspicion’ and a ‘hermeneutics of faith’; Gadamer falling into the latter category. Paul 
Ricouer, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. (Yale: Yale University Press, 1970), pp.28-36.
60
possibility of systematically distorted interpretations. It is this problem that Thompson 
addresses when juxtaposing the concept of ideology and hermeneutics.
Thus a ‘critical’ hermeneutical alternative should not be seen as taking issue with the 
underlying premises of a philosophical hermeneutical stance. On this, Thompson is in 
agreement with Gadamer. Rather, Thompson departs company with Gadamer in the 
sense that he attempts to apply the insights of this approach in a more critical fashion, 
one that is sensitive to the extent to which meaning is manipulated for purposes of 
domination.
In sketching out how 'meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination', 
Thompson articulates a methodology he terms as ‘depth hermeneutics’. This technique 
involves three interrelated elements or ‘phases’. The first phase is that of social- 
historical analysis. The concern here, is to “reconstruct the social and historical 
conditions of the production, circulation and reception of symbolic forms”.88 This will 
involve giving due consideration to such factors as the ‘spatio-temporal setting’ and 
‘social structure’ in which symbolic symbols subsist. In relation to my own concerns this 
entails that the analyst considers the timing and circumstances that gave rise to a term 
like ‘globalisation’. It draws attention to the need to consider who uses the term, and the 
position that they have in the social stucture (for example are they in a position of 
‘power’?).
88 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.282.
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The second phase of the depth hermeneutic technique focusses on the ‘formal’ or
‘discursive’ dimension, and of relevance to this thesis, draws attention to the central
importance of argumentative analysis. In this respect:
The aim of argumentative analysis is to reconstruct and render explicit the 
patterns of inference which characterize the discourse... [enabling] the analyst to 
break up the discursive corpus into sets of claims and topics in terms of certain 
logical, or quasi-logical, operators (implication, contradiction, presuposition,
i 89exclusion, etc.).
Given that this thesis is concerned with examining the function and significance of 
globalisation to New Labour, this aspect of the depth hermeneutic technique draws 
attention to the need to consider such matters as: the presuppositions surrounding 
‘globalisation’ (it is seen as ‘progressive’, ‘obvious’, ‘unavoidable’, a ‘thing-in-itself); 
the implications implied by the process, (further liberalisation, openness, and flexibility); 
the subsequent claims that follow from the understanding, (it is universally beneficial, 
encouraging co-operation and peaceable relations); plus the way in which the argument 
validates and grounds itself (the facts ‘speak for themselves’).
The third phase of the depth hermeneutic approach concerns interpretation, or ‘re­
interpretation’. To ascribe a meaning to the formal analysis, now located with a broader 
social-historical context, we must engage in a ‘creative construction of meaning’:
[i]n developing an interpretation which is mediated by the methods of the depth- 
hermeneutic approach, we are re-interpreting a pre-interpreted domain; we are 
projecting a possible meaning which may diverge from the meaning construed by 
subjects who make up the social-historical world.90
89 Ibid., p.289.
90 Ibid., p.290.
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There are however, added elements to employing the depth hermeneutic technique to the 
interpretation of ideology, because a ‘critical inflection’ is added. In this sense, “[t]o 
interpret ideology is to explicate the connection between the meaning mobilized by 
symbolic forms and the relations of domination which that meaning serves to establish 
and sustain”.91 That part of the analysis concerned with the social-historical examination 
then, “directs our attention towards the relations of domination which characterize the 
context within which symbolic forms are produced and received”.92 Domination, as 
understood here, refers to the ways in which "established relations of power are 
'systematically asymmetrical', that is, when particular agents or groups of agents are 
endowed with power in a durable way which excludes... other[s]".93 The third phase 
thus allows for a re-interpretation of the second phase, leading to the possibility of 
interpreating an ideological dimension to the position.
Combined, each of these phases directs our attention to “an initial access to the modes of 
operation of ideology”.94 This relates to how ideology actually operates {modus 
operandi). Drawing upon a broad corpus of work, Thompson categorises a set of modus 
operandi, which in turn are linked with a set of strategies o f symbolic construction. 
However, before outlining these modus operandi, a number of qualifications need to 
mentioned. The first point to be made is that Thompson does not claim to be offering an 
exhaustive account, and that each of these categories are not mutually exclusive. He 
claims rather, that his aim "is simply to stake out, in a preliminary manner, a rich field of
91 Ibid., p.293
92 Ibid., p.292
93 Ibid., p.59.
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analysis".95 And indeed this point should be clarified from the outset as it applies to my 
own intentions.
Secondly, as has been shown already, critical ideologies have suffered in the past from 
an unsatisfactory epistemology which has undermined their position. Though a 
hermeneutical orientation is capable of rectifying these shortcomings, it does so at a cost 
however. A more diffuse concern with meanings requires a more broad-ranging and 
diffuse means of analysis. This in turn entails that a more complex set of categorisations 
and strategies be recognised. It is probably not an attainable end therefore to provide a 
comprehensive strategy that in turn can claim to provide all the answers in this area.
Thirdly, by definition, a definitive position cannot be staked. This is because the context 
is always changing, not least because our interpretations of the object domain - a 
constitutive feature - alters that domain as a result of our undertstanding of it.96 This 
however, does not invalidate my orientation. What it does do is set limits to any project, 
and qualify any answers to which one might arrive.
Finally, and importantly, this method does not set out to invalidate more 'social 
scientific' methods, but instead ‘qualifies’ such an approach. There are relatively 
persistent structural features in the social realm which validate a structuralist approach, 
and therefore allow for a more objectivist position to be taken. It is important to
94 Ibid., p.293
95 Ibid., p.60.
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recognise that a critical hermeneutical orientation does not rule out these 'structural 
features', and so does not eschew ‘social scientific’ methods. Thus, and contrary to 
Dilthey, understanding is not contrasted to explanation as an alternative mutually 
exclusive orientation. Rather it does not recognise such an approach as being the last say 
on the matter.
With this bom in mind I now elaborate upon the various categories of modes of 
operation of ideology, as outlined in the table below. At this stage, this will only be done 
in summary fashion before being more thoroughly undertaken in the chapters explicitly 
concerned with globalisation further into the thesis. This is because not all the categories 
are relevent to my own explicit interests, and therefore a discussion here would be 
preemptive.
Modes of operation of ideology. Table taken from Thompson, 1990,op.cit., p.60.
General Modes Some typical strategies o f symbolic construction
Legitimation
Rationalization
Universalization
Narrativization
Dissimulation
Displacement
Euphemization
96 This is what Anthony Giddens refers to as the 'double hermeneutic'. See Anthony Giddens, New Rules of 
Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies. 2nd revised edition, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1993).
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Trope (e.g. synecdoche, metonymy, metaphor)
Unification Standardization
Symbolization of unity
Fragmentation Differentiation
Expurgation of the other
Reification Naturalization
Etemalization
Nominalization/passivization
The first modus operandi listed in the table refers to Legitimation. Legitimation in this 
context refers to the ways in which 'relations of domination' are portrayed as "just and
Q7worthy of support". There are a number of associated strategies of symbolic 
construction that fall into this category: rationalization, which is the process of 
reasoning adopted to justify or defend these relations; universalization, which pursuades 
people by positing that "institutional arrangements which serve the interests of some 
individuals serve the interests of all", each and all having equal access to succeed 
through them; and finally, narrativizition, in which traditions are invented and histories 
'written' which have the effect of binding groups, through stories of common pasts and 
shared destinies "which transcends the experience of conflict, difference and division".98
97 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit, p.60.
98 Ibid., pp61-62.
66
As an example as to the relevance of this to my thesis objectives, one question in this 
context would be: how does ‘globalisation’ function, in given circumstances, to 
legitimate a position, and can we identify the means whereby this is done and interpret it 
as ideological? Are there a set of circumstances that give rise to the need for, and explain 
why, someone like Blair would proffer a particular understanding. For example, within 
the New Labour discourse, can we perceive the strategy of universalisation in the 
context of arguing for a particular understanding of globalisation. Is Blair, via a strategy 
of universalistion, able to then convince people that globalisation (selectively 
understood) meets the interests of all people (a questionable assumption), and might 
there be a reason for this that goes undisclosed?
The second, Dissimulation refers to the manner in which "relations of domination may 
be established and sustained by being concealed, denied or obscured".99 Displacement 
refers to when either positive or negative features associated with an object or agent are 
displaced onto another. Another associated strategy, euphemization, occurs where 
"actions, institutions or social relations are described or redescribed in terms which elicit 
a positive connotation".100 Finally, trope concerns the way in  which language is used 
'figuratively'. The figurative use of language includes 'metonymy' (e.g., the state acts), 
'synecdoche' (e.g., the British postion on embargoes read the British government's 
position), and metaphor.
"Ibid., p.62.
100 Ibid., p.62.
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Unification as a modus operandi concerns how a sense of unity, regardless of actual 
division or difference is established and sustained at the symbolic level. Standardizaton 
concerns how "[s]ymbolic forms are adapted to a standard framework which is promoted 
as the shared and acceptable basis of symbolic exchange".101 In addition, and related is 
the symbolization o f unity, in which symbols such as national flags are adopted in order 
to construct a sense of unity.
Fragmentation, as a fourth modus operandi of ideology denotes how "[Relations of 
domination may be maintained, not by unifying individuals in a collectivity, but by 
fragmenting those individuals and groups that might be capable of mounting an effective 
challenge to dominant groups, or by orientating forces of potential opposition towards a 
target which is projected as evil, harmful or threatening".102 Differentiation and 
expurgation o f the other are two associated strategies in this context, the latter refering to 
the sense in which an enemy or threat is created, requiring challenging the existing 
relations of domination.103
The final modus operandi listed is reification. This refers to when "relations of 
domination may be established and sustained by representing a transitory, historical state 
of affairs as if it were permanent, natural, outside of time".104 This has the effect of 
obscuring the essentialy historical character of the social world; naturalization assumes 
that such events are in some way natural, that such outcomes are inevitable and
101 Ibid., p.64.
102 Ibid., p.65.
103 Ibid.
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ineluctable as a result of their 'natural characteristics'. Eternalization denies the social- 
historical character through the portrayal of events as "permanent, unchanging and 
everrecurring".105 Nominalization refers to when identifiable agency is 'erased' so to 
speak, replaced with the use of a noun, "as when we say 'the banning of imports' instead 
of 'the Prime Minister has decided to ban imports'".106 Passivization refers to the 
rendering of verbs into the passive form, for example, instead of saying that 'immigration 
officers are currently interviewing the asylum seeker', one instead says 'the asylum 
seeker is currently being interviewed'. Taken together, these modus operandi form an 
impressive set of categories for thinking about the interaction of meaning and power.
So, each of the above modus operandi point to instances in which meaning may be said 
to have been mobilised in the service of power. That this is so however, draws on the 
need to locate each of these strategies within concrete circumstances, and to take a 
critical stance vis-a-vis this backdrop. Thus, the interpretation of ideology (here 
understood as a version of the depth hermeneutical procedure), necessitates three 
‘phases’: social-historical analysis; formal or discursive analysis; and finally, beyond 
this, “it puts forward an interpretation, a creative and synthetic proposition, concerning 
the interelations between meaning and power”.107
Conclusion
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid., p.66.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid., p.320.
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In this chapter I have articulated an approach to the study of ideology. This approach 
argues for a particular account of ideology that is more sensitive, at the philosophical 
level, to the insights of hermeneutics. The epistemological insights of a hermeneutic 
approach, it is argued, mean that certain conceptualisations of ideology have now been 
rendered redundant. This nonetheless does not invalidate the term. Instead, in retaining a 
critical dimension to the concept of ideology, one ought to refer to a more nuanced set of 
strategies geared to identifying ‘meaning in the service of power’. These ‘strategies’ are 
part of what constitute the method of ‘depth hermeneutics’, which I take from the work 
of John Thompson. Three phases are identified in this respect, reflecting a concern with 
social-historical analysis, discursive or formal analysis, and an ‘interpretation’ which 
brings the two together. This latter concern may be referred to as dennoting a critical 
(re)interpretation, sensitive to the interelations of meaning and power.
The subsequent chapters will now reflect the orientation staked in this chapter. In this 
respect, any subsequent analysis must eschew a complete reliance on a positivist 
approach to understanding globalisation. This means that ultimately, ‘globalisation’ is 
‘real’ only in the sense that it is made real by the ongoing interpretations of social actors. 
As the understanding of globalisation alters, then so will the ‘reality’ reflect this 
alteration. What follows from this is that assesing the significance of ‘globalisation’ will 
entail more than simply judging whether it is empirically tenable. In addition, 
considerations of meaning and power take on a new signifiacnce. Thus, with the aid of 
certain modus operandi outlined above, and following an analysis of what the term is not 
(empirically), we are in a position to offer a ‘deeper’ explanation on the significance of
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the term that follows from a set of assumptions underlying the motives of New Labour in
power.
In line with this argument, I now turn to the next chapter, which concerns itself with 
critically examining the globalisation literature. This will provide an important starting 
point for first critiquing the formal elements concerning globalisation in the New Labour 
discourse, something that is necessary if we are to then develop the critique at a more 
ideological level.
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Chapter 3
Understanding Globalisation
Introduction
As Holton comments, “globalization has, over the past decade, become a major 
feature of commentaries on contemporary social life”.1 These commentaries have 
resulted in a number of strong positions being posited concerning the nature of the 
contemporary world and how to succeed in it. According to Giddens, globalisation 
should now be given “[a] key place in the lexicon o f the social sciences".2 In this 
chapter I question how useful the concept of ‘globalisation’ is, suggesting that in its 
various forms it is a concept that tends to obscure rather than clarify. In  critically 
examining the literature, I concentrate on that understanding of globalisation 
generally found in the New Labour discourse, one that corresponds with initial views 
of globalisation.
I begin by examining the various approaches to globalisation. These are commonly 
divided up in to ‘two waves’ of thinking. The first wave refers to an initial ‘strong 
thesis’. This in  turn gives rise to  a ‘ second wave’ o f  thinking that encompasses a 
sceptical response and a set of more ‘complex’ theories of globalisation.
1 Robert J. Holton, Globalization and the Nation-State. (London: MacMillan Press 1998), p .l.
2 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences o f Modernity. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p.52.
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In critiquing the first wave, I focus on one exemplary writer most firmly associated 
with the strong thesis, Keneiche Ohmae.3 This understanding, I suggest, has until 
recently constituted a ‘hegemonic view’, in that it is this understanding that most 
people hold to when evoking the term.4 I will examine his approach and allude to a 
number of problems. This will involve a c onsideration of the c riticisms of certain 
‘sceptics’ like Hirst and Thompson, who in criticising Ohmae and others associated 
with the strong thesis, develop an ideal typology of what globalisation must be.
I then turn to an examination of more ‘complex’ theories of globalisation, and in 
particular the work of Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, Perraton.5 This work, it will be seen, 
marks a considerable evolution in thinking, offering a more sophisticated explanation 
of globalisation and its consequences. In articulating a more sophisticated account, 
they shed further light upon some of the major inadequacies contained in the strong 
globalisation thesis, as well as drawing attention to some limits to be found in the 
sceptical account. In addition I also refer to the work of Jan Aart Scholte, who 
usefully draws attention to the synonymous use of globalisation with other processes, 
such as globalisation as liberalisation, internationalisation, and westernisation.6 This 
will allow me to draw out some of the underlying presumptions and disciplinary 
consequences of adopting ‘globalisation’ as a means of analysis. Taken together, this 
‘second wave’ of thinking on globalisation constitutes a formidable challenge to the 
strong thesis, which I suggest closely parallels the New Labour understanding.
3 Keneiche Ohmae, The Borderless World : Power and Strategy In the Interlinked Economy. (London: 
Collins, 1990). Kenechie Ohmae, The End of the Nation-State: The Rise o f the Regional Economies. 
(New York: Free Press, 1996).
4 See Stephen Gill, ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism’, in 
Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, Vol 24, No.3, 1995, pp399-423.
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Finally, I w ill concentrate on the limitations of e ach approach by t aking a c ritical 
hermeneutic perspective. This latter perspective will stress the need for a non- 
positivistic dimension to be present in any examination of globalisation stressing the 
importance of ‘who holds to what interpretation’, and in ‘what circumstances’. This 
dimension, largely ignored, refers to the importance of the interpretation of 
globalisation. In arguing for the importance of the idea, I will draw upon the analysis 
contained in chapter two, and sketch out what a critical hermeneutical approach to 
understanding globalisation entails. On this latter view, additional questions arise, for 
example, which actors think it real, and what kind of understanding do they hold too? 
What power do they have in order to act upon their understanding and with what 
consequences?7 What this highlights, is the need for an alternative technique for 
assessing the significance of globalisation, one that is sensitive to the ways in which 
its meaning (judged for example in terms of its implications) serves to sustain 
‘relations of domination’.
In summary, in this chapter I question the explanatory utility of globalisation, 
particularly as it was initially understood. I draw attention to a number of serious 
limitations to this view. In  referring to a second wave of literature on the topic, I 
highlight how this hegemonic view is both untenable and undesirable: untenable, in 
that it is empirically unsustainable; undesirable, in that it obfuscates rather than 
clarifies, ‘disciplining’ how we understand the plural changes currently underway.
5 David Held, Andrew McGrew, David Goldblatt, & Jonathon Perraton, Global Transformation: 
Politics. Economics and Culture. (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1999).
6 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction. (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000).
7 For example, Gray argues that “a strong political culture (France, Japan) has asserted itself 
successfully against the supposedly irresistible forces o f globalisation”. John Gray, The Guardian, 4* 
January 1994, p. 18.
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Such a view ‘silences’ an alternative interpretation of the significance of 
globalisation that might instead stress its ideological uses.
Keneiche Ohmae and the Strong Globalisation Thesis.
As Hay and Watson observe, “ideas do not simply appear from thin air. At all times 
they are embedded within, and conditioned by, the wider social formation of which
o
they are themselves a part”. So it is with globalisation. Contrary to the view of 
Giddens, it is simply not correct to think that the “global spread of the term” could 
“come from nowhere to be almost everywhere”.9 Globalisation is first and foremost 
an idea, latterly a theory, one that has been loaded from the start; it is not possible 
that it can come from ‘nowhere’.
As a theory, globalisation gained currency most significantly in the economic realm. 
This continues to be the case. Refer to a newspaper, listen to a politician, and almost 
invariably globalisation will b e d  iscussed i n t erms o f  e conomics. T o m ost p eople, 
globalisation refers to a process of global integration, driven, in the main by 
economic forces.10 Thus reflecting the climate of opinion most dominant in economic 
and business circles (that of neo-liberalism), ‘globalisation’ generally understood, in 
many respects simply refers to ‘liberalisation’. All subsequent talk of ‘globalisation’ 
in the more academic literature has not to date significantly altered this general view.
8 Colin Hay & Mathew Watson, ‘Globalisation: ‘Sceptical’ notes on the 1999 Reith Lectures’, The 
Political Quarterly, Vol. 70, No.4, 1999, p.419.
9 Anthony Giddens, 1999 Reith Lectures: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/events/reith 99.htm. 
p .l, emphasis added.
0 For example see the Economist’s special report on globalisation, ‘Is it at Risk?’, February 2nd, 2002, 
pp. 61-63. The article states that, “[f]or the first time in the modem era o f global integration, the 
world’s biggest economies (and many emerging ones) have stalled at the same time. As a result, the 
principal measures o f economic integration, cross-border flows o f  goods and capital, showed no
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However, it is of course more than this. Though globalisation and liberalisation are 
often conflated, those that refer to globalisation often believe it to be something more 
profound and far reaching. While liberalisation connotes a more specific process, 
globalisation suggests something more significant, obscure, and yet irresistible. I 
now turn to what is often referred to as the ‘strong thesis’ of globalisation, a view 
that constitutes the ‘first wave’ of thinking about globalisation. It is this view that 
most people have in mind when referring to globalisation, and it is this view which 
most obviously displays many of the hallmarks of the times in which it rose to 
prominence.
The ‘strong’ globalisation thesis encompasses all social ‘realms’, the economic, 
political and cultural. Economically, the world increasingly approximates a single 
global economy, with a tendency towards price ‘equalisation’. Politically, the nation­
state is conceived of as less sovereign and increasingly anachronistic.11 Culturally, it
is posited that the world is becoming increasingly homogenous, as more and more
1 0people draw upon the same set of symbolic references to derive meaning. Each of 
these developments, it is assumed, is in large part explained as the outcome of the 
process of globalisation. According to Dicken, in essence the strong view asserts 
that:
[w]e live... in a globalized world in which nation-states are no longer 
significant actors or meaningful economic units; in which consumer tastes 
and cultures are homogenized and satisfied through the provision of 
standardized global products created by global corporations with no 
allegiance to place or community.13
advance last year”. The article asks the question, “[d]oes all this, as some argue, pose a threat to the 
liberal international order- that is, to globalisation?”.
11 Richard O’Brien, Global Financial Integration: The End o f Geography. (London: Royal Institute of  
International Affairs, 1992), p .l.
12 B. Barber, ‘Jihad Vs. McWorld’, The Atlantic Monthly, March 1992, pp.53-65.
13 Peter Dicken, Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy. 3rd addition). (London: Paul 
Chapman Press, 1998), p.3.
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This understanding is echoed by Held, Goldblatt, Perraton and McGrew, who 
associate the strong globalisation thesis as being “primarily an economic 
phenomenon”, that assumes an increasingly integrated global economy”, in  which 
“global capital impose[s] a neoliberal economic discipline on all governments such 
that politics is no longer the ‘art of the possible’ but rather the practice of ‘sound 
economic management.’”14 Perhaps the most influential of writers associated with 
the strong account, certainly the most oft quoted, is Keneiche Ohmae.15 Ohmae’s 
view has come to signify the classic statement on the significance of globalisation as 
understood in its strong version.
Ohmae starts from the premise that we now live in a “genuinely global economy”.16 
This is not something in the process of being formed but rather is something that 
already exists.17 Examining the relatively unimpeded flows of what he refers to as 
the four ‘I’s’; industry, investment, individual consumers and information, can 
evidence its existence. From this premise Ohmae derives a number of conclusions 
about the cultural and political realm, which unfold according to a kind of “global 
logic”.18 In the political realm, Ohmae argues that traditional nation states, as a result 
of the development of a global economy “have become unnatural, even impossible
14 Held et. al., Global Transformations, op.cit., p.4.
15 Other prominent writers associated with this approach include Robert Reich, The Work o f Nations. 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1992); Richard Bamet & John Cavanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial 
Corporations and the New World Order. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995); T. Levitt, ‘The 
Globalisation o f Markets’, Harvard Business Review, May-June, 101; Jeffrey D. Sachs, & Andrew 
Warner, ‘Economic Reform and the Process o f Global Intergration’, Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 1995, V ol.l., p p l-118.
16 Ohmae, The End o f  the Nation State, op.cit., p l6.
17 This contention is certainly not unique to Ohmae, nor was he the first to make it. See Peter Drucker, 
‘The Changed World Economy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.64, No.4, 1986, p.768.
18 Ohmae, The End o f  the Nation State, op.cit., p.81.
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business units”.19 As a result, according to  Ohmae, ‘political borders’ have turned 
into “largely meaningless lines on economic maps”.20
As this global logic unfolds, the state is confronted by an increasingly limited array
of options in order to ‘succeed’. Ohmae presents the case as if the logic of the ‘new
global economy’ necessarily dissolves the nation state, with change being presented
as inevitable. Little else can be done short of remaining entirely isolated:
[b]eing able to take advantage of the global system means making internal 
changes to harness its resources and expertise, and these changes, in turn,
require a degree of local freedom of action that inevitably collides with a01determination to retain firm political control at the centre.
[a]s the creation of a much earlier stage of industrial history, it [the nation 
state] has neither the will nor the incentive nor the credibility nor the tools 
nor the political base to play an effective role in a genuinely borderless 
economy.22
Thus, a set of imperatives are writ into Ohmae’s account. The new global economy 
determines these imperatives, which are presented as existing ‘out there’, 
independently of any single state or agent. To not act according to this ‘global logic’ 
will “scare away” the global economy, though presumably only temporarily, as such 
a position cannot be sustained. This is particularly the case for democracies, as the 
‘political base’ (individual consumers), will not tolerate anything else; their interests 
lie elsewhere.
A few words should be said about this ‘global logic’. What Ohmae has in mind is 
something in line with Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ metaphor. It is the logic of the 
market as interpreted by classical and neo-classical economics, working within the
19 Ibid., p.95.
20 Ibid., p.29.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p.42.
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Anglo-Saxon liberal economic tradition, and shorn of its domestic confines. In the 
competitive s etting o f  a ‘ market’, certain o utcomes are p resented as d esirable and 
inevitable (and therefore predictable) as the result of the interplay of utility 
maximising individuals and profit maximising firms. A tendency to certain 
equilibrium outcomes prevails thanks to the operation of the price mechanism. These 
outcomes are efficient, provided that the state keeps it’s interventions to a 
minimum.24
Ohmae’s work represents a classical statement on the nature of a ‘global logic’ 
understood in neo-liberal economic terms. Moreover, in as much as this is how 
globalisation is understood, it also represents a classical statement on the significance 
of globalisation. According to Ohmae, the nation state can no longer productively 
intervene due to the spatial limitations that it implies. This is not surprising, as for 
Ohmae, it has only been a transitional feature of the global system. Ricardo Petrella 
builds upon this orientation and global logic, spelling it out in a somewhat more 
cynical manner:
“Thou shalt globalise. Thou shalt incessantly strive for technological 
innovation. Thou shalt drive thy competitors out of business, since otherwise 
they’ll do it to you. Thou shalt not countenance state intervention in 
economic life. Thou shalt privatise.”25
This captures the essence of what is understood to be the necessary response to the 
consequences of globalisation. It takes the form of a rational blueprint of logical
23 Ibid., p. 107.
24 O f course, differences prevail between advocates o f neo-liberalism, not least concerning the ability 
o f the market to provide ‘public’ and ‘merit’ goods. Even so, a neo-liberal view holds that any 
inability on the part o f the market to provide such goods, does not qualify as a fundamental challenge 
to the core position.
25 Ricardo Petrella, ‘Les Nouvelles Tables de la loi’, Le Monde Diplomatique, October 1995. Quoted 
in Robert Went, Globalization: Neo-Liberal Challenge. Radical Responses. (London: Pluto Press,
2000), p.2.
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9 f \responsive measures that exclude any alternative. It is contained in a whole host of 
writings on globalisation, such as Thomas Friedman’s best selling account of
97globalisation, The Lexus and the Olive Tree. For Friedman, this global logic is 
dubbed the ‘golden straightjacket’.
Hence the ‘ strong thesis’ b egins o n the b asis o f  arguing that a global e conomy i s 
already in existence. Accordingly, a new constellation of imperatives and 
opportunities arise that are derived from an economic focus. In this new ‘borderless 
world’, states become ‘dysfunctional’. Consequently, they should devolve power; 
should they not, then short of remaining entirely isolated, they will be compelled to 
do so by an inexorable ‘global logic’. As a unit that hinders the attainment of the 
good life, the nation state is viewed with a mixture of scepticism and disapproval. As 
an agent of change in the new global system, it is no longer relevant, and its options 
are increasingly circumscribed. According to this view of globalisation, the issues are 
black and white, open up and benefit, or remain wedded to a dated ‘national interest’ 
and suffer the consequences.
The strong thesis is not just concerned with the economic and political realm, but 
also the cultural realm. Essentially, the view is that globalisation is giving rise to an 
increasingly homogenous global culture. For Friedman, “because this phenomenon 
we call ‘globalization’ - the integration of markets, trade, finance, information and 
corporate ownership around the globe - is actually a very American phenomenon: it
26 On this global logic see also Paul Hirst, From Statism to Pluralism: Democracy. Civil Society and 
Global Politics. (London: University College London Press, 1997), pp207-208; Ramesh Mishra, 
Globalization and the Welfare State. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999), p. 15.
27 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalisation. (London: 
Harper Collins, 2000).
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98wears Mickey Mouse ears, eats Big Macs, drinks Coke”. Ohmae himself, refers to
this as a process of ‘Califomia-ization’:
Consumers around the world are beginning to develop similar cultural 
expectations about what they ought to be able to buy as well as about what it 
is they want to buy... this process of convergence, which I have described 
elsewhere as the ‘califomia-ization’ of taste and preference, is making 
today’s ‘global’ consumers more like each other in many respects than they 
are like either their non globally oriented neighbours or their parents or 
grandparents.29
However, Ohmae is to an extent ambivalent about the nature of this convergence. 
Recognising that consumer tastes and preferences are not the sum of what goes up to 
make culture Ohmae suggests that they in fact tend to “overlay new tastes on an 
established, but largely unaffected, base of social norms and values. It adds new 
elements to the local mix of goods and services, but leaves the worldview of the 
people who purchase them unchanged”.30 Nonetheless, he concludes that, that said, 
“even social borders are starting to give way”. For Ohmae, “multi-media 
experiences... have consequences that go far beyond surface issues of taste... to 
fundamental issues of thought process and mind set”. Those places that are exposed 
to media influences are therefore the very places in which cultural convergence, 
more profoundly understood, is underway. Ohmae, by way of an example, examines 
the cleavages that have developed between the generations in Japanese society, 
culminating in the most recent ‘nintendo’ generation, who more closely resemble 
their Western peers than their elders.
28 Thomas Friedman, ‘Big Macs II’, New York Times, 11* December 1996, A27. Quoted in John. D. 
Kelly, ‘Time and the Global: Against the Homogenous, Empty Communities in Contemporary Social 
Theory’, in Brigit Meyer & Peter Geschiere, (eds.), Globalization and Identity: Dialectics o f Flow and 
Closure. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), p.239.
29 Ohmae, The End o f  the Nation State, op.cit., p.28.
30 Ibid., p.29-30.
31 Ibid., p.30.
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Challenging the Strong Thesis: The Sceptics
The account above, in many ways expresses the understanding of globalisation that 
most people adhere to, or at least have in mind when others refer to it. It is moreover, 
an account that shares in common many features to be found in the New Labour 
version. Therefore, in this next section I turn to the subsequent globalisation 
literature that questions this view. I begin by examining the ‘sceptical’ position.
There are a number of writers classified as ‘sceptics’, though they are by no means 
all sceptical about the same thing. However, as with the strong thesis, the sceptical 
accounts generally focus on the economic dimension of globalisation. They are thus 
sceptical about the idea of a globalised world economy, and the view of globalisation 
that rests upon this premise. The most celebrated account associated with the 
sceptical approach is that of Hirst and Thompson.
For Hirst and Thompson, globalisation is in fact largely a myth. It is a myth
nonetheless, that is widespread, providing justification for a raft of highly significant
policy measures. As such it is a myth that needs to be challenged. Their
understanding of this view, is as follows:
A truly global economy has emerged or is emerging in which distinct 
‘national’ economies and, therefore, domestic strategies of national economic 
management are increasingly irrelevant. The world economy has 
internationalized in its basic dynamics, is dominated by uncontrollable global 
market forces, and has as its principal actors and major agents of change truly 
transnational corporations (TNCs), which owe a llegiance to no nation state 
and locate wherever in the globe market advantage dictates.33
32 See Hay & Watson, Globalisation: ‘Sceptical’Notes, op.cit.
33 Paul Hirst & Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the 
Possibilities o f Governance. First Edition. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p.195.
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In offering an alternative understanding of globalisation, they begin by questioning 
whether in fact “we are either firmly within a globalizing economy, or that the 
present era is one in which there are strong globalizing tendencies”.34 In order to 
show that this might not be the case they first take issue with the idea that the degree 
of integration of the international economy is without precedent.
According to Hirst and Thompson, in certain respects, “the current international
economy is less open and integrated than the regime that prevailed from 1870 to
1914”. By comparing the ratio of merchandise trade to Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) at current prices, Hirst and Thompson find that in fact:
Trade to GDP ratios were consistently higher in 1913 than they were in 1977 
(with the slight exception of Germany where they were near enough equal). 
Even in 1995, Japan, the Netherlands and the UK were still less open. The US 
was the only country that was considerably more open than it was in 1913.36
Additionally, Hirst and Thompson examine the ratio of current account balance to 
Gross National Product (GNP), as a gauge of financial openness. Citing the research 
of Lewis, and Turner and Howell, they found that international capital flows were at 
their highest in 1913 (5.9%) falling to around 1.6% in 1970, and by 1992 rising to 
around 3%.37
34 Paul Hirst & Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the 
Possibilities o f Governance. Second Edition, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 13. See also Paul 
Hirst and Grahame Thompson, ‘The Problem of ‘Globalization’: International Economic Relations, 
National Economic Management and the Formation o f Trading Blocs’, Economy and Society, Vol.24, 
1995, p.394.
35 Hirst and Thompson, Globalization in Question 2nd ed., op.cit., p.2. Emphasis added.
36 Ibid., p.27. See also their appendix to this chapter. This deals with some o f the economistic 
problems involved in comparing trade to GDP in terms o f constant prices. Though recognising the 
difficulties they nonetheless still conclude that their methodology is preferable as it “has the advantage 
o f continuity, and it expresses the way the total economy is or is not being integrated into the 
international system.” P.65.
37 Ibid., p.28. See also Arthur Lewis, ‘The Rate of Growth of World Trade’, in Sven Grassman & Erik 
Lundberg (eds.), The World Economic Order: Past and Prospects. (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1981), 
ppl 1-74; Philip Turner, ‘Capital Flows in the 1980s: A Survey o f Major Trends’, BIS Economic 
Papers, No.30, Bank for International Settlements, Geneva, 1991; M. Howel, ‘Asia’s Victorian
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Finally, in examining the flow of labour, that is ‘international migration’, Hirst and 
Thompson found that at the current historical juncture this was limited, and far less 
than in previous periods, particularly when compared to the end of the nineteenth 
century, with only a few opportunities for movement remaining for the relatively 
skilled; “[djuring the nineteenth century the mass movement of workers to the 
sources of capital was accepted and encouraged; now it is rejected except as a 
temporary expedient”.38
Additionally, Hirst and Thompson turn their attention to two other widely held views 
associated with globalisation, concerning Foreign Direct Investment flows, and the 
impact of the relatively footloose modem transnational corporation. Contrary to 
popular belief, Hirst and Thompson argue that genuinely transnational companies are 
in fact quite rare. What is more, most companies remain nationally based, with little 
evidence of any trend towards the development of more transnationals. Examining 
the p attems o f  production, they found “that between 6 5 and 70 p er cent o f  MNC
-JQ
value-added continues to be produced on home territory”. More, citing evidence 
produced by Thompson, they conclude that to date “MNCs still rely on their ‘home 
base’ as the centre for their economic activities...we should be reasonably confident 
that, in the aggregate, international companies are still predominantly MNCs (with a 
clear home base to their operations) and not TNCs”.40 Such a position is also backed
Financial Crisis’, paper presented at the Conference on the East Asian Economic Crisis, Institute for 
Development Studies, University o f Sussex, 13-14* July 1998.
38 Hirst and Thompson, Globalization in Question 2nd ed., op.cit., p.29.
39 Ibid., p.95.
40 Ibid., p.84
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by Dicken41. It is also confirmed by the research findings of Ruigrok and Van
Tulder, who conclude that:
of the largest one hundred core firms in the world, not one is firmly ‘global’, 
‘footloose’ or ‘borderless’. There is however a hierarchy in the 
internationalisation of functional areas of management; around forty firms 
generate at least half of their sales abroad; with few exceptions, executive 
boards and management styles remain solidly national in their outlook; with 
even fewer exceptions, R&D remains firmly under domestic control; and 
most companies appear to think of a globalisation of corporate finances as too 
uncertain.42
As Hirst and Thompson point out “it is multinational companies (MNCs) that are the 
agents responsible for FDI [foreign direct investment]”.43 Again, in  examining the 
pattern and impact of these flows a number of counter claims vis-a-vis the strong 
globalisation thesis are m ade. Though rates of foreign direct investment (FDI) are 
high, these flows are largely concentrated within the ‘triad’ of the European Union, 
Japan and the United States, where “ [s]ixty per cent of the flows of FDI over the 
period 1991-6 were between just the members of the Triad bloc, which also 
accounted for 75 per cent of the total accumulated stock of FDI in 1995”.44 What is 
more, in that FDI figures still count for on average only ten per cent of GDP, it is 
suggested that the profundity of these flows is overly exaggerated.
A scepticism about the historically unprecedented nature of the so-called global 
economy is a view not only held by Hirst and Thompson. For example, Gordon
41 See Dicken, Global Shift, op.cit., p i93. See also John M. Stopford & Susan Strange, Rival Sates. 
Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares. (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1991), 
p. 121. Y-S Hu, ‘Global Firms are National firms with International Operations’, California 
Management Review, Vol.34, pp. 107-126. Both quoted in Dicken, The Global Shift, op.cit., p. 193.
42 Winfried Ruigrok & Rob Van Tulder, The Logic o f International Restructuring. (London: 
Routledge, 1995), p.159.
43 Hirst and Thompson, Globalization in Question 2nd ed., op.cit., p.66.
44 Ibid., pp70-71. It should be noted, as Hirst and Thompson point out, this is a highly difficult area to 
measure, with differing ways o f calculating FDI figures. They conclude that on the whole, and given 
certain problems, “the FDI measure is likely to overestimate ‘activity conducted abroad’”. See pp76- 
84.
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argues that “we have not witnessed movement toward an increasingly ‘open’ 
international economy.” 45 Distinguishing between short-term and long-term 
(productive) capital flows, he argues that we have “witnessed declining rather than 
increasing mobility of productive capital”.46 Such a view is backed by Glyn and 
Sutcliffe, who argue that the current phase of integration “is still very far from a 
globally integrated economy...In many ways it is less globalized than 100 years 
ago” 47
The above c onclusions, allow Hirst and Thompson to develop their argument at a 
more theoretical level. In challenging both the novelty of contemporary integration, 
as well as the degree and direction of integration, (in other words, based on the 
assumption shared by the strong thesis that first and foremost globalisation denotes 
the process that leads to a truly ‘globalised economy’) Hirst and Thompson believe 
that it is possible to dismiss many claims about the significance of globalisation. On 
this basis, a number of subsequent claims then follow.
Firstly, Hirst and Thompson dismiss the idea that the nation-state is increasingly 
powerless and dysfunctional in light of the so called changes associated with 
globalisation. They argue that the G3 retain the capacity to regulate and control 
global markets. This suggests that certain countries can exert “powerful governance
Aftpressures” for the good should they so choose. Additionally, in emphasising the 
continued central import of governance measures, Hirst and Thompson challenge the
45 David Gordon, ‘The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations?’, New Left Review, 
March-April 1998, V o l.68, p.63.
46 Ibid.
47 Andrew Glyn & Bob Sutcliffe, ‘Global but Leaderless? The New Capitalist Order’, in Ralph 
Miliband & Leo Panitch, (eds.), New World Order: The Socialist Register. (Merlin Press: London,
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view that agency is precluded as the result of any ineluctable ‘global logic’. Should 
they wish too, governments (not just of the G3) can set in motion an agenda that 
strengthens its position by controlling the shape that the future takes.
Taken together, the arguments of Hirst and Thompson and other sceptics form a 
convincing alternative to the view associated with the likes of Ohmae. Principal 
amongst their contributions to the debate is the compelling evidence they evoke 
which dismisses the presumption that there exists a ‘global economy’ of the nature 
articulated by Ohmae. Additionally, they also refute the claim of their being a certain 
‘global logic’, with all that that entails. Influential from its publication, the work of 
Hirst and Thompson effectively shifts the terms of the debate and in doing so 
reintroduces an important role for the state. It also renders unsatisfactory any talk of 
inevitability or impotency on the part of ‘G3’ and other governments, re-introducing 
the importance of governance measures and state sovereignty in affecting and 
determining outcomes. As a result, it constitutes an important rearguard argument for 
those on the left, suspicious of the consequences of globalisation.
Given that there i s no borderless economy, the sceptical approach also effectively 
questions the idea that the state is ‘dysfunctional’. The metaphor of dysfunctionality 
is given meaning because Ohmae refers to the state as an economic agent. However, 
even if this is accepted, Rodrik and Evans have in fact demonstrated a positive 
correlation between social expenditure, a gauge of state intervention, and openness
1992), p.91. See also Robert Gilpin, The Challenge o f Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 
Twentv-first Century. (Princeton University Press: Chichester, 2000), p.323.
48 Hirst and Thompson, Globalization in Question 2nd ed., op.cit., p.2.
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and competitive advantage, citing the example of Sweden.49 This suggests a positive 
role for the state in the context of a global economy, provided that the nature of the 
intervention is geared towards competitivity.
The postulate that the new global economy impresses upon the state an increasingly 
circumscribed menu of options has been contested by a number of authors in addition 
to Hirst and Thompson. As a result, the simplistic view associated with the strong 
thesis - that stressed that one either pursue a policy of openness and deregulation, 
(which in turn leads to convergence of policy), or pursue a policy that posits closure - 
can been dismissed. The counter argument stresses that this binary division in fact 
masks an array of options, which is augmented in complexity once it is recognised 
that different state capacities and different types of capitalism coexist 
simultaneously.50
For example, Berger, Dore, and Weiss all stress the variation in policy responses and 
options.51 For Weiss this is unsurprising considering the variety in ‘state capacity’.52 
Weiss argues that ‘domestic institutional capacity’ is highly significant, and varies 
from state to state. In stressing the non-similar features of the ‘nation state’, Weiss 
takes issue with the idea that globalisation confronts the state with a set of “ stark
49 Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone to Far? (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 
1997), p.6. See also Peter Evans, ‘The Eclipse o f the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era o f  
Globalization’, World Politics, 50 (1), Oct 1997, pp62-87.
50 See Stephen Driver & Luke Martell, New Labour: Politics After Thatcherism. (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1998), pp49-51.
51 Linda Weiss, ‘Managed Openness: Beyond Neoliberal Globalism’, New Left Review, Number 239, 
November/December 1999, ppl26-140. Linda Weiss, ‘Globalization and National Governance: 
Antinomy or Interdependence?’, Review o f  International Studies, Vol.25, No.5, December, 1999, pp. 
1-30. See also David Baker, Gerald Epstein & Robert Pollin, (eds.), Globalization and Progressive 
Economic Policy. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge); Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore, (eds.), 
National Diversity and Global Capitalism. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
52 Weiss, L. Managed Openness, op.cit.
53 Ibid., p.128.
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options”.54 She argues that, “between the extremes of passivity and closure that have 
attracted most attention lies a substantial area for analysis, institutional reform, and 
policy action”.55 Weiss posits that “globalisation as a relentless force ‘out there’ 
pushing one-directional change ‘in here’ is therefore misconstrued, if  not utopian”.56 
This is in stark contrast to Ohmae, who discusses a set of imperatives that exist as a 
result of the new global economy (conceived of as something that exists ‘out there’).
Hence, in addition to the scepticism about the existence of a g lobal economy, the 
second wave of sceptical literature also takes issue with the simplistic status and role 
accorded to the state. Taken together, this set of arguments provides a robust counter 
to some of the assertions to be found in the work of Ohmae and others associated 
with the strong thesis.
Nonetheless, and for a number of reasons, the sceptical literature does not succeed in 
dealing a deathblow to ‘globalisation’. To begin with, the strong thesis embodied in 
the work of Ohmae counts only for the ‘first wave’ of globalisation thinking. The 
sceptical critique offered by the likes of Hirst and Thompson challenges this first 
wave, but by and large, it does not deal with the alternative strand of ‘second wave’ 
thinking.57 Secondly, the first wave was less concerned about articulating a theory of 
globalisation than describing a state of affairs that came to be associated with a 
phenomenon labelled globalisation. On this view, the label is in a sense inadvertent. 
For example the term globalisation does not in fact figure largely in the work of 
Ohmae. Where it is evoked the term is g enerally u sed as a synonym denoting the
54 Ibid., p. 127.
55 Ibid, p. 127.
56 Ibid, p. 129.
57 In fact, this is explicitly recognised by Hirst and Thompson in their second edition.
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spread of something; generally the globalisation of markets, but it does not in itself 
explain anything.
However, this does not diminish the significance of the sceptical critique. This is 
because the sceptical critique challenges a pervasive and widely held common 
sensical view o f  globalisation. This common sense understanding, as embodied in  
Ohmae’s work, has a number of features. One feature that defines this ‘common 
sense’ approach to globalisation is that it refers to the global spread o f something. 
Thus when Ohmae does refer to globalisation, he usually means the spread of the 
market. Additionally, it could mean the spread of a product, an idea and so on. A 
second f  eature o f  t his c ommon s ense u nderstanding p osits a global 1 ogic a t w ork. 
This global logic is understood in neo-liberal terms. This forms the disciplinary 
backdrop to the way the topic is then approached. Hence economics and politics are 
separated in such a way that the economic is considered fundamental, and the 
political relegated to a managerial role, one that limits itself to a concern with 
providing certain ‘public’ and ‘merit’ goods.
The consequences of thinking in these terms points to a third key feature of the 
common sense understanding of globalisation. This refers to the assumption that it 
already exists ‘out there \  so to speak, as a ‘thing in itself.58 This in turn generates a 
discourse that leads to a particular programme concerning how one should respond 
to ‘it’. This gives rise to assumptions about globalisation as being natural and 
ineluctable. It also allows for a clear distinction to be made between the state and 
globalisation, as if the former did not in part constitute and reproduce aspects of what
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are then perceived to be understood as evidence of the existence of the latter 
(understood in abstracto).59
That Hirst and Thompson are critical of the understanding of globalisation as 
associated with the ‘strong version’ of the thesis of economic globalisation should 
then, not be taken to mean that they are critical of ‘globalisation theory’ tout court. 
This label is unsatisfactory. The former approach is generally concerned with 
describing a particular state of affairs, and not so concerned with arriving at a robust 
and parsimonious theory of globalisation. In the work of Ohmae it is the operation 
and logic of the market that explains the contemporary situation, not something 
called globalisation.
Given this, is it valid to even talk of a strong thesis of globalisation? The answer is 
probably a qualified yes. The classification schema in part derives from the second 
wave, which cobbles together a mixture of approaches, developments and processes 
which are subsequently labelled as a strong thesis. Those initial writers subsequently 
classified in this category probably did not see themselves in this light when writing. 
As I have argued, for Ohmae ‘globalisation’ was not attempting to explain anything 
in this phase, rather i t  was b eing explained. Hence in  the first wave globalisation 
operated more as explanandum and not as explanans. I t was used more as a label 
associated with a period of change that derived from the business and economic 
literature. It is the second wave that posits an explanatory role in the globalisation 
discourse. Unfortunately the so-called ‘strong thesis’ is what is then concentrated on
58 See John Maclean, ‘Philosophical Roots of Globalization and Philosophical Routes to 
Globalization’, in Randall Germain, (ed.), Globalisation and its Critics. (London: MacMillan Press 
Ltd, 2000), p. 10.
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by the second wave, at the price of ignoring any particular author who is associated 
with the approach. Thus Ohmae or Reich are rarely tackled head on, but rather 
dismissively subsumed within this caricatured category and questioned in terms of 
their so called shared features; cultural homogenisation, death of the state, rise of the 
trans-national corporation.
In as much as this is done, the position is reified, and its complexity and variety is 
overlooked. For example there is no reason to assume that the various authors 
writing about the ‘homogenisation of cultures’ see themselves as connected to those 
who discuss the demise of the nation-state, or necessarily would be lead to conclude 
such a position as a logical necessity flowing from their argument. When Ohmae 
examines the ‘cultural realm’, he considers consumers, tastes etc., in an increasingly 
open global market. As such, he conducts his discussion according to the 
assumptions and ontology of a neo-classical liberal economist. Ohmae makes a 
judgment on the degree of cultural convergence based on an ontological assumption 
that the world consists of rationally self-interested individuals who attempt to 
maximise their utility; in other words keen to enjoy the fruits of a market offering 
relatively similar consumer goods. Though he is led to make a strong subsequent 
claim about cultural convergence, this again is explained, in Ohmae’s case, in terms 
of changing technology and increased access to information, mediated through the 
mass media. Therefore, the process is attributed not to globalisation, but an explicit 
number o f  a ltemative factors. T herefore, any 1 ack o f  r igor o r n aivete follows, n ot 
from sloppy thought, but rather because little weight is given to the concept 
globalisation.
59 See Ian Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), Chapters 1-3.
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That said though, one can still argue for a ‘qualified yes’ as to whether a strong thesis 
of globalisation is a valid category. This is because it does have a widespread 
currency in the minds of people as well as the media. Such a view holds a strong 
sway on the imagination of the public. It therefore shouldn’t be inferred that the work 
of H irst a nd T hompson i s i nvalid. T heir w ork s hould b e s een a s n ot a critique o f  
globalisation theory proper, but rather a critique of some of the common sense 
assertions often associated with what is understood as globalisation. In that sense it is 
probably more valuable than if it was a critique of globalisation theory.
The distinction between globalisation theory and the strong thesis is therefore 
important. What Hirst and Thompson and other sceptics achieve is a degree of clarity 
in presenting their argument. This follows from their ability to analytically delineate 
what ‘globalisation’ must be, and then examine whether it is in fact occurring. They 
postulate that globalisation must refer to the process by which there emerges a “truly 
global economy”.60 This obviously stands in contrast to Ohmae, who argues that this 
is already an accomplished fact.
In making this point, I draw attention to a key problem pervasive in the globalisation 
literature, one that is perpetuated in the writings of Held and others. This refers to the 
plural ways in which the term globalisation is in fact understood. This raises 
problems, as I will show, that reverberates throughout the whole globalisation 
literature and discourse. The so called ‘globalisation debate’, is not so much a debate 
but rather a set of incommensurable discussions about different things. What Hirst
60 Hirst and Thompson, Globalisation in Question 2nd ed., op.cit., p .l.
93
and Thomson are critical of are a number of descriptive postulates about the current 
state of affairs. The problem is that this is then portrayed as a critique of 
globalisation. It is not. Rather it is better understood as a challenge to the strong 
thesis. T his i s u seful b ecause t he s trong t hesis holds a p articularly p owerful s way 
over the imaginations of the public, business and politicians alike. Hirst and 
Thompson “see these extreme views [the strong thesis] as... relatively coherent and 
capable of being developed into a clear ideal-typical conception of a globalized 
economic system”.61 What they are taking issue with is the popular portrayal of 
globalisation, and its empirical limitations, as well as its ideological disciplinary 
consequences.
However, it is unsatisfactory in that they do not adequately engage with more 
complex accounts of globalisation. Effectively then, they are not in a position to 
claim that they have demonstrated the myth of globalisation.
‘Complex' Globalisation Theory
In addition to the strong globalisation thesis, an increasingly sophisticated corpus of 
work has developed that I classify as complex globalisation theory. In this section I 
will summarise some of the essential features of this category, and how it articulates 
its position vis-a-vis the previous account. This will allow a further assessment to be 
made concerning the deficiencies of the strong thesis, as well as allow for a more 
critical evaluation to be made of the sceptical approach.
61 Ibid., p.3.
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Complex globalisation theory constitutes another strand of the secondary literature 
on globalisation.62 However, unlike the sceptical writings, here the term globalisation 
is maintained, though in a reworked fashion, because it is seen to function to explain 
current processes. This category encompasses a large number of writings of various 
hues and aspirations. I therefore confine myself to an examination of two of the more 
influential accounts, those of David Held, Anthony McGrew, Jonathon Perraton, 
David Goldblatt on the one hand, and of Jan Art Scholte on the other. In addition, I 
will draw upon a number of secondary sources that also fall within this category and 
generally agree with the core position of the above writers.
By ‘complex globalisation theory’ I mean that corpus of thought, distinct from the 
strong thesis, that explains certain trends or developments in the social realm by 
means of the term globalisation. Thus complex globalisation theory is concerned 
with the contemporary relevance of globalisation as explanans. Contrary to sceptical 
thinking, for complex globalisation theorists globalisation is underway. It is thought 
of as significant as it helps explain much that is novel about the contemporary 
condition; “globalization is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political
c *i •
and economic changes that are reshaping modem societies and world order”. This 
constitutes a core assertion that orients their work and leads them to retain the term.
Yet contrary to the assertions synonymous with the first wave of thinking on 
globalisation, the process here is conceived not in economic terms, nor as an
62 In addition to the authors examined here, key contributors to this literature include Roland 
Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. (London: Sage Publications, 1992); 
Anthony Giddens, Consequences o f Modernity. (Cambridge: Polity/ Blackwell Publishers, 1992); 
Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences. (Columbia: New York Press, 1998). For 
a more comprehensive survey see Anthony McGrew & David Held, (eds.), The Global
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accomplished fact but rather in terms of interconnectedness. The choice of words is 
important as interconnectedness is contrasted to interdependence, integration and 
convergence. This in effect enables a more ‘neutral’ connotation to be implied to the 
process because it does not rule out certain ‘imperial’ or hierarchical connotations. 
According to Held et.al., “globalization refers to the widening, deepening and 
speeding up of global interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, 
from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual”.64 It can be thought of 
as “a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial 
organization of social relations and transactions”.65
What g ives t he i nterconnectedness i ts global d imension i s t he s patial r each o f  t he 
phenomena.66 This concern to focus upon the novel features relating to the spatial 
organisation of aspects of contemporary life draws attention to the fact that 
globalisation transcends any parochial concern with economics, or any synonymous 
use of the term with the idea of ‘spreading’ or ‘diffusing’. In eschewing such 
metaphors as ‘spreading’, Held et.al., draw attention to the limitations that 
‘Euclidean’ conceptions of time and space, arguing that these conceptions have to 
date erroneously underwritten both the strong thesis and sceptical accounts of 
globalisation.67
Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate. (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 
2000).
63 Held et.al., Global Transformations, op.cit., p.7.
64 Ibid., p.2.
65 Ibid., p. 16.
66 See David Held, ‘Democracy and Globalisation’, in Daniele Archibugi, David Held. & Martin 
Kohler, (eds.), Re-Imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy. (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1998), p.13.
67 Anthony MacGrew, ‘Conceptualizing Global Politics’, in Anthony G. McGrew & Paul Lewis, 
(eds.), Global Politics. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). See also James Anderson, ‘The Exaggerated
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It is this problematising of time and space, that constitutes perhaps the most original
contribution to contemporary thinking, and is something that is at the heart of
complex globalisation theory. As Rosenberg, in his critique of the follies of
globalisation recognises, in adopting globalisation as explanans, this second wave of
thinking has necessitated a wholesale ‘spatialization of social theory’.69 Bauman,
according to Rosenberg, is typical in this regard:
It suddenly seems clear that the divisions of the continents and of the globe as 
a whole were the function of distances made once imposingly real thanks to 
the primitiveness of transport and the hardships of travel... ‘distance’ is a 
social product; its length varies depending on the speed with which it may be 
overcome.. .70
With their focus placed on the significance of the constraints of time and space now 
being overcome, Held et.al., reconceptualise globalisation as being contingent, non­
linear and driven by a plurality of causes prefiguring no particular end state.71 As a 
result, the process does not imply homogeneity or convergence. This contradicts the 
original strong thesis. The authors argue that the set of processes that make up 
globalisation can be witnessed as occurring in a dialectical manner, at once 
producing convergence and fragmentation, uniting and dividing.72 Such a view is 
reflected in the work of Sorenson and Holm, who see “uneven globalization [as] best 
conceived as a dialectical process, stimulating integration as well as fragmentation,
Death o f the Nation-State’, in James Anderson, Chris Brook & Alan Cochrane, A Global World?. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
68 Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences, op.cit., p. 15. Mike Featherstone & Scott Lash, 
‘Globalization, Modernity and the Spatialization of Social Theory: An Introduction’, in Mike 
Featherstone, Scott Lash & Roland Robertson (eds.), Global Modernities. (London: Sage 
Publications, 1995), p. 1
69 Justin Rosenberg, The Follies of Globalisation Theory: Polemical Essays. (London: Verso, 2000), 
p.l.
0 Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences, op.cit., p. 12. Quoted in Rosenberg, The Follies, 
op.cit., p.2.
7 Held et.al., Global Transformations, op.cit.
72 See Ian Clark, Globalisation and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Richard Falk, Predatory Globalization: A Critique. (Malden 
MA.: Polity Press, 1999).
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universalism as well as particularism, and cultural differentiation as well as 
homogenization.”73
Thus the more complex account, distinguishes itself from the sceptics on the one 
hand, and the strong thesis on the other, not by positing itself as a sort of via media, 
but rather as something quite distinct. It does not accept the terms of the debate as 
laid out either in the strong thesis or the subsequent sceptical ideal, instead offering a 
differing take in terms of causality (multi-causal), trajectory (non-teleological), 
conceptualisation (contingent, non-economistic) and periodisation.
In so doing, the theory of Held et.al., attempts to move beyond certain limitations 
which it identifies as being shared by both the sceptical and original strong thesis. To 
begin with, the sceptics means of testing the extent of globalisation is problematised 
by Held et.al. They deny the ‘ideal’ end point that is posited by the likes of Hirst and 
Thompson. For Held et.al., the process is non-linear as well as multi-causal. It is not 
to be judged in terms of an approximation to an ideal global economy. They take 
issue with the sceptical account of Hirst and Thompson in this respect, because they 
argue that it is overly empirical and teleological in its orientation. For Held et.al., 
“[tjhere is no a priori reason to assume that globalization must simply evolve in a 
single direction or that it can be understood in relation to a single ideal c ondition 
(perfect markets)”.74
This assertion constitutes a key challenge. Held et.al. are able to argue for the 
validity of the term globalisation, distancing it from its original associations with
73 Georg Sorenson & Hans-Henrik Holm, (eds.), Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the 
End o f  the Cold War. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p.6.
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writers like Ohmae, yet retrieving it from the critique of the sceptics. Nonetheless, in 
doing so, their reconceptualisation results in an account that is problematic in that it 
becomes difficult to identify what is and is not explainable in terms of globalisation. 
Without any i deal end p oint o r starting p oint b y which t o j udge change, c omplex 
problems arise related to what the consequences of globalisation are. As a result the 
analysis is necessarily obfuscated. This is witnessed when examining their book, 
‘Global Transformations’, which encompasses a huge array of changes in the 
cultural, social, political and economic realm, yet all linked by the parsimonious idea 
of globalisation. It is perhaps unsurprising therefore, that the book is entitled global 
transformations, relying more on a descriptive account of worldwide change.
Some of the inherent limitations identified here have been addressed by Jan Aart
• * 7 cScholte in his own critical examination of globalisation theory. Scholte argues that 
a serious limitation to the globalisation literature is that it mistakenly conflates 
globalisation with a number of other processes when it is discussed. Hence at the 
heart of Scholte’s argument concerning globalisation, is a concern to give an 
analytically more precise meaning to the term, something he believes is lacking in
• nf\the literature. For Scholte these conflations refer to globalisation as ‘liberalization’, 
‘internationalization’, ‘universaliztion’, and ‘westernization’ or ‘modernization’. By 
liberalization Scholte means the “process of removing government imposed 
restrictions on movements between countries in order to create an ‘open’,
74 Held et.al., Global Transformations, op.cit., p.l 1.
75 Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, op.cit. For a sample o f other writings that generally 
might be said to constitute a ‘third critical wave’, see Hay & Watson (eds.), Demystifying 
Globalisation, op.cit. See also Germain, (ed.), Globalisation and its Critics, op.cit.
76 Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, op.cit., p. 16. Scholte quotes the definition offered 
by Held et.al., in Global Transformations, op.cit.; “[g]lobalization can be thought of as a process (or 
set o f processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization o f social relations and 
transactions -  assessed in terms o f their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact -  generating
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‘borderless’ world economy”. By ‘internationalization’, Scholte is referring to the
77intensifying of “cross-border relations with countries”. When referring to 
‘universalization’, “global means ‘worldwide’”, and globalisation “the process of 
spreading objects” worldwide.78 Finally, Scholte associates ‘Westernization’, or 
‘Modernization’, with Americanization or more generally the “spread of 
modernity”. 79
In distinction to the above processes, Scholte understands g lobalisation as being a 
recent phenomenon that is defined by what he refers to as ‘deterritorialisation’ or in 
his preferred usage ‘supraterritorialization’. Scholte aligns himself with those writers 
who focus on the spatio-temporal nature of the process, arguing that it is only in 
relating globalisation to supraterritorialisation that one is able to retrieve 
globalisation from the overly broad and nebulous sense in which it is associated with 
so much that is novel. According to Scholte, globalisation entails a ‘reconfiguration 
of geography’, such that social geography is now “marked by the growth of 
supraterritorial spaces”, transcending territorial places, territorial distances and
O A
territorial borders.
This is a useful set of distinctions and relevant to my own interests for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, Scholte’s classification enables a clearer exegesis to be done. Clarity 
then enables a more rigorous distinction to be made between the various processes, 
in order to establish what is novel if anything about globalisation, and what
transcontinental or interregional flows and networks o f activity, interaction, and the exercise o f  
power.” P. 16.
7 Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, op.cit., p. 15-16.
78 Ibid.
79 t u : A
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significance globalisation has. This serves to focus the debate, rather than, as is 
currently the case, the ‘debate’ on the significance of globalisation being almost non­
sensical due to the plurality of definitions and assumptions surrounding the term.
However, Scholte’s approach is important for a further set of reasons, more relevant 
to my own interests here. Firstly, a focused definition will function to preclude 
certain ideological strategies that are currently in operation. As will be examined in 
section three, in evoking globalisation New Labour plays upon the fuzzy nature of 
the concept in order to eschew any deeper analysis of ‘change’. In adopting an 
unclear ‘common sense’ understanding, stressing the obvious features and 
consequences of globalisation, they are able to argue that the philosophy of the Third 
Way is  the only way forward for a p a r ty o f th e  Left. This w ay forward, involves 
significant compromises on a number of issues, that for some, effectively severs New 
Labour’s connections to a leftist past. Yet the account of globalisation is such that 
these compromises take on an unavoidable and incontestable nature.
Following on from this, Scholte’s approach also has the virtue of drawing our 
attention to the fact that there resides a deeper theoretical orientation contained 
within many accounts of globalisation. This relates to the sense in which 
globalisation is often conflated with liberalisation, internationalisation and 
westernisation for example. It is this recognition that is particularly germane here.
There are for example, important consequences that unfold from recognising that 
globalisation is largely being conflated with liberalisation. Globalisation in this
80 Ibid., p.8. See also Jan Aart Scholte, ‘Globalization: Beyond the Buzzword’, in Eleonore Koffman 
& Gillian Youngs, (eds.), Globalisation: Theory and Practice. (London: Pinter, 1996).
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respect, refers to the process of increasing liberalisation whereby various barriers to 
trade are reduced or eliminated over time, to create an increasingly open or 
‘borderless’ economy. Thus globalisation denotes “the process of international
01
economic integration”. However, understood as liberalisation, it is generally clear 
that these changes come about as a result of ‘barriers’ being ‘lifted’ by governmental 
agencies, or perhaps international organisations. Agency is easily identified, with the 
result that the process is not particularly obscure. Once this process is conflated with 
globalisation however, so it becomes less clear, lending a more inevitable and 
unavoidable quality to the phenomenon.
Additionally, underlying such an approach is a set of neo-liberal assumptions that 
discipline the ‘globalisation topic’. Globalisation qua liberalisation formulates ‘A’ 
and ‘B’ and the processes that connects each in a very selective and contentious way, 
associated with a particular epistemology and ontology, i.e., it contains certain 
‘philosophical commitments’. For example, the economic and political are separate, 
with an implicit normative claim as to the prior status of the economic with the 
political focusing on the effective management of the former.
What is more, as liberalisation, globalisation is seen as the antithesis of protectionism. 
This is done, for example by Smeets. In his article on the globalisation of 
international trade and investment, Smeets argues that globalisation is the process o f
81 Harald Sander, ‘Multilateralism, Regionalism and Globalisation: The Challenges to the World 
Trading System’, in Harald Sander & Andras Inotai, (eds.), World Trade after the Uruguay Round: 
Prospects and Policy Options for the Twenty-first Century. (London: Routledge, 1996), p.27.
82 For example Vincent Cable explicitly talks of an ‘economist’s ’ view o f globalisation. Vincent 
Cable, Globalisation and Global Governance. (London: RIIA, 1999).
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liberalisation, and that “[liberalisation equals inclusion: protectionism exclusion.” 
Smeets continues; in this binary logic policymakers have “little choice: if 
governments stick to the common determination to raise levels of overall welfare, 
which has been the basis of the very success of the GATT/WTO multi-lateral trading 
system, there is no alternative to the road of progressive liberalisation of markets and 
enhancing competition in goods and services alike”.84
Such a formulation helps explain why the process is assumed to be positive and 
potentially inclusive by so many. Containing a number of liberal assumptions, 
globalisation takes on a ‘progressive’ quality, whilst often failing to recognise 
converse tendencies. Such assumptions, as discussed by Hurrel, include: the idea that 
the process “fosters economic efficiency”; that it “encourages international 
institutions and problem solving”; and that the process promotes “societal 
convergence built around common recognition of the benefits of markets and liberal
O f
democracy”. It also sheds light on the nature of the ‘global logic’ ascribed to 
globalisation as a benign logic, ultimately in the interests of all those who would act 
rationally.
There are also significant insights to be gleaned from the second of Scholte’s 
observations, where globalisation is often understood as ‘internationalisation’. As 
internationalisation, globalisation denotes the process of increasing
83 Smeets, ‘Globalisation o f International Trade and Investment’, in Frans Beulens, (ed.), 
Globalistaion and the Nation-State (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 1999), p.8, emphasis added.
84 Ibid.
85 Andrew Hurrel & Ngaire Woods, ‘Globalisation and Inequality’, Millennium: Journal o f  
International Studies, Vol.24 No.3, 1995 p.449. See also Bryan Lowell & Dianna Farrel, Market 
Unbound: Unleashing Global Capitalism. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996).
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• oxinterconnectedness o f  “ cross-border r elations b etween c ountries”. This i n f  act i s 
what Hirst and Thompson have in mind in making sense of what is currently 
happening. According to them, the “conceptualisation of the current stage of the 
internationalisation of economic activity” is in fact what globalisation denotes.87 
They argue that an ‘inter-nationalised world economy’ is “one in which the principle 
entities remain national economies, or agents that continue to be primarily located in
o o
a definite national territory”. In this conceptualisation, what remains is the premise 
of states or countries as the object or conduit through which activity is measured. 
Thus, for Dicken, internationalisation involves “the simple extension of economic 
activities across national boundaries”.89
What also remains in this way of thinking is the presumption that the state underpins, 
underwrites and empirically remains the fundamental structural feature of 
international society. The synonymous use of globalisation instead of 
internationalisation also figures (in conjunction with liberalisation), in thinking 
emanating from government formulation. This will be discussed in more detail and in 
relation to the UK government further on. Essentially, the significance of this 
conjunction derives from the idea that internationalisation presupposes the continued 
import o f  t he s tate, a nd s tate s ystem. It d raws attention t o t he r ole o f  t he s tate i n 
determining the rules that subsequently allows for trade, financial flows, and other 
economic activity. However, masked under the generic ‘globalisation’, the 
impression is given of a process unfolding separately from the state.
86 Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, op.cit., p. 15.
87 Paul Hirst & Grahame Thompson, ‘The Tyranny o f Globalisation: Myth and Reality?’ in Buelens, 
(ed.), Globalistaion and the Nation-State, op.cit. p. 139.
88 Ibid. p. 141.
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Thus in  thinking about globalisation, its significance and implications, i t  becomes 
important to develop an account of the significance of the above conflations. This is 
not just in order to attain analytical clarity, but also in order to guard against 
purposefully obscure thinking. Conflation inherently obscures, and given certain 
circumstances, the consequences of this may be to realise and perpetuate particular 
interests; one may excuse one’s actions in terms of globalisation, and as a result be in 
a position to mask the inherent ideological agenda that such actions are really 
inspired by.
What this draws attention to -  issues concerning the significance of context and 
methodology -  is not picked up on by Scholte himself. This is in part justifiable 
given the concerns that Scholte sets for himself. He is, after all, interested in staking 
out a distinct theory of globalisation. However, as I shall argue in the next section, I 
believe that their remains serious question marks relating to such a stance, and that in 
making “space and time themselves the fundamental basis of explanation”, Scholte, 
as with other complex theorists may have to answer to the claim that the ‘conceptual 
inflation’ of space and time comes at a price.90
Before turning to this, and in summary, a number of things can be said about the 
validity and utility of complex theory. To begin with, in contrast to the strong thesis, 
this second wave of thinking is focussed explicitly on the conceptualisation of 
globalisation, as a result offering a clearer, non-teleological and more sophisticated 
account of the process. The problem with this view though, is that it has the effect of 
obscuring as much as enlightening our understanding of contemporary changes,
89 Dicken, Global Shift, op.cit., p.5.
90 Rosenberg, The Follies, op.cit., p.6.
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overvaluing perhaps, the explanatory potential of spatial theory. Complex theory 
does not so much invalidate crucial elements to the sceptical critique, but rather 
relocates its emphasis elsewhere. As a result, its relevance to my thesis stems from 
the fact that its reworked conceptualisation of globalisation moves away from a 
version that stresses an inevitable and non-dialectical account.
A Critical Hermeneutic Approach.
It will be remembered that a central question concerning ‘globalisation’ is how to 
make an assessment of its implications and significance, given its contested 
nature. In this final section I will address this question in light of a secondary set 
of premises related to a disavowal of any positivist approach to understanding the 
term, and a recognition of the fact that it is constituted in specific social-historical 
circumstances.
As discussed in the previous chapter, a hermeneutic approach postulates that 
social agents, acting on the basis of their interpretations, in part form social 
reality. Understanding social reality then, involves understanding the web of 
meanings that go into making this social world. What is more, in making sense of 
these webs of meaning, we alter our interpretations, with the effect that social 
‘reality’ itself changes. Thus, the very process of understanding the ‘real world’ is 
slippery, there being no final or definitive account to read off of.
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This draws attention to the constitutive role of understanding, and how it 
challenges the philosophical premises of a positivist conception of truth. On this 
view, the discrete separation of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ underlying a positivist 
approach is considered to be untenable.
This means that understanding ‘globalisation’ requires carrying out research into 
the nature of the interpretation that specific actors hold too, as these 
interpretations in part form that which is ‘real’. There can be no convenient 
distinction made between the object under investigation, in this case 
‘globalisation’, and the subjects engaged in making sense of this phenomenon and 
acting (reacting) accordingly.
However, as discussed in chapter 2, critical hermeneutics draws attention, not 
only to the ontological centrality of understanding, but also to the importance of 
power. No two actors are the same, be they individuals or institutions. Their 
interpretations and their differences in terms of power will often vary, with the 
effect that some are more significant in ‘shaping’ and constituting that which is 
‘real’, thus lending a critical inflection to the analysis. As situated actors within a 
structured context, consideration must be given to the inevitable variation in the 
ability to shape circumstances understood as their ability to manipulate meaning. 
Though it is indeed true that social actors are in part responsible for constructing 
social reality, some are more significant than others.
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In allowing for this insight in examining globalisation, we are led away from an 
essentialist view of globalisation, with the result that it can neither be thought of 
as a ‘thing-in-itself, or as something that impacts upon entities in a similar way.
Instead, questions then arise as to which interpretations of globalisation are held, 
by whom, and in what context. Inline with the depth hermeneutic technique, I 
draw attention to the social-historical milieu, highlighting the significance and 
role played by the prevailing orthodoxy. In this context this involves recognition 
of the significance of neoliberalism. The question becomes, what role does this 
orthodoxy play in reproducing a particular set of processes denoted as 
‘globalisation’?
Globalisation theorists who seek to denote globalisation either as an accomplished 
fact, or as something that can be considered in the abstract tend to overlook the 
relevance of this point. This I believe is a mistake of the first order. Globalisation 
ought not to be understood as a disembodied phenomenon, divorced from a 
particular context. As stated at the outset of this inquiry, ‘ideas do not simply 
appear from thin air. At all times they are embedded within, and conditioned by, 
the wider social formation of which they are themselves a part’.91
91 Hay, Sceptical Notes, op.cit.
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Yet there is a secondary dimension to this given my particular concerns. 
Assuming no clear distinction between subject and object, one must also question 
whether it is not in the interests of New Labour to perpetuate one particular 
understanding at the cost of another. It is only in recognising this second 
dimension, thus disavowing any essentialist (and therefore reified) account of 
globalisation, that we may arrive at a means whereby judgment can be offered on 
interpreting an alternative significance to globalisation in any particular context 
on the basis of a different understanding of what ‘globalisation’ actually ‘is’.
This draws attention to the second requirement of the hermeneutic technique, 
which highlights the role that the structure of the social realm plays. This latter 
point p osits t hat o ne n eeds t o b e se nsitive t o t he ‘ relations o f  d omination’ t hat 
characterises the social realm and that inevitably lead to some agents being 
‘dominant’. In the case of thinking about globalisation and New Labour, this will 
draw attention to factors such as electoral expediency, and the need for credibility. 
This will in turn play a part in the way ‘globalisation’ is appropriated (and thus 
constituted) in those particular circumstances.
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New Labour, as a result of their particular place within the social structure, are in 
a position to shape and control the future in a way that one individual or company 
is not. They are, as a result, implicated in the production and reproduction of a set 
of processes that then resemble that which they say they must respond to. Thus we 
see a sort of Janis faced nature to the process, dependent at once on the belief that 
it is real, and yet also sustained by this belief. To the extent that additional 
mitigating circumstances hold, the process will continue to correspond to a 
particular set of processes.92
Conclusion.
It is now worth returning to some of the central questions that have oriented this 
chapter. Of what use is the concept of globalisation? How has it been understood? 
What consequences, if  any, can be attributed to it? And how are we to judge its 
significance?
As the above analysis has concluded there are a number of limitations to the account 
of globalisation so far examined. The nature of these limitations are of an empirical 
and analytical kind. The first wave was shown to be unsatisfactory in a number of 
respects, particularly in the contention of a global logic, following on from the 
assumption of a global economy. This was shown to be an exaggeration, and in many 
respects simply untenable. What underlines this view, in the case of Ohmae, is an 
approach that is shaped by neo-liberal assumptions.
92 This will be examined in chapter 6.
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This view remains highly significant due to its widespread currency. The strong 
thesis evokes the term as a descriptor, and assumes the causal connections that are 
contained within this category. The nature of these connections seem obvious, thanks 
in part to the social circumstances in which they have been articulated. That is to say, 
the view is ‘hegemonic’, promulgated in circumstances that favour it in a particular 
form. Thus policy, derived according to a ‘global logic’ takes on this quality also. 
This populist understanding conflates globalisation with liberalisation, which stems 
from a c urrent prevailing orthodoxy amongst elites for neo-liberal formulations of 
contemporary change. The result of a complex set of assumptions on ontology and 
epistemology which have developed over the long term, and which often go 
unquestioned as a result, the empirical indicators associated with this approach are 
considered obvious, as do the appropriate responsive measures.
Ontologically, the strong thesis stresses a disembodied nature to globalisation. 
Globalisation is considered as a ‘thing in itself, existing ‘out there’. Combined with 
a particular ethical dimension, that stresses the positive aspects to globalisation, the 
problem of ‘structural’ determinism then arises. On this view globalisation is 
portrayed as b eing ‘ a process without a subject’, yet a process that i s nonetheless 
desirable.
In examining the complex theory of Held et.al., globalisation theory proper can be 
identified. Complex theory determines to retain the term, but in the process finds it 
necessary to deal with many of the analytical deficiencies identified by the sceptical 
approach. This results in complex theory stripping the term down to a basic abstract 
spatio-temporal concept, that must ultimately still rest upon some deeper theoretical
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position or remain moribund as explanans. The strength of this approach stems from 
the complex theoretical formulation offered, recognising the multi-causal, non- 
teleological and dialectical elements to a set of processes that are in some ways 
unique.
However, the question for this approach is why not simply dump the term, and 
instead settle for something else? For example, in the case of Scholte, why not 
simply refer to de-territorialisation if that is indeed what globalisation denotes?
Secondly, both the strong thesis and complex accounts suffer as a result o f their lack 
of critical self-reflection and hermeneutical sensitivity. This has in effect silenced an 
important dimension, that of the significance of the ‘idea of globalisation’. In 
ignoring this element, research has tended to assume globalisation more as a ‘thing- 
in-itself. This has resulted in a truncated account of globalisation that fails to 
consider the important constitutive role played by the ‘subject’ interpreting and (thus 
constituting) what globalisation is.
What is more, following certain hermeneutic premises, I argue that one must remain 
mindful of the concrete circumstances in which social life is played out. Though 
themselves critical of the empiricism of the sceptical critique of globalisation, such a 
limitation might also be legitimately lodged about the account offered by Held et.al. 
Whereas sceptics like Hirst and Thompson were led to a recognition of the 
importance of the idea of globalisation, in other words considering globalisation as a 
‘discourse’, this dimension is not dealt with by Held et.al. Their approach prejudices
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the analysis in favour of an empirical focus, playing down consideration of power 
and dominance and its relation to meaning.
Finally, in arguing for a recognition of the importance of hermeneutics for a study of 
globalisation and its significance, we are now in a position to progress towards the 
next section of the thesis. I have argued hitherto, that an assessment of globalisation 
entails in effect two elements. One, how is globalisation understood, and is this 
understanding correct empirically? That is to say, is it possible to argue that 
globalisation entails further liberalisation, and does it determine a particular kind of 
‘global logic’? My preliminary assessment of the literature would suggest no. 
Evidence evoked in order to validate a conceptualisation of globalisation resembling 
that of the strong thesis then, is empirically suspect.
However, the hermeneutic line taken here draws attention to a second element. 
Assessing the significance of globalisation can not be simply carried out at the level 
of whether it is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. The constitutive nature of the interpretation draws 
attention to a need to consider how a particular form of globalisation may come to be 
instantiated, reified, and as a result reproduced. Further, once one also takes into 
account insights drawn from the depth hermeneutic technique, we are in a position to 
draw attention to a more cynical dimension. That is, particular meanings may be 
promulgated, naturalised and legitimated by those in positions of power. This will 
subsequently allow for a deeper understanding of the ‘nature’ of globalisation, and 
how it is and can be instantiated in the social realm.
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Chapter 4
‘Globalisation’ and the Domestic Realm.
“...is it accidental that neoliberal accounts o f globalization have mainly 
emanated from dominant social circles and countries?
Introduction
Globalisation is a key concept at the very heart of New Labour thinking. In Blair’s 
words it is “the driving force behind the Third Way”.2 It has been evoked, along 
with the new global economy and change, as being something of an accomplished 
fact, and conceptualised in such a way as to redefine the constellation of opportunity 
and constraint. For Blair and New Labour, “certain key consequences flow from 
accepting globalisation and working with it”. Evoked in order to explain why 
‘reform’ and ‘modernisation’, ‘competitiveness’ and ‘enlightened engagement’ are 
all unavoidable necessities, these developments, taken together, constitute nothing 
short of a revolution in the thinking of the Labour party.
In this chapter I confine myself to the domestic elements to this discourse, which in 
effect means limiting myself to an examination of Blair’s understanding of 
globalisation. By this I mean to suggest that an initial focus needs to be placed upon 
the interpretation of Blair because it is he, as leader, who has by far and a way been 
the most articulate and enthusiastic of writers on the topic. Almost alone in 1996 and
1 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction. (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000), 
n.287.
Tony Blair, ‘Facing The Modem Challenge: The Third Way In Britain and South Africa’, speech at 
the Old Assembly Dining Room, Parliament Building, Cape Town, South Africa, 8 January 1999.
3 Tony Blair, ‘The Global Economy’, speech to the Keindanren, Tokyo, 5th January 1996.
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1997, Blair champions a particular version of globalisation that in turn grounds his 
particular vision of a ‘Third Way’ in politics.
Beginning from the premise that there already exists a ‘new global economy’, and 
assuming globalisation to be underway, this interpretation is largely neoliberal in 
outlook, with globalisation and ‘liberalisation’ generally being synonymous. In 
essence, this account of globalisation assumes that national governments are denied 
“the space in which to construct alternatives to the neoliberal orthodoxy”.4 As with 
‘change’, the new global economy and globalisation are depicted as existing ‘out 
there’, with the result that the parameters of the politically possible are already set. 
Circumscribed in this way, the New Labour outlook is one of response to 
globalisation. Contrary to more complex accounts of globalisation, the process is not 
considered to be open ended, transient or contingent upon state capacity.5 Deviating 
in significant respects from the more complex accounts discussed in the previous 
chapter, this version is in fact analogous to that of the first wave writers on 
globalisation, sharing the premise of an already existent global economy, and a neo­
liberal orientation.
In examining the nature of this interpretation, I divide the analysis into three sections, 
focussing on the ontological, epistemological and normative aspects of the discourse. 
To begin I examine the significance of globalisation in relation to agency and 
structure in the New Labour discourse. I argue that an initial ontological take on 
globalisation subsequently leads to an agenda seen to be largely about pragmatic
4 Colin Hay & Mathew Watson, ‘Labour’s Economic Policy: Studiously Courting Competence’, 
p. 155, in Gerald R.Taylor, (ed.), The Impact of New Labour. (London: MacMillan, 1999).
See Linda Weiss, ‘Globalisation and the Myth of the Powerless State’, New Left Review  225, 1997, 
pp84-114.
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response. More, this particular take largely conflates globalisation with liberalisation, 
with profound consequences.
Secondly, I draw attention to the manner in which the New Labour discourse, 
following Blair’s account, incorporates an ‘end of ideology’ thesis. This denotes an 
epistemological dimension, in that the largely positivist manner in which Blair 
conceptualises g lobalisation (separating the subject interpreting g lobalisation, from 
the ‘object’ globalisation itself) subsequently allows New Labour to espouse a 
political programme that can claim to be about ‘technocratic responsive’ measures, 
beyond the scope of party politics.
Finally I examine how Blair assumes a unifying nature to the process, in effect 
implying a teleological and homogenising quality to globalisation. In each instance, I 
question this version, drawing on my analysis in the previous chapter in order to 
conclude that this particular understanding actually functions, at least in the short 
run, to produce and reproduce a set of processes that might then be portrayed as 
validating their position.
Globalisation as Liberalisation and a ‘Thine-in-Itself.
In the following section, I explore and critically examine the first of Blair’s keynote 
speeches on globalisation, which sets out a particular view of globalisation and its 
implications for domestic political agency. In examining Blair’s position, I draw 
attention to the significance of his understanding of globalisation as at once denoting 
a process of liberalisation and yet also being conceptualised as a ‘thing-in-itself.
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In a speech given in Tokyo in 1996, Blair discusses the nature of the global 
economy, and how “certain key consequences flow from accepting globalisation and 
working with it”.6 Blair begins with a diagnosis of the situation, and narrates a short 
historical account of its development, in which he makes a distinction between two 
‘eras’ of response, arguing that “[t]he driving force of economic change today is 
globalisation. Technology and capital are mobile. Industry is becoming fiercely
n
competitive a cross n ational b oundaries”. I n recognition o f  t he p rofundity brought 
about by this change “[t]he key issue [now] facing all governments of developed
O
nations is how to respond’. The response takes the form of two stark options -
‘protectionism’ or ‘openness’:
I reject protectionism as wrong and impractical. I f  this is so, then to compete 
in t he global market t wo t hings m ust b e d one. A c ountry h as t o d ismantle 
barriers to competition and accept the disciplines o f  the international 
economy. That has been happening the world over, to varying degrees in what 
might be called the first era of response to globalisation.9
On this view, this ‘first era’ narrates an account of globalisation that might instead be
referred to as ‘liberalisation’, in that it is associated with the increasing liberalisation
of trade and cross border activity:
Let’s examine the impact of globalisation. It is of course, true to say that 
world trade and the opening of markets have been proceeding for centuries. 
Globalisation in that sense is not new. What is new, however, is its pace and 
scope.10
Furthermore, defined negatively, it is a period in which barriers to competition are 
dismantled, and “the disciplines of the international economy” accepted.11 This is 
not seen as a bad thing; rather it is a necessary phase, with acceptance portrayed as
6 Blair, ‘The Global Economy’, op.cit.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid. Emphasis added.
9 Ibid. Emphasis added.
10 Ibid.
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inevitable. Finally, on this view, globalisation thereby takes the form of a ‘thing-in- 
itself, in that as a process that drives economic change, governments are only able to 
respond. New L abour is therefore not implicated in any w ay in its constitution or 
current form.
A first point to make, and as discussed in the previous chapter, is the fact that 
globalisation ought not to be thought of as the same thing as liberalisation. Mindful 
of the largely sloppy and inexact way in which the term is generally (ab)used, it will 
be remembered that Scholte points out that it “is not the same thing as 
internationalisation, liberalization, universalization or modernization”.12 This mistake 
is nevertheless made in that instead of talking of liberalisation, Blair opts for the term 
globalisation. Thus it might be said, perhaps glibly, that from the outset, New Labour 
operates on the basis of an erroneous (though broadly accepted) understanding of 
globalisation, it simply denoting the intensification of world trade and the further 
opening up of markets.
Conflating liberalisation with globalisation, as discussed in the previous chapter, is 
not an uncommon occurrence. It is, as was suggested, both an essential element of 
the strong thesis, and an association that remains as the dominant way in which 
globalisation is generally understood. For Scholte this is unfortunate because in 
confusing globalisation with liberalisation, the former is robbed of an independent 
explanatory role. However, and as I have suggested, there are far deeper concerns 
with regard to making such a conflation, particularly once we factor in questions of
11 Ibid.
12 As discussed, Scholte argues that if  anything “globalization refers to a far-reaching change in the 
nature o f social space”. Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, op.cit., p.46, p.50.
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power and context. Thus in the case of New Labour, it is important to draw out these 
consequences by delving further into Blair’s argument.
With acceptance portrayed as ‘inevitable’ in the first phase of globalisation, many of 
the policies associated with the Conservative governments of the 1980’s take on a 
different status. According to Blair, “[m]uch of the change [in the 1980’s] was to do 
not with ideology but with the altered circumstances of the world economy”.13 
Therefore, as Hay points out, the need to modernise, and the underlying logic of that 
modernisation, takes on an inevitable quality. That is to say, following from this, the 
New Labour “proponents of modernisation” can now “rely... upon a rather more 
deterministic logic of economic necessity.” 14 Thus, “rather than see Thatcherism as 
initiating a break with the past, it is seen as a response to the distinctive economic 
(and presumably the attendant political) pressures of new times.”15
The significance of this will be re-interpreted in greater detail further into the thesis. 
Nevertheless, the point to be made here concerns the significance of the conjunction 
of globalisation as liberalisation and globalisation as a ‘thing-in-itself, and the 
deterministic logic that follows.
In combination, this conjunction enables Blair to make a number of points relating to 
the legacy bequeathed to him. Because globalisation is not seen as being the result of 
previous and specific government measures - measures animated by a prevailing
13 Blair, ‘The Global Economy’, op.cit.
14 Colin Hay, The Political Economy o f New Labour: Labouring Under False Pretences? (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999), p.9. Emphasis in original. See also Martin Smith, ‘A Return to 
Revisionism? The Labour Party’s Policy Review’, in Martin Smith & Joanna Spear (eds.), The 
Changing Labour Party (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 14.
15 Ibid.
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orthodoxy (and propagated by those unambiguously of the right) - Blair is
subsequently able to posit that certain policies (particularly policies concerned with
further liberalisation) also take on a particular form; as policies forced upon the
government of the day. Blair writes:
Governments of Left and Right in the 1980’s abolished exchange controls, 
cut top rates of tax, and deregulated trade, just as governments of Left and 
Right in the 1960’s and 1970’s pursued different policies... Changing these 
types of policy was the first wave of activity by governments to meet the 
challenge of globalisation.16
Thus a particular ontological dimension to globalisation contained in this 
conceptualisation functions to lend an inevitable, and de-politicised quality to the 
process of liberalisation. By ontological here I mean how globalisation is 
conceptualised as a ‘thing-in-itself, ‘out there’ determining outcomes. What is 
important to recognise, is that framing the approach in this way allows Blair to 
discuss two eras of response to globalisation. This precludes thinking about the 
possibility of the process itself evolving, it plays down any recognition of its 
contested nature, and silences the idea that it may in part be constituted and 
reproduced as a result of the interpretations held by key actors.
Many take issue with the idea that the kind of ‘modernisation’ practiced by New
11Labour is explainable in terms of the external constraints the party faces. In 
challenging this explanation, the convention is to supplant the term ‘globalisation’
16 Blair, ‘The Global Economy’, op.cit.
17 Important challenges include, Geoffrey Garret, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Colin Hay, ‘Anticipating Accommodations, 
Accommodating Anticipations: The Appeasement o f Capital o f Capital in the Modernization o f the 
British Labour Party, 1987-1992’, Politics and Society, 25.2, 1995, pp234-256. Mark Wickham-Jones, 
‘Social Democracy and Structural Dependency: The British Case. A Note on Hay’, Politics and 
Society, 25:2, 1995, pp257-265. Mark Wickham-Jones, ‘New Labour in the Global Economy: Partisan 
Politics and the Social Democratic Model’, British Journal o f  Politics and International Relations, 
Vol.2, N o .l, April 2000, ppl-25. For a review of each o f these authors, see David Coates, ‘Capitalist
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for ‘external constraint’. Thus to criticise ‘globalisation’ is to criticise their 
understanding of ‘constraint’: that is they question that we need to respond to 
‘globalisation’ in a particular way. Garret, for example, draws attention to the fact 
that ‘competitivity’ is not curtailed as the result of redistribution and that exit options
remain limited (due to the ‘positive externalities associated with large public
1 8economies). Garret points to the fact that ‘globalisation’ is in fact likely to augment 
political demands for such policies domestically, given the increased insecurity and 
feeling of vulnerability.19 Wickham-Jones agrees, pointing to a continued ‘policy
space’ for a reformist social democratic government operating in the context of the
20UK. Both point to the fact that social democratic policies can in fact be desirable to 
capital.
These constitute important counter-arguments, very much in line with the sceptical 
position. However, we need to recognise that ‘globalisation’ also functions more as 
an idea, and is not simply an external (empirical) constraint. As important as these 
criticisms are however, we need to continue to explore the New Labour argument in 
order to tease out the deeper consequences of their position.
There are additional consequences to the particular ontological position contained in 
the discourse. Globalisation, conceptualised as an (empirical) ‘thing-in-itself, is in 
fact synonymous with a formulation of globalisation as ‘a process without a
Models and Social Democracy: The Case of New Labour’, British Journal o f  Politics and 
International Relations, Vol.3, No.3, October 2001, pp284-307.
18 Though social democratic policies also require an ‘encompassing’ labour movement to be 
successful. See Garret, Partisan Politics, op.cit., p.5, 9,10-11, 44.
19 Ibid, ppl39-144.
20 Wickham-Jones defines a ‘reformist goal’, as an “intentional commitment to egalitarian and 
redistributive outcomes as a direct and central aspect o f economic policy”. Wickham-Jones, New 
Labour in the Global Economy, op.cit, p.3.
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21subject’. It is worth re-quoting part of the previous passage; “[t]he driving force of 
economic change today is globalisation. Technology and capital are mobile. Industry 
is becoming fiercely competitive across national boundaries”.22 In other words, 
globalisation ‘drives’ the process; technology and capital, understood in the passive 
form, each determine outcomes. In order to appreciate the importance of this, it is 
useful to draw attention to context and agency.
As Fairclough points out, “[t]he crucial starting point for the politics of New Labour 
is acceptance of the new international economic liberalism -  ‘the new global 
economy’ in it’s own terms -  as an inevitable and unquestionable fact of life upon 
which politics and government are to be premised”. Indeed, this is reflected in the 
title Blair chooses to give his speech, namely ‘the Global Economy’. On the basis of 
a particular understanding as to the nature of the context, Blair then determines the 
nature of the constraints that he believes New Labour must subsequently follow. Two 
key factors, in line with the strong thesis, are assumed about this: first, because a new 
global economy is already in existence it must be accepted on i t ’s own terms; 
second, and given the former, a particular ‘global logic’ follows, resting upon 
significant assumptions relating to the first point.
In examining this point, attention must be given to both the evidence evoked, and the 
argument subsequently used by Blair to justify his case. First, thanks to the 
predominance of the strong thesis view of globalisation, Blair is able to assume that 
the ‘facts’ of the situation ‘speak for themselves’. As Fairclough argues, the premise
21 See Colin Hay and David Marsh, ‘Introduction: Demystifying Globalisation’, in Colin Hay & David 
Marsh, (eds.), Demystifying Globalisation. (London: MacMillan, 1999).
22 Blair, ‘The Global Economy’, op.cit.
23 Norman Fairclough, New Labour New Language? (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 15.
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of the global economy is more assumed than it is demonstrated.24 To the extent that 
this is true, this translates to mean an acceptance of a neo-liberal understanding. And 
it is on this basis, that he then ascribes certain consequences (global logic) as 
‘obvious’.
In simply listing a series of indicators he believes are obvious and associated with
globalisation, Blair assumes that the facts that make up these lists are enough to
validate the existence of a global economy, and in themselves can explain the
implications in turn derived from the existence of this economy. Blair was
comfortable with this strategy in 1999, in his Lord Mayor’s speech, in which he
refers to a number of anecdotal examples in order to underwrite his position. These
include: the quantity traded on current currency exchange markets; the increase in
total world trade; and the levels of foreign direct investment. In other words, the very
indicators associated with the strong thesis:
People still under-estimate the impact of globalisation. Technology is re­
writing the rules of business and the rules of trade. Economic frontiers are 
crashing d own. One and a half trillion dollars are traded every day on the 
world’s currency exchanges... Total world trade has doubled in the last 10 
years. In 1970, British overseas investment was 9 billion pounds. It has now 
risen to 400 billion pounds. Household British names like Christies and 
Rover are owned by French and German companies. And household 
American names like Burger King and Holiday Inn are owned by British 
companies.26
The strength of this above approach is twofold. First, as suggested, it taps into what 
was generally thought to be the case by the wider public at the time, i.e. it plays on 
the fact that it is seen to be obvious, or common sense. As such it is considered to be 
incontrovertible and uncontroversial. Second, an additional virtue of this approach
24 Ibid., p.27.
25 Tony Blair, ‘Shaping a Pivotal Role For Britain in the World’, speech at the Guildhall, London, 22nd 
November 1999.
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stems from not having to develop a deeper critical analysis of a more systemic kind. 
That is, such an approach allows Blair to avoid the need for an analysis, “still less 
[sic] a critique of the modem capitalist system”, something that is reinforced as the
9 7result of globalisation being formulated as a ‘process without a subject’.
So the above facts are made meaningful thanks to the existence of a hegemonic view 
of globalisation that bears all the hallmarks of the strong thesis; hence drawing 
attention to its significance. Blair is able to promulgate it as if it were obvious - along 
with its implications - and indeed be confident that it will generally be accepted in 
such a way as well. This connotes an important dimension to ‘globalisation’ that, as 
I suggested in the previous chapter, remains largely unexplored in both the sceptical 
and complex literature on the subject, drawing attention to how a prevailing orthodox 
view, once adhered to by those in power, can be constituted and reproduced because 
it is not considered to be problematic.
Following the hermeneutic lines outlined earlier, the effect of this is to reify the 
process.29 Thus, to understand the nature of ‘globalisation’ one must give due 
consideration, not just to the paucity of the argument judged empirically, but to an 
additional feature associated with ‘context’ - taking into account the relative 
significance of dominant ideas, as these ideas play a central role in potentially 
constituting a particular ‘reality’.
26 Ibid.
27 Fairclough, New Labour, New Language?, op.cit., p.29.
28 Conversely, where such a view has not gained currency (for example France), then so such an 
argument and position would from the outset be untenable.
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Returning to the form of argument adopted, Blair, in this instance, justifies his 
position simply by referring to lists of ‘facts’, which he assumes ‘speak for 
themselves’ in explaining the impact of globalisation. These facts are not related to 
one another o r understood within a more critical theoretical account. Rather, each 
fact is given ‘equivalence’, referring to how items in lists (for example the quantity 
traded on currency markets, and the levels of total world trade), “are connected only 
in so far as they appear together, [with] no deeper explanations [being] sought.” 
This is significant in that the items are ‘paratactic’; that is, “their elements are equal, 
one is not subordinate to another.”31
Blair assumes that they do not need to be related according to an underlying theory. 
These facts can simply be related in a generic fashion in order to give an impression 
about the impact of globalisation. This has the result of avoiding the rather thorny 
issue of the need for any deeper structural critique. As Fairclough points out, “[t]he 
factors or elements ascribed to globalisation are connected only in the sense that they 
appear together. There is no attempt at explanation that tries to specify deeper 
relations amongst them (e.g. of cause and effect) which might constitute a system”.32 
Blair is thus able to avoid any deeper analysis of the contemporary capitalist system 
and the particular form that current changes take. He is instead able to merely appeal 
to what may be referred to as a shallow ‘logic of appearances’.
29 It should be pointed out however, that whether or not this process o f reification can be interpreted as 
ideological additionally necessitates factoring in background motivations and locating these in terms 
o f sustaining relations o f domination.
30 Fairclough, New Labour, New Language?, op.cit., p. 162.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p.28.
125
Nevertheless, ‘facts’ cannot be meaningful in and of themselves. Such a position, 
positivist in orientation, fails to recognise that meaning does not inhere in the 
‘objective’ realm itself. All that can be said in this respect, is that the effect of 
favouring this ‘logic of appearances’ is to disguise the nature of this particular 
version of globalisation, which in turn masks a degree of complicity in reproducing 
this version as a result of acting in accordance with its precepts.
A second key element, related to agency, concerns the fact that the global economy 
(and globalisation) must be accepted on ‘it’s own terms’. This entails a choice, with 
one either opting for ‘protectionism’ or ‘openness’. In common with the ‘strong 
thesis’ examined in the previous chapter, Blair shares the limited view of there being 
only two options, what Weiss refers to as ‘passivity’ or ‘closure’. This then 
underscores B lair’s commitment to  free trade and liberalisation.34 Protectionism is  
given a pejorative connotation, and associated with isolation as opposed to 
engagement. This black and white ‘either/or’ conceptualisation, ignoring certain 
gradations between the poles in order to make the options stark, then gives rise to a 
fatalism in the face of globalisation.
The consequences of this are far reaching, not only in terms of the status accorded to 
what I have previously referred to as denoting a ‘global logic’, but also in terms of 
that which is considered permissible. Within the discourse, the status that this global 
logic subsequently takes is of an unavoidable, yet also teleological and rational 
process. Blair states that protectionism is both ‘wrong’ and ‘impractical’. Thus, his
33 Linda Weiss, ‘Managed Openness: Beyond Neoliberal Globalism’, New Left Review, Number 239, 
November/December 1999, p.127.
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dismissal has both an ethical (‘wrong’) and a pragmatic (‘impractical’) dimension. 
The ethical dimension is important here in that globalisation, in being associated with 
liberalisation, automatically takes on a positive dimension in the minds of New 
Labour. As Hurrel and Woods argue, the process of liberalisation is assumed to be 
‘progressive’, ‘inclusive’ and conducive of co-operation and peaceable relations.35
These assumptions are then carried over into thinking about the consequences of 
globalisation. Thus in the minds of New Labour, such an optimism is also imputed to 
globalisation as well. Though unavoidable, the process is nonetheless desirable 
because it will result in a set of outcomes that approximate an increasingly unified 
and efficient market from which all can potentially benefit, culminating in the idea 
that one ought to ‘embrace’ change.
It is also argued that resistance is ‘impractical’. This entails that any ethical stance 
that promotes resistance is nonetheless spurious, as the forces associated with 
globalisation preclude any resistance. Hence it would be unreasonable to ‘resist’ 
doing that which is seen to be obvious. On this view, “[n]o country is immune from
' j / i
the massive change that globalisation brings”.
Importantly, the profound impact of that change is experienced by all nations, and
regardless of whether the government of the day is of the Left or Right:
What impresses me most is not the differences in the challenge this change 
poses for our countries. It is the similarities. And not just for countries like
34 Blair is not alone in this strategy. Gordon Brown also contrasts Laissez-faire with “1930s 
protectionism”. Gordon Brown, ‘Rediscovering Public Purpose in the Global Economy’, speech 
delivered to the Kennedy School o f Government, Harvard University, 15th December 1998.
35 Andrew Hurrel & Ngaire Woods, ‘Globalization and Inequality’, Millennium: Journal o f  
International Studies, Vol.24, No.3, 1995, pp447-70.
36 Blair, ‘Facing The Modem Challenge’, op.cit.
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France and Great Britain that are at similar stages of economic development. 
But in  Latin America, in  Eastern Europe, in  the Far East, even in  parts o f  
Africa.37
Here Blair not only posits a particular understanding of ‘change’, as something ‘out 
there’, independent of any subject, and understood in the singular. He is also led to 
assume a degree of homogeneity in the agent, in this case the states that change 
impacts upon. This is important in that globalisation can be assumed to neither 
favour nor disfavour a state according to any indigenous features, for example 
wealth. It is neutral in this conceptualisation, as it is with the individual within the 
state. Each experiences globalisation in such a way as to suggest a response that is 
positive, i.e. it should be embraced.38
But is this view tenable? From the previous chapter, a number of points can be made. 
Firstly, globalisation is neither a ‘thing-in-itself, nor a ‘process-without-a-subject’. It 
does not determine a policy of ‘openness’ or ‘closure’, nor is it, in its current 
manifestation, neutral. This means that ‘it’, manifests itself as a set of processes 
determined b y key agents ( thus r eflecting p ower). S ceptics s uch a s Weiss, B erger 
and Dore, and Baker et.al., all draw attention to the “substantial area for analysis,
on
institutional reform, and policy action” available to a government. Reflecting not 
only the variety of forms systems of capitalist accumulation takes, but also allowing
37 Tony Blair, ‘The Third Way’, speech to the National Assembly, Paris, France, 24* March 1998.
38 This is why Callinicos considers this position to be ‘neo-conservative’, as reflected in the following 
quote o f Blair’s; “Globalization has brought us economic progress and material well-being. But it also 
brings fear in its wake”. Though recognising this concern Blair nonetheless holds to the view that it is 
unfounded; like a fear o f spiders, it is a fear that can and ought to be overcome. Blair, Tony. ‘Values 
and the Power o f Community’, speech to the Global Ethics Foundation, Tubingen University, 30* 
June 2000. Quoted in Alex Callinicos, Against the Third Wav. (Cambridge: Polity Press, Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001), p. 16.
39 Weiss, Managed Openness, op.cit. p. 127. See also Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore, (eds.), National 
Diversity and Global Capitalism. (Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 1996); Linda Weiss, 
‘Globalization and National Governance: Antinomy or Interdependence?’ Review o f  International 
Studies, Vol.25, No.5, December 1999, ppl-30.
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for significant differences between particular state set-ups, ‘globalisation’ cannot be 
used to justify the orientation suggested here.
Those commentators who specifically focus on the Labour party and ‘globalisation’ 
also reinforce such a position.40 Hence, Hay, Wickham-Jones, Garret, Smith, Coates 
and Panitch, all (though from different perspectives), critically examine the options 
that the UK retains in light of current processes of change.41
And so, in  and o f  themselves, the ‘ facts’ associated with globalisation are largely 
meaningless, in the sense that the amount traded on financial currency markets, 
though important, does not predetermine a policy as inevitable and unavoidable, and 
does not validate the existence of ‘globalisation’. Instead, the particular approach 
adopted by Blair suggests a converse interpretation; it can be understood as an 
attempt to reinforce a particular set of processes, whereby the ‘reality’ of 
globalisation (selectively understood) is constituted.
Blair’s version of globalisation thus formed ought not to be thought of as neutral, as
it cannot favour states or individuals equally. As Scholte argues:
Globalization has had significant effects on various types of social 
stratification, including with respect to class, country, gender, race, the urban/ 
rural divide and age...on the whole it has tended to widen gaps in life 
chances...these injustices are not inherent to globalization, but have mainly 
flowed from neoliberal approaches to new geography.42
40 As Hay points out, New Labour simply conflate “the necessities o f new times with the 
contingencies of neo-liberalism”. Hay, The Political Economy o f  New Labour, op.cit., p. 10.
41 In addition to those already cited, see Leo Panitch & Colin Leys, The End o f Parliamentary 
Socialism: From New Left to New Labour. (London: Verso, 1997); Steve Ludlum & Martin Smith, 
(eds.), New Labour in Government. (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2000); David Coates & Peter Lawler, 
(eds.), New Labour in Power. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).
42 Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, op.cit., p.234. Emphasis added.
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Given the variety of situations individuals find themselves living in, there is therefore 
little reason to assume that change is necessarily a favourable thing.
To sum up, I have examined some of the consequences that flow from an account 
that conflates liberalisation with globalisation, assuming it to be a ‘thing-in-itself. 
This, I argue, is a mistake. The validity of the argument that ‘globalisation’ can be 
thought of as determining a particular set of responses, or that these responses are 
inevitable, or indeed desirable, is questionable. This particular analysis suffers from a 
lack of depth, and depends upon avoiding a critique of the economic system, in 
favour of an account that rests upon a shallow ‘logic of appearances’.
Blair does not offer any sustained theoretical argument to justify his position, to 
identify agency, or to qualify the desirability of the process. This general mode of 
argument silences the problematic and contested nature of what in fact the 
‘commonsense’ strong thesis holds to and entails. As will be examined in the next 
section on Third Way theory, this has important consequences, allowing New Labour 
to talk of a more permanent ‘reconciliation of antagonisms’, that follows from them 
ascribing ‘unifying’ traits to contemporary processes of change. Centrally, it enables 
New Labour to de-politicise the process, and thus present its programme, geared as it 
is to responding to globalisation, as non-ideological and pragmatic. It is in this 
respect that I refer to the epistemological dimension to the globalisation discourse, 
drawing attention to an ‘end of ideology’ thesis.
Globalisation and the Third Wav: De-Politicising the Domestic Agenda
130
Blair defines the response to globalisation in the first era in negative terms, as a 
period in which barriers to competition are dismantled and ‘the disciplines of the 
international economy’ accepted. Though still about responding to globalisation, a 
second era is now posited that is distinguished from the first era by its more creative 
and proactive nature. However, and importantly, as in the first era, one does not have 
a hand in shaping the process, i.e. the ontological status of globalisation remains 
unchanged.43
The initial position on g lobalisation in this period plays its part in justifying New 
Labour disavowing many of the traditional policies that have defined and 
distinguished social democratic parties and the left. Such policies include a 
commitment to  full employment, egalitarianism, Keynesian demand- management, 
and the belief in pervasive state involvement in social and economic life.44 
Nevertheless, this position develops to encompass a more creative role for agency, 
away from a ‘hands-off approach towards a mixture of technocratic and supply side 
measures, with the government now working in ‘partnership’ with the market. What 
is more, as the measures are promulgated against a backdrop of globalisation, they 
are seen to be urgent.45 Taken as a whole, the above programme is formulated as a 
political philosophy called the Third Way.46
43 See Blair, ‘The Global Economy’, op.cit.
44 See Giddens, The Third Way, op.cit., p.7.
45 For New Labour globalisation is like a race; “globalisation is not just here to stay. It is here to 
accelerate”. Robin Cook, ‘Foreign Policy and the National Interest’, speech by the Foreign Secretary 
to the Royal Institute o f International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 28th January 2000.
46 I will not enter into too detailed a discussion o f all the component parts o f ‘Third Way’ thinking, but 
here contain m yself to the function that a particular understanding o f globalisation plays in the 
discourse. For a discussion o f the genesis o f third way theory, I refer the reader to Alan Finlayson, 
‘Third Way Theory’, Political Quartely, Vol 70, No.3., July-September 1999, pp271-280, and 
Michael Temple, ‘New Labour’s Third Way: Pragmatism and Governance’, British Journal o f  Politics 
and International Relations, Vol.2, No.3, October 2000, pp302-325. The essential elements o f third 
way theory are spelled out and thoroughly discussed in Anthony Giddens, The Third Wav. 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Anthony Giddens, The Third Wav and its Critics. (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2000); Anthony Giddens, (ed.), The Global Third Wav Debate. (Malden Mass.: Polity
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Third Way thinking is construed as being a pragmatic formula for “achieving
prosperity in a world of rapid economic and technological change”, given that “[b]ig
government doesn’t work, but no government works even less”.47 Blair draws a clear
line between now and the past, with old Left and new Right constituting the old
dogmatic views that characterise those times:
The political debates of the 20th century -  the massive ideological 
battleground between left and right -  are over. Echoes remain, but they 
mislead as much as they illuminate.48
The 21st century will not be a battle around ideology. But it will be a struggle 
for progress. Guided not by dogmatic ideology but by pragmatic ideals, it can 
be achieved.49
Unlike ‘old Left’ and ‘new Right’ thinking, there now exists a Third Way which is 
‘non-ideologicaT. It is not seen as a via media but rather a move beyond these 
ideologies.50 And it is this assertion that draws attention to the centrality of 
globalisation.
In a keynote speech given at the annual Confederation of Business Industry 
conference, Blair develops this relationship of Third Way politics with the present, 
arguing that it constitutes a progressive step beyond the dated ideological positions 
of the past:
I reject the rampant laissez-faire of those who believe government has no role 
in a productive economy; and I reject too, as out of date and impractical, the 
recreation or importation of a model of the corporate state popular a 
generation ago. Today the role of government is not to command but to
Press, 2001). For an account o f the Blairite debt to Giddens’ arguments, see C. Bryant, ‘The Third 
Way, Two Tonies -  and a Single Vision?’ European Consortium fo r  Political Research News, Vol 10, 
No.2, ppl7-18.
47 Blair, ‘The Third Way’, op.cit.
48 Tony Blair, ‘Doctrine of the International Community’, speech to the Economic Club o f Chicago, 
22nd April 1999.
49 Tony Blair, Untitled speech at the World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, 18* January 2000.
50 Andrew Vincent, ‘New Ideologies for Old?’ Political Quarterly, Vol.69, N o .l, 1998, pp48-58.
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facilitate, and to do so in partnership with industry in limited but key areas. 
This is not a matter of ideology but of national interest.51
The above approach shares in common certain traits that characterised the ‘end of 
ideology’ debate. This set of arguments, as outlined in chapter two, posited that the 
intensity of ideology was inversely correlated to the degree of economic 
development. The basic argument posited that as countries became increasingly 
‘developed’, ‘ideology’ would demise. What would remain was an increasingly 
‘technocratic’ role for the government. Ideologies, on this view, were associated with 
apparently rigid and dogmatic approaches such as Marxism. These were seen in 
contrast to the views held by the liberal western nation-states that had evolved 
beyond such positions.
In the above, Blair is keen to label the old Left and new Right as being out of date 
and ‘ideological’. Thus, as with ‘end of ideology’ theory, New Labour lends a 
pejorative association to the term. Moreover, and contrary to the approaches of the 
old Left and new Right, Third Way thinking is seen as something that transcends the 
ideological limitations associated with the former doctrines. It is held that the new 
context and set of associated trends (globalisation and ‘change’), bring with them the 
possibility of non-ideological progressive politics, beyond Left and Right, 
traditionally understood. That is, a set of objective circumstances brought about by 
change, and more specifically globalisation, has caused an obvious set of 
developments that demand uncontroversial (nondogmatic) responses. As a result, any 
government of the centre or centre-left all face the same array of problems, and
51 Tony Blair, ‘New Labour, New Economy’, speech to the annual conference o f the Confederation of  
British Industry, 13th November 1995.
52 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties. (Glenco 111.: 
Free Press, 1960).
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presumably simply need to apply the same (technocratic) mixture of solutions with 
ideology being supplanted by ‘national interest’.53
Thus replacing ‘development’ in this end of ideology thesis is ‘change’ and its 
implications. All states are confronted by a new set of issues, the logical response to 
which are similar -  openness, flexibility and deregulation. The pursuit of the national 
interest limits the role of government as being that of ‘facilitator’, working in 
‘partnership’ with industry in ‘limited’ areas. More specifically, the aim of 
intervention, Blair suggests, is to enhance competitiveness; targeting individuals in 
order to enhance their life chances, with the additional aim of providing a productive 
labour force. The fact that globalisation determines the approach means that the party 
has no alternative. Thus lacking any ‘room for manoeuvre’, and following the 
erasure of agency within the process, it is held that a space is created to viably talk of 
non- ideological (depoliticised) approach.54
With economic circumstances having put an end to the applicability of rigid 
ideological approaches, New Labour instead see a more technocratic role for 
government in attempting to realise ‘leftist’ values. Blair believes New Labour must 
now seek to realise the goals to which it aspires in a circumscribed context, one that 
embraces openness and accepts the ‘disciplines of the international economy’. The 
spectre of Tow cost countries’ looms large. In order to remain competitive British
53 “This is not a matter o f ideology but o f national interest”. Blair, ‘New Labour, New Economy’, 
op.cit.
5 According to Burnham, ‘depoliticisation’ can be understood as a governing strategy, “placing at one 
remove the political character o f decision-making”. Peter Burnham, ‘New Labour and the Politics of 
Depoliticisation’, British Journal o f  Politics and International Relations, Vol.3, No.2, June 2001, 
ppl27.
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industry can only operate where ‘knowledge’, ‘skills’ and ‘creativity’ form a key
, 55part:
In the end, none of our nations can compete in the old way. There is no future 
as low wage, low skill sweatshop economies with the rewards going to the 
few, in the hope they trickle down to the many.56
In the increasingly global economy of today, we cannot compete in the old 
way. Capital is mobile, technology can migrate quickly and goods can be 
made in low cost countries and shipped to developed markets. British 
business must compete by exploiting capabilities which its competitors 
cannot easily match or imitate.. .knowledge, skills and creativity.. ,57
This focus reinforces the importance of the labour market as a k ey issue at stake. 
Blair is keen to highlight the importance of ‘flexibility’, understood as ‘adaptability’ 
in a world of change. According to Blair, “[t]he word ‘flexible’ has a loaded meaning 
in the French translation. But for me it means adaptable”.58 Here ‘flexibility’ looses 
any pejorative associations due to the fact that it is now defined against change; thus 
as discussed, globalisation functions to de-politicise the issue.
And it is not just flexibility that benefits from this reorientation. The new imperatives 
associated with the rise of the global economy function to de-politicise a number of 
additional responsive measures, for example operational independence for the Bank 
of England.59 The management of interest rate policy and the money supply is also 
de-politicised in that it is reduced to being merely a technocratic issue. In fact Blair 
goes one step further.60 In line with the neoliberal distinction (and relative valuation)
55 See Stephen Driver & Luke Martell, New Labour: Politics After Thatcherism. (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1998), pp32-33.
56 Blair, ‘The Third Way’, op.cit.
57 Department o f Trade and Industry ‘Building the Knowledge-Driven Economy’ (White Paper), 
(London: The Stationary Office, 1998).
8 Blair, ‘The Third Way’, op.cit.
59 On this issue see Hay, The Political Economy o f  New Labour, op.cit., p.138.
60 The extent o f this shift is illustrated by the rejection o f a more modem and moderate variant o f  
leftist thinking; ‘stakeholding’. As Driver and Martell point out, one need only contrast Blair’s 
Singapore speech in 1995 with the position articulated in the 1997 Labour Mainifesto, A New 
Economic Future fo r  Britain. See Driver & Martell, New Labour: Politics After Thatcherism, op.cit.,
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of the role of the political and the economic, Blair suggests that “there is no longer
any right or left politics in economic management today”.61 According to Blair:
[t]he era o f  the grand i deologies -  all-encompassing, all-pervasive, total in  
their solutions, and often dangerous -  is over, hi particular, the battle between 
market and public sector is over.62
In this post ideological context then, the government’s role “becomes less about 
regulation than equipping people for economic change”. The role that the state does 
play in this altered and changing context concerns issues relating to the ‘supply side’. 
New Labour posits that it must now focus instead on ensuring a continued 
competitive advantage, reflecting what Cemy has coined as being the ‘competitive 
state’.64
Such a position reflects the development in thinking concerning the ‘new forces’ 
unleashed by globalisation. These determine that the essential role for government is 
to “[deliver] macro economic stability, [tackle] supply side barriers to growth, and 
[deliver] employment and economic opportunities for all.”65 In line with the Major 
government, a concern is placed on ‘sound money’, i.e. fiscal prudence (balancing 
the budget over the medium term), and keeping inflation within strictly set targets.66
pp51-60. See also Will Hutton, The State W e’re In. (London: Jonathon Cape, 1995); Gavin Kelly, 
Dominic Kelly & Andrew Gamble, (eds.), Stakeholder Capitalism. (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1997).
61 Blair, ‘The Third Way’, op.cit.
62 Tony Blair, ‘Security in a World o f Change: The New Politics of the Left’, in Tony Blair, New  
Britain: Mv Vision o f a Young Country. (London: Fourth Estate, 1996), p.213.
63 Blair, ‘The Third Way’, op.cit.
64 The ‘competitive state’, refers to the way in which states now struggle in an age o f globalisation to 
“retain a share o f a fixed stock of world capital”. Phil Cemy, The Changing Architecture o f Politics. 
(London: Sage, 1990). Quoted in Colin Hay & Matthew Watson, ‘Labour’s Economic Policy: 
Studiously Courting Competence’, in Gerald R. Taylor, (ed.), The Impact o f New Labour. (London: 
MacMillan Press Ltd, 1999), p.155.
65 Ed Balls, ‘Open Macro-Economics in an Open Economy’, Scottish Journal o f  Political Economy, 
Vol. 43, No. 2 ,1998, p.113.
66 In July 1997 fiscal policy was tied to two mles; “[f]irst, over the economic cycle, the government 
would only borrow to invest (public consumption would therefore be paid for by taxation). Secondly, 
the government would ensure that the level o f public debt as a proportion o f national income would be 
held at a stable and prudent level”. Burnham, New Labour and the Politics o f  Depoliticisation, op.cit.,
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This follows because credibility places a premium on stability.67 As Gordon Brown’s 
chief economic adviser points out, “the rapid globalization of the world economy has 
made achieving credibility more rather than less important, particularly for an
• / j o
incoming left-of-centre government”. Thus, in light of the importance of 
credibility, the policy effectively eschewed an interventionist role, and instead leads 
the party strategists to focus instead on the supply side of the economy.
Thompson surmises this position as being a kind of ‘supply side socialism’, 
involving a disavowal of ‘radical interventionism’ and Keynesianism, whilst 
stressing instead the import of supply side measures geared towards raising 
productivity and opportunity. These measures ultimately function to meet the 
aspiration of full employment and equality of opportunity. Though moving away 
from redistribution, the position does still favour a facilitating role for the state in 
aiding the employment opportunities of the individual. However, in macroeconomic 
terms this nonetheless implies a degree of ‘inactivism’, being concerned simply with 
securing stable monetary conditions.69 Keynesian thinking is rejected in favour of a 
belief that the economy is likely to tend toward equilibrium, and does not suffer from
7 0adjustment rigidities or insufficient demand at ‘full employment’ levels.
ppl41-142. The current inflation target is 2.5% growth in the retail price index. On this see Werner 
Bonefeld & Peter Burnham, ‘The Politics o f Counter-Inflationary Credibility in Britain’, 1990-1994’, 
in Review o f  Radical Political Economics, Vol.30, No. 1, 1998, pp.32-52.
67 For a critique o f this emphasis in favour of a ‘Neo-Keynesian’ approach see Will Hutton, ‘New  
Keynesianism and New Labour’, in Andrew Gamble & Tony Wright, The New Social Democracy. 
(Oxford: The Political Quarterly Publishing Co., 1999), pp97-102.
8 Balls, Open Macro Economics, op.cit., p .l 18. Of course it is not lost on the party that the 
humiliating devaluations of the past have all occurred during Labour terms o f office in 1949,1967 and 
1976.
69 See Noel Thompson, Political Economy and the Labour Party: The Economics o f Democratic 
Socialism 1884-1995. (London: UCL Press, 1996). See also, Nicholas Ellison, Egalitarian Thought 
and Labour Politics: Retreating Visions. (London: Routledge, 1994).
70 Hutton, New Keynesianism and New Labour, op.cit.
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Such a position however has remained controversial and subject to considerable 
debate in that the above policies approximate a more neo-liberal position in
71economic policy. What is obviously crucial in this respect is whether New Labour 
can justifiably present their position as being, not one of acquiescence, but rather as 
acceptance of an inevitable position that is essentially neither left nor right.
In this respect, we now see that this limited view of the state benefits from the 
obscure manner in which agency and causality operate. ‘Capital’ and ‘technology’ 
form two key elements that validate globalisation, underpin its significance, and 
validate the above position as not being one of acquiescence. To begin with, the 
mobile and transitory nature of capital and technology disciplines the demand side 
possibilities for government intervention. That is, the fiscal environment must 
balance the needs of attracting and retaining each, and of preventing capital flight. 
The spectre of a highly mobile form of capital and technology is then used to justify 
both ‘flexibility’ in the labour market, and a ‘competitive’ tax regime.
There nonetheless remains little discussion of what ‘capital’ is, or who controls it. As 
Hirst has pointed out, in the case of capital, the question remains -  what ‘capital’ are
77you talking about? In gauging the significance of this point, little can be interpreted 
about it in terms of universals other than that a ‘mobile’ form of capital perhaps 
represents a bigger problem for the United Kingdom than Germany, due to its greater
71 See Hay, The Political Economy o f  New Labour, op.cit.
72 Hirst points out that “[fi]rst it is firms, and, as we have seen, even most large multi-nationals have 
been reluctant to re-locate their core production facilities away from their main markets. Secondly, it 
is funds mobilised by financial institutions, but these are in the main the savings, pensions and life 
insurance o f the broad middle class o f the advanced industrial countries... [therefore] those flows can 
be controlled to some degree by public policy.. .[finally] [d]omestic capital markets still provide 90 
per cent o f national investment”. Paul Hirst, ‘Globalisation and Social Democracy’, in Gamble & 
Wright, The New Social Democracy, op.cit, p.88.
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n'Xreliance on finance capital from abroad. Blair remains silent on the possibilities of 
legislating in order to affect the impact for example of short terms speculative flows, 
or the possibility of taxing them. He is able to do so, I argue, due to the current 
predominance and general acceptance of the strong thesis of globalisation. The 
general consensus has it that such a position would simply be absurd.
Additionally, globalisation, presented as a ‘process-without-a-subj ect ’, denotes the 
occurrence of nominalization, as it represents change as if  it were a noun. This 
purposely backgrounds such agents of change as ‘multi-national’ and ‘trans-national’ 
companies.74 Where Blair and New Labour do discuss business, it is in terms of 
British business defined vis-a-vis foreign companies, done however, not in order to 
unmask the agents most significant in driving the agenda for change, but rather, to 
instil a sense of patriotism, doing their bit to keep us all ahead of the race.
So we may say that the desire to tar the old left and conservative right with the 
pejorative label ‘ideology’, whilst staking a non-ideological position is in fact 
untenable, not least because Blair erroneously assumes that one can distinguish 
between a ‘right’ and ‘ wrong’ political doctrine according to  some non-normative 
objective criteria. New Labour’s discourse argues that globalisation and the new 
global economy have fundamentally altered the domestic setting and what it is 
possible to achieve in it, and from this imply that political thinking has altered, now 
occurring in a new space as it were, a new constellation of opportunity and 
constraint. An objective set of circumstances now confronts all countries such that 
the parameters of what may be considered sensible are entirely circumscribed. Given
73 Hutton, The State We ’re In, op.cit.
74 This will be discussed in greater detail in chapter six.
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this, the argument forwarded is that a ‘rational’ state will be compelled to pursue the 
‘national i nterest’, n ow understood i n t erms o f  r emaining a head o f  t he r ace. T hey 
will embrace this logic and as such forgo doctrines that are ideological (meaning 
unreceptive to the inevitable). Thus the central role of government in this period is 
solely “to equip the country and its people for change”.75
This account not only derives from a set of erroneous epistemological assumptions, 
but also naively assumes a non-constitutive role for the actors in the construction of 
globalisation. Recognising this constitutive dimension to  social reality undermines 
the ontological status accorded to globalisation. Globalisation cannot be thought of 
as giving rise to an objective set of conditions separate from the actor’s implication 
in reifying (and interpreting) a particular set of processes. Recognising such 
‘complicity’ results in the ‘politicising’ of the current set of processes denoted as 
‘globalisation’. This means that it is not tenable to derive a non-ideological 
‘pragmatic’ programme.
In summary, following a particular understanding of globalisation, New Labour 
attempt to ‘de-politicise’ their programme, ‘objectifying’ in its place the pursuit of 
the ‘national interest’. This is portrayed as being a move beyond the traditional old 
left and new right positions, and thus its significance resides in the fact that it is 
presented as superior, novel and non-ideological (assuming ideology to be a bad 
thing). This however is nonetheless a flawed position. It is based on an erroneous 
conceptualisation of globalisation ontologically as a ‘thing-in-itself, that in turn 
allows for a de-politicised political agenda, which itself is unsustainable
75 Blair, Untitled speech by the Prime Minister at the World Economic Forum, (Jan 2000), op.cit.
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epistemologically. Once it is recognised that globalisation, as understood by Blair, is 
a set of processes constituted by key agents, and sustained by a particular 
perspective, the process once more becomes politicised, and the aspiration to locate 
the role of government as one geared towards facilitating competitiveness becomes 
questionable, questionable that is, in light of the assertion that this remains a 
nominally leftist agenda.
The Normative Dimension to Globalisation.
For New Labour, as with many of the initial proponents of the ‘strong’ globalisation 
thesis, the impact of globalisation is generally viewed as being either a neutral or 
good thing. Though globalisation has functioned as a compelling force precluding 
any alternative, contained in the New Labour understanding is also, and necessarily, 
a more positive normative position. This positive orientation follows not just from 
the liberal assumptions underlying the process, but also from the need to avoid a 
negative fatalism, given that the process is considered unavoidable. This positive 
dimension encourages people and businesses to ‘embrace’ the changes associated 
with globalisation, in order that they may all benefit from the wealth that 
globalisation is assumed to bring.
And in pursuing this position, a central idea of the Third Way is that the new setting 
allows for the reconciliation of previously antagonistic themes. This plays down the 
possibility of increasing division following from the unfolding trends -  as associated
76 This constitutes a recurrent theme at the heart of New Labour thinking; “[m]y vision o f the 21st 
century is o f a popular politics reconciling themes which in the past have wrongly been regarded as 
antagonistic -  patriotism and internationalism; rights and responsibilities; the promotion o f enterprise 
and the attack on poverty and discrimination”. Blair, ‘The Third Way: New Politics for the New  
Century’, op.cit. See also Gordon Brown, Fair is Efficient. (Fabian Pamphlet 563, Fabian Society, 
London, 1994).
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with more complex accounts of globalisation -  in favour of a view that stresses a 
sense of ‘we-ness’ forming. The aspiration o f enhancing a sense of community is not 
assumed to be undermined by the social forces associated with the global market. 
Likewise, Blair rejects the view that there may exist profoundly individualistic 
dynamics to remaining constantly ‘ahead of the race’, and dismisses the possibility 
that these dynamics might work to undermine any commitment to ‘community’ as an 
ideal. It is assumed that, even though the gap between the rich and poor continues to 
grow (both globally and domestically), a sense of community nonetheless can be 
expected to deepen. Thus, an important element to the analysis is the presumption 
that globalisation is a non-divisive and progressive force.
The new changes ascribed to globalisation function to dispel any idea that the 
process will exacerbate economic divisions that in their turn might augment internal 
differences. This is perhaps where the New Labour account deviates most sharply 
from the more complex formulations of the second wave, which stress the dialectical 
nature of the unfolding process.
Figure 4.1
New Labour Attitude Towards Globalisation and its impact on the 
Domestic Realm: 1996-1999.
Good Neutral
Allows for the subsequent re­
conciliation of what was 
previously thought o f as 
antagonistic elements.
Does not challenge New Labour 
values.
Delivers economic growth Demands response.
Encourages a sense o f ‘we-ness’. Determines agenda.
To be embraced. Does not exacerbate divisions
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The above table summarises the essential elements to this normative appraisal 
discussed above. In addition to the positive assumptions listed above, a view of the 
‘new times’ brought about by globalisation also leads Blair to re-evaluate what it 
means to be on the ‘left’. Thus Blair evokes globalisation in order to justify both the 
depoliticising of certain means and a re-examining of the values associated with the 
left. According to Blair, it is necessary to distil the essential values (or ends) that
7 7have always traditionally defined the moderate parliamentary left.
It is important to recognise that discussion of what the values of New Labour are, 
and how they should be realised in the context of globalisation, becomes a key issue 
for Third Way theory. Blair needs to continue the pursuit of certain ‘values’ -  
constitutive o f  t he 1 eft -  b ut t o r ealise t hese v alues a long p ragmatic 1 ines. T his i s 
crucial in that it connects Third Way philosophy to its leftist past and as a result, the 
approach retains its credentials in the eyes of the left. And it is this requirement that 
determines a positive assessment of globalisation.
In approaching the issue, Blair distinguishes between timeless ‘ideals’ and passing 
fads, giving rise to the idea that Third Way politics involves ‘a voyage of re­
discovery’. The realisation of these values is timeless and untouched by the changed 
context; the ‘outdated ideological baggage’ only referring to the old ideals of Labour
70
and of the New Right -  their ‘means’, and sometimes ‘ends’. Each, as has been
77 Blair, ‘The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century’, op.cit. See also Michael Temple, ‘New  
Labour’s Third Way: Pragmatism and Governance’, British Journal o f  Politics and International 
Relations, Vol.2, No.3, October 2000, p.309.
78 Blair recognises that the ‘ends’ are sometimes also mistaken; “during the 1960’s and 1970’s the 
left... appeared indifferent to the family and individual responsibility, which was wrong.” Tony Blair,
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discussed, is  negatively associated with b eing ‘ dogmatic’, understood as rigid and 
meaning unresponsive to change. In contradistinction, the Third Way is understood 
differently, not just as being a pragmatic response to a given set of realities, but also 
as a programme where “[t]here are no ideological preconditions, no predetermined 
veto on means.”79 As a result “[w]hat counts is what works”, but with the proviso 
that, “if we don’t take this attitude, change traps us, paralyses us and defeats us.”80
In offering a new foundation, a concern is then placed on distilling these essential
values, which are considered to be “the belief in justice, liberty, equality of status,
above all the belief that it is in a strong society of others that the needs of the
individual are fulfilled”:81
The Third Way stands for a modernised social democracy, passionate in its 
commitment to social justice and the goals of the centre-left, but flexible, 
innovative and forward-looking in the means to achieve them. It is founded 
on the values that have guided progressive politics for more than a century -  
democracy, liberty, justice, mutual obligation and internationalism.82
In addition to the above list of values, additional values are cited, including: “equal 
worth, opportunity for all, responsibility, community” ; and “fairness, j ustice, the
O A
equal w orth a nd d ignity o f  a 11”. When e xtended t o t he 1 ntemational p lane, t hese
‘Security in a World o f Change: The Politics o f the New Left’, speech to the Newscorp Leadership 
Conference, Hayman Island, Australia, 17th July 1995, in Blair, New Britain, op.cit., pp203-214.
79 Blair, ‘The Third Way’, op.cit. As with the discussion on the ‘global economy’, Blair also adopts 
the strategy o f listing these values, avoiding the need to relate each according to a deeper underlying 
theory o f cause and effect.
80 Blair, ‘The Third Way’, op.cit.
81 Blair, ‘Facing The Modem Challenge’, op.cit.
82 Blair, ‘The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century’, op.cit. Quoted in Fairclough, New 
Labour, New Language, op.cit., p.46.
83 Blair, ‘The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century’, op.cit.
84 Tony Blair, speech to the Institute for Public Policy Research, London, 14th January 1999. Quoted 
in Fairclough, New Labour, New Language, op.cit., p.46.
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values are the same as those held by the ‘international community’, and include 
“liberty, the rule of law, human rights, and an open society”.85
Again, the problem with arguing for this ‘list’ of values is that the approach glosses 
over how they are related, and how they are to be realised. Given that I have posited 
that ‘change’ in the form of globalisation is essentially understood here as 
liberalisation, it is questionable that the mechanics of the solution can be truly 
connected to a Labour position of the past. Furthermore, any moderate party could 
endorse these values in themselves, be they of the left or the right. But it is thanks to 
the lack of any deeper critique that Blair is able to avoid the thorny issues that would 
arise related to reconciling ‘fairness’ and ‘opportunity for all’.86
Nevertheless, the different shape that these questions now take no longer 
problematises issues relating to the desirability and structural inadequacy of a society 
organised in accordance with norms associated with the ‘market society’.87 And yet, 
in light of globalisation, the discourse is able to avoid the difficulty of providing a 
critique of capitalism. Blair is therefore able to retain his credentials as a left of 
centre reformist. Third Way thinking is, as a result, able to locate itself on the left, 
though now only by positing a continued adherence to a particular set of ‘ends’ or 
values. The means to realising these ends are not in any fundamental sense prevented 
by capitalism.
85 Blair. ‘Doctrine o f the International Community’, op.cit.
86 For example, what opportunities does Blair have in mind in thinking about ‘opportunity for all’, and 
how might a more polarised set o f circumstances, i.e., greater inequality, in fact be reconciled with a
view o f ‘fairness’ that truly aspires to equal opportunity? From the perspective o f the left, it is 
generally held that equality o f opportunity requires, if  it is to be achievable, certain redistributive 
measures concerned with arriving at a ‘level playing field’.
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This is however, at best a tenuous assumption, more an article of faith than a valid 
position. Blair does not provide any justification as to why we should assume that the 
fundamental ends that have timelessly defined the left can now be assumed to come 
about provided we ‘embrace’ globalisation, and accept the strictures that it 
determines. What is surprising in this discourse is the lack of debate that has been 
sparked concerning the n ature of these values that apparently define the left in an 
ahistorical manner. This might in part be due to the amorphous choice of values 
listed.
And yet from the analysis in chapter three, a number of points can be made that 
would suggest that the above assumptions are perhaps too readily optimistic. 
Manifested as ‘liberalisation’, certain empirical assumptions, concerning the neutral 
and progressive nature of the process can be laid to rest. As liberalisation, certain 
individuals and institutions are favoured at the cost of others: for example, 
‘flexibility’ is not borne equally by all.88
In positively promoting globalisation to each member of society, New Labour 
assumes that each can and will benefit. And yet, drawing on the complex literature, 
stressing a s i t d oes t he dialectical n ature o f  c ontemporary changes, w e s hould n ot 
assume that change allows for a redefinition of a newly unified group, and so does 
not offer the possibility of reconciliation. According to Blair, all those affected by 
globalisation and change are no longer understood as being divided along class lines 
or in terms of winners and losers. Instead, all of society’s individuals are depicted as
87 Lionel Jospin famously distinguished between a market economy and a market society, pointing out 
that the latter, though implicit in the third way, was nonetheless undesirable.
88 See Richard Sennet, The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences o f Work in the New  
Capitalism. (London: W.W.Norton &Company, 1998).
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being united and unified in the face of transformation and change. All are considered 
to potentially benefit through the novel opportunities for advancement that 
globalisation b rings. T he f  orces t hat u nite t hem c an t hus n ow e clipse any i ntemal 
divisions. The unifying glue is no longer nationality, or a common concern for 
security in the face of an enemy. Instead, the communitarian values of solidarity and 
collectivism are to be realised in a decidedly individualist manner -  against the 
backdrop of a collective experience of change and insecurity in a global economy. 
Each individual is now united by the fact that they are all, as members of the nation-
O Q
state, locked into a new competitive environment.
This form of competition is not for security but for prosperity and continued 
development. As such it is non-antagonistic, in the sense that it does not develop into 
anything other than a benign competition - as when individuals compete with one 
another in any market society. The form that this competition takes is not assumed to 
dissolve any sense of unity. The assumption is that these developments do not cut 
across societies, rather they work to unite them, solidifying them in the face of 
change, rather than dividing them.
Yet a tension nonetheless exists between the forces of globalisation (liberalisation) 
and individualisation on the one hand, both of which are inextricably linked, and on 
the other hand the aspiration of sustaining and renewing the community as an active 
political ideal. In the New Labour account, these are not depicted as antithetical. 
However, it could be argued that individuals, located within an increasingly polarised
89 Blair, speech to the IPPR, 14th Jan 1999, op.cit. A key element to the Third Way is the concept of  
‘individualisation’. See Giddens, The Third Way, op.cit; Ullrich Beck, Anthony Giddens & Scott 
Lash, Reflexive Modernisation: Politics. Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modem Social Order.
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context, will not see their interests lying either with each other, or with companies, 
but rather with the smaller subgroups of ‘losers’ that are developing, be they 
economic, or given expression in ethnic, religious or environmental terms.90
This position, in line with more complex thinking on globalisation, rightly stresses 
the dialectical (at once unifying and fragmenting) nature of current 
interconnectedness. As will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, the assumptions 
that allow for this become increasingly tenuous, as they are confronted by the reality 
of counter positions, and as this position is forced to work out its own logic by 
turning towards the ‘external’ dimension to this argument.
Conclusion: A Preliminary Assessment of the Domestic Function and Significance of 
Globalisation for New Labour.
How are we then to assess the function and significance of globalisation in this 
period? In this chapter, I have begun to develop a critical analysis of the 
understanding o f  globalisation t hat h as figured i n t he N ew Labour d iscourse, h ere 
focussing on Blair and the domestic impact globalisation is purported to have. This 
understanding, largely r eflecting a particular view of globalisation prevalent at the 
time, is I argue unsatisfactory. Most obviously, it conflates globalisation with 
liberalisation, and as a result, tends to rather glibly assume the process to be 
progressive and in the interests of all. It is highly deterministic, obscure, and 
empirically untenable.
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994). See also, David Marquand, Re-inventing the Left. (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1994).
90 Likewise, an increasing number of ‘cosmopolitan’ winners might increasingly identify with others 
in a same position but in other countries.
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During this period, covering roughly the years 1996 to 1999, Blair consistently 
depicts the forces of globalisation in such a way as to suggest that the economically 
and politically possible is narrowed.91 This narrowing can be explained by a number 
of factors: the disciplinary consequences of adopting certain neo-liberal premises; the 
structural inevitability writ into the depiction of change and globalisation as 
something existing ‘out there’; and the obfuscatory consequences of persistently 
understanding globalisation as a ‘process without a subject’, which leads to an 
inability to identify agency within the process. Each of the above elements is 
problematic. ‘Globalisation’ does not determine outcomes in the way Blair suggests. 
There remains, as argued in the previous chapter, considerable room for manoeuvre; 
choices remain, and become all the more clear once it is recognised that key agents 
determine the particular form that change currently takes.
Secondly, though the ‘forces’ of globalisation driving economic change are presented 
as inevitable, they are nonetheless considered to be progressive and potentially 
inclusive. Contrary to much thinking on the left, globalisation is portrayed positively 
-  as an opportunity for all, it is not considered to be divisive. Thus, from a normative 
perspective, globalisation is considered a good thing that does not present any 
fundamental challenge to ‘the left’. Yet this is difficult to sustain. In light of a series 
of observable trends, one is led to the view that globalisation qua liberalisation, 
favours certain groups at the price of others. However, the significance of this 
particular understanding of globalisation in this respect is that Blair does not have to 
confront this issue; its benign nature can be assumed.
91 Hay & Watson, Labour’s Economic Policy, op.cit., p.155.
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Yet there is a further reason for the New Labour approach to stress the positive 
aspects to globalisation. This is because without such an approach, it would not be 
possible to connect with the left and the values that underpin social democracy. In 
other words globalisation functions to bridge a gap. This relates to an apparent 
antithesis: how New Labour are able to both endorse and accept the disciplinary 
consequences of an open neo-liberal regime and an already existent new global 
economy, and yet still posit that they can and do represent a valid leftist alternative.
Because they present the process as progressive and unavoidable, New Labour must 
eschew any critique of capitalism and the market.92 However, and in order to 
continue to locate themselves in the leftist tradition, New Labour contend that they 
offer a novel (and radical) political philosophy that they label the ‘Third Way’. This 
functions to sustain credibility in the eyes of the left (be they traditional leftist 
electors, or Labour party activists and members), by arguing that the circumstances 
brought about on account of globalisation justifies the stance that they take. This 
explains why ‘globalisation’ underpins the idea of a ‘Third Way’, hence its central 
significance. The belief that there might exist any contradiction between acceptance 
of the global market and continued fidelity to leftist values is considered to be 
misconceived, as the new context allows for the reconciliation of many of the themes 
traditionally thought of as antagonistic. The context functions to allow for the 
reconciliation of a number of traditional antagonisms associated with the left.
Instead, antagonistic groups now find that they are unified in the face of change. Yet 
the nature of New Labour’s argument is more that these themes are not so much
92 Seen by Hall as a step too far. Stuart Hall, ‘Son o f Margaret’, New Staesman and Society, 6th 
October 1997.
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reconciled as eclipsed; they are less significant once judged against the price of not 
responding in the appropriate way to the imminent challenge globalisation 
represents. It is the spectre of the alternative that in fact ‘unifies’ the country, 
suggesting as much a negative function to globalisation and how it is utilised.
Finally, a key conclusion that can be drawn from this phase of the analysis pertains 
to the constitutive nature of the process. Globalisation, though a contested idea, is 
ultimately constituted on the basis of ongoing interpretations, and the New Labour 
position towards ‘globalisation’ is highly informative in this respect. The effect of 
the particular New Labour orientation and understanding effectively reproduces a 
particular set of processes. And this is of great significance when judging and 
understanding the short-term significance of ‘globalisation’ in terms of its domestic 
impact and operation.
Acting on the basis of a particular idea of the ‘global economy’, accepted ‘on its own 
terms’, determines a particular ‘global logic’; in which liberalisation, openness, 
deregulation and flexibility become inevitable (though desirable). As a result, 
‘globalisation’ functions to create and reinforce a set of circumstances that can be 
said to further determine their options. And this is in line with the constitutive 
dimension outlined here.
Thus an initial simple reading of this dynamic draws attention to the possibility that 
as this position b ecomes entrenched, then sodoes ‘ globalisation’, w ith the double 
bind that as a result the idea increasingly resembles the very process said to be 
determining these policies in the first place (thus further validating such a selective
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response). This however is only a possibility, and, I will argue, in the longer term an 
unlikely one at that, in that the domestic arguments by their nature are dependent for 
their success on additional factors, beyond the control of the leadership.
And so what are these additional factors? In the next chapter I draw attention to 
perhaps the most important consideration, and that is the function played by a 
particular foreign policy. The argument that is to be made is that a successful 
domestic ‘Third Way’ depends, not just upon ‘globalisation’ underpinning it as a 
force on the outside determining, and so validating a programme on the inside, but 
also ‘globalisation’ being sold in the Blairite form abroad. That is to say, the 
domestic and foreign orientations are co-dependent. Foreign policy becomes an 
increasingly important site for New Labour thinking, as it can be seen as a site that 
resolves certain concerns that are seen to flow from the domestic impact of the 
process (selectively understood).
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Chapter 5
‘Globalisation’ and the Formulation of New Labour Foreign Policy
“ What applies at home within a nation, applies abroad between nations. Just as citizens 
within a country reach out for the strength o f the community to help them confront the 
challenge o f economic and social security, so nations are coming together to promote 
trade and prosperity, peace and international order” 1
“/  was very struck reading through the papers for your discussion that not all 
contributors showed that sense o f confidence, comfort and ease about globalisation”. 2
Introduction
In the following chapter I will critically examine the significance of globalisation in the 
context of thinking about New Labour’s foreign policy. To do so, I examine the 
accounts of Cook and Blair who together have developed New Labour thinking in this 
realm, concentrating on key speeches delivered between 1998 and 2001.
I begin by relating the international with the domestic, suggesting that the issues 
discussed in the previous chapter in part explain the need for a particular foreign policy, 
different in certain respects from the past. Thus, in  understanding ‘globalisation’, the 
analysis draws attention to how it functions between the two realms, shaping a particular 
argument both in content, form and orientation.
1 Tony Blair, ‘Managing Change: A National and International Agenda of Reform’, speech at the World 
Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, 28th January 2000.
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This then draws me into a discussion of the main themes outlined by Cook and Blair, 
i.e., the significance globalisation has for them in terms of foreign policy formulation. In 
this respect I critically examine the function globalisation plays in terms of validating an 
‘ethical’ policy that places human rights as a central yet unproblematic feature to foreign 
policy, how globalisation leads to a redefinition of sovereignty, and how globalisation 
allows for a qualification of the principle of non-intervention. This, it will be seen, in 
turn rests upon a further set of assumptions that follows from an understanding of 
globalisation, relating to the idea that the national and global interest coincide, and that, 
in light of globalisation, a universal set of values are developing, brought about thanks to 
a natural harmony of interests.
Finally, and in order to better make sense of this view, I draw attention to the fact that 
this so called ‘third way’ approach is in effect ‘solidarist’ in its orientation, drawing 
upon the English School of thinking about international society: implying as it does, a 
move beyond certain realist assumptions, whilst retaining a state centric approach. I 
question this approach, drawing attention to certain limitations, that I argue stem from 
their problematic view of globalisation. I argue that ultimately globalisation does not 
hold out the opportunity of adumbrating a ‘third way’ in foreign policy.
Globalisation and the Domestic Analogy
The discourse on globalisation and change in the previous chapter entailed a reappraisal 
of the nature of leftist means (and arguably ends). In accepting the disciplinary
2 Robin Cook, ‘The Challenges of Globalisation’, speech to the Trilateral Commission at the International 
Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 9th March 2001.
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consequences of an open global economy (selectively defined), Blair argues for a 
wholesale rethinking of political agency. This rethink largely narrows opportunities, but 
also generates new areas for productive intervention. It was seen that in moving beyond 
traditional left and right approaches, Blair posits an ‘end of ideology’ thesis, in which he 
contends that the novel progressive programme associated with this new approach no 
longer suffers from the limitations of traditional left and right thinking. Superior because 
the approach escapes the problem of rigidity and dogmatism, Blair also suggests that 
globalisation now enables certain antagonistic themes characterising the domestic realm 
to be reconciled.
This approach, however, reflects both a particular phase in thinking about globalisation 
(the ‘first phase’), that uncritically accepts a ‘strong thesis’ account, and, focussed as it 
is only on its domestic significance, also constitutes a sort of ‘truncated’ 
conceptualisation. From this there follows two important factors. First, over time, we see 
that the strong thesis gives way to more complex conceptualisations o f  globalisation. 
Thus, to the extent that the New Labour depends on this view, it is increasingly subject 
to the need to be modified or changed. Second, the understanding of globalisation 
naturally develops to take into account the necessity of incorporating an international 
dimension to the programme. That is, the logic of the argument necessitates a particular 
position on foreign policy: ‘what applies within a nation’, must now ‘apply abroad 
between nations’. Each of these features overlap, to make for a problematic set of 
arguments on the significance of globalisation when judged in terms of the impact it is 
purported to have on foreign policy.
3 In this regard I am thinking of certain ‘supply side’ interventions.
155
Thus, to begin with, for New Labour the ideas associated with the Third Way cannot be 
comprehended if thinking is spatially confined within the borders of the state. Given the 
‘world as it is’, Cook and Blair posit that there is also a Third Way philosophy in foreign 
affairs.4 According to Blair, “the forces of necessity, even of survival are driving us to 
co-operation.”5 S olutions, at one t ime a ssumed to b e f  ound w ithin t he b orders o f  t he 
state, will now remain unresolved unless answers can be found in the international 
realm. Hence the particular understanding of globalisation (seen as the ‘driving force’ 
underpinning the third way), inevitably gives rise in time to a focus being placed on the 
international implications of globalisation. Alternatively put, in light of the domestic 
significance of globalisation, foreign policy formulation becomes an increasingly 
important ‘site’ for resolving certain issues as “[w]e can no longer separate what we 
want to achieve within our borders from what we face across our borders”.6
As a result, both Blair and Cook are led to formulate an agenda in which the domestic 
and international are increasingly inseparable. Hence the importance of the domestic 
analogy: according to Peter Hain, former FCO Minister of State, it is now in fact 
possible to talk of the end of foreign policy, “as the concept of ‘foreign’ becomes ever
4 Cook first talks o f a third way in foreign policy in 1998; Robin Cook,‘The First Year’, speech at the 
Mansion House, London, 23rd April 1998. He then distances himself from this in November o f the same 
year; Robin Cook, New Statesman, November 13th 1998. Blair first discusses a ‘third way’ in foreign 
policy in a speech at the beginning o f 1999 in South Africa; Tony Blair, ‘Facing the Modem Challenge: 
the Third Way in Britain and South Africa’, Cape Town, South Africa, 8th January 1999. See Mark 
Wickham-Jones, ‘Labour’s Trajectory in Foreign Affairs: The Moral Crusade of a Pivotal Power?’, in 
Richard Little & Mark Wickham-Jones, (eds.), New Labour’s Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade?’. 
(Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2000), p. 17.
5 Tony Blair, ‘The Third Way’, speech given to the French Assembly, France, 24th March 1998.
6 Tony Blair, ‘A New Era of International Partnership’, speech to the 53rd United Nations General 
Assembly, 21st September 1998.
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harder to contemplate”.7 And this draws attention to thinking, not just about the status 
that globalisation now gives to foreign policy as an important site, but also how it shapes 
the actual content and form that the argument can now take.
Blair and Cook believe that what is required is the ‘will’ and ‘vision’ to chart a new
course within this apparently novel context; to be open to new ideas and to no longer
remain wedded to outdated ways of thinking. In contrast to the conservative forces,
inherently incapable of dealing with the novelty of the times, the ‘progressive’ approach
of the centre and centre left is well placed. Both believe that it is the left that is in fact
uniquely qualified to rise to the challenge because “[i]t is parties of the left of centre, 
t
with their preference for collective solutions, who are better fitted to  understand and
o
operate in the modem multilateral world”. By way of contrast, the reactionary ‘forces of 
the right’, unlike the ‘progressive forces of the left’, remain “hopelessly and touchingly 
to an outdated model of the nation state in isolation”.9 In contrast to the view that one 
simply responds according to the ‘logic of the international system’, both instead stress a 
proactive, constitutive role for policy, moving beyond the confines of a ‘narrow 
realpolitik\ and paradoxically lending a ‘left’ and ‘right’ twist to policy in its place (at a 
time when it transcended domestically).10
7 Peter Hain, ‘The End of Foreign Policy?’, speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham 
House, 22nd January 2001.
8 Cook, ‘The Challenges of Globalisation’, op.cit.
9 Ibid.
10 Robin Cook, ‘British Foreign Policy’, Locarno Suite, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 12* May 
1997. On the ‘logic’ o f the international system see Barry Buzan, Richard Little & Charles Jones, The 
Logic of Anarchy: Neo-Realism to Structural Realism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
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In more substantive terms, drawing attention to the argumentative form as well as 
content key, themes developed by Blair in thinking about globalisation in the domestic 
realm are translated into thinking about the international realm. The metaphor of the 
marketplace gives rise to thinking in terms of ‘competition’ and ‘co-operation’. Just as 
the need to be competitive defines a role for the government on the supply side, it also 
functions as a metaphor for the manner in which ‘states without enemies’ now interact.11 
The principle concern of states in light of globalisation is that they continually seek to 
maintain a competitive advantage on the shifting sands of the global marketplace.
States that will be successful in an era of globalisation will be those that adopt particular 
ways: those of a ‘progressive’ modem state. ‘Progressive’ means that they must accept 
the market, certain strictures of accountability, individual freedoms and liberty. Where a 
state exercises just such measures, it is no longer seen as a potential enemy but is rather 
more likely to be a partner for co-operation and a benign competitor. And these 
strictures are made all the more palatable as they are represented as being not so much 
political values or Western mores, but common sense responsive measures given the 
reality of the world as it now is. The objective quality to context thus enables Blair and 
Cook to espouse these measures as if they are universal and not parochial.
Success in an age of globalisation holds out not just the promise of a more benign 
political environment, but also the prospect of dealing with problems pertaining to the 
natural environment. In pursuing the goal o f  economic growth - that is in  embracing
11 Ulrich Beck, The Re-Invention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order. 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997).
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globalisation - the required dynamism functions to promote democratisation and 
accountability. This follows because a dynamic economy requires incentives and
19creativity, which in turn demands ever-greater personal freedom. A harmony of 
interests develops out of this new context, so that as nation-states each respond, ever- 
greater levels of co-operation and collective problem solving are expected. As in the 
domestic realm, the challenges represented by globalisation are resoundingly positive; 
the forces associated with globalisation are not seen to exacerbate conflict and 
insecurity. On the contrary, they set up a dynamic that will allow for the solution of new 
problems, unique to an ‘age of globalisation’. Globalisation, on this view, serves to unify 
states, as it does individuals, confronting and embracing change.
Britain i s p resented a s b eing 1 ike a ny o ther n ation-state i n t he global a ge, h aving t he 
same concerns and interests as any other state (excepting certain ‘rogue’ states). As with 
individuals in  the domestic setting, each state not only experiences globalisation and 
change in the same way, but is also as a result compelled to respond in essentially 
similar ways. This response, one of liberalisation and openness, is not seen to be a 
particularly British or Western diagnosis. Rather, the New Labour diagnosis is seen as a 
view that in a fundamental sense could be endorsed by any nation-state struggling with 
the impact of globalisation. It is, as with the approach advocated domestically, 
effectively neutral and not ‘ideological’.
12 Robin Cook, ‘The Influence of Ideas o f 1989 On Foreign Policy’, speech given at the Centre for the 
Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science, 13th January 2000.
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As in the domestic realm, the form that the argument takes is to posit that ‘antagonistic’ 
themes are ‘reconciled’. The national interest is no longer seen as being opposed to a 
‘global interest’. British ‘values’ are seen to be in harmony with the values of the 
‘international community’, which are themselves synonymous with universal values. In 
this political philosophy, the concept of interests becomes more capacious. British 
interests equate with the interests of the international community, they are held by all 
individual members of this community, and are not exclusively or primarily about 
security. The pursuit of human rights for example, are no longer potentially subversive 
of harmonious relations between states concerned with pursuing economic interests, but 
rather are increasingly seen to be in the global interest. The same applies to promoting 
democracy and greater accountability. Thus, on this view, globalisation works to 
undermine any fundamental conflict of issues amongst members of the international 
community. ‘Fundamental’ here, implies the potential to move beyond the realpolitik of 
yesteryear. The active pursuit of solutions to particular problems associated with 
globalisation work to encourage ever-greater solidarity in the international domain, 
rather than ignite tensions or fuel potential conflicts.
And though there are obvious parallels between this view, and earlier ‘Utopian’ or 
‘Liberal Idealist’ accounts such as proffered by the likes of Leonard Woolf, Blair and 
Cook stress the novelty of the situation, assuming as they do, that globalisation is 
historically unprecedented; thus rejecting the sceptical position on globalisation.13 That
13 See David Long & Peter Wilson, Thinkers of the Twenty Years Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed. 
(New York: Clarendon Press, 1995).
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is, the process is not agent driven, but a given. It therefore changes the rules of the game 
as it changes the context in which action is now undertaken.
So, the traditional antagonisms reflected in differing national interests ‘fuse’. A 
symbiosis occurs, whereby the global and the national interest increasingly become the 
same t hing. T his h as t he e ffect o f  d epoliticising m uch o f  w hat i s a ssociated w ith t he 
national interest.14 The benefit, that now, pursuing the UK’s interests, what Williams 
refers to as ‘traditional British foreign policy practices’, is the same as pursuing a set of 
interests that are global, and therefore universal.15
Thus replicating the idea of a move beyond left and right in the domestic realm, Blair 
and Cook argue that we can now also move beyond two positions in the international 
realm. That is we can move beyond the now dated ‘realist’ and ‘idealist’ stances. This 
has unsurprisingly drawn considerable attention.16
In an important analysis of New Labour’s foreign policy, Wheeler and Dunne posit that 
this represents “a marked shift”, not least because it results in a move away from any
17consensus between the parties concerning the nature of the international realm. 
Hitherto, the conceptual landscape determined that disputes were conducted in terms of 
the binary division of realist pragmatism and a more cosmopolitan idealism. Now, it is
14 Robin Cook, ‘Foreign Policy and National Interest’, speech by the Foreign Secretary to the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 28th January 2000.
15 Paul Williams, ‘The Rise and Fall of the ‘Ethical’ Dimension’, Cambridge Review o f  International 
Affairs, Vol. 15, N o.l, 2002, p.53.
16 See the series of discussions in Little and Wickham-Jones, New Labour's Foreign Policy, op.cit.
17 Nicholas J Wheeler & Tim Dunne, ‘Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign 
Policy’, International Affairs, Vol.74, No.4, 1998, p.850.
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claimed, Cook and New Labour are beginning to forge a ‘new direction’, which, though
1 ftproblematic, is nonetheless to be commended. Wheeler and Dunne point to five areas 
of particular significance: first, “the desire to project a different identity”; second “the 
new language of international relations adopted”; third “an ethical dimension”; fourth 
“human rights as a central element”; and fifth “the widening and opening of the policy 
process”.19
However, though recognising the profundity of ‘globalisation’ to New Labour thinking, 
Dunne and Wheeler principally concern themselves with working out a more systematic 
theory to facilitate rigorously applying an ethical dimension (that is practicing a third 
way) to British foreign policy.20 They do not consider the particular role ‘globalisation’ 
has to play in relation to the above. This is a shortcoming, because it is a specific 
understanding of globalisation, and certain attendant assumptions derived from it, that 
allows for the possibility of discussing a ‘third way’ in international affairs. That is, 
globalisation performs an important function with regards to the ethical dimension, 
human rights, and perhaps most significantly the new language. 21
In summary, the initial focus on globalisation, concerned though it is, with the domestic 
significance, nonetheless subsequently shapes the approach taken to  understanding its 
foreign policy implications, and opens up new possibilities. Given the domestic position,
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid. On ethics and foreign policy, see Paul Keal, (ed.), Ethics and Foreign Policy. (Canberra: Allen & 
Unwin, 1993); Chris Brown, ‘On the Relationship between Ethics and Foreign Policy’, paper presented to 
the ‘Ethics and Foreign Policy’ workshop, University of Bristol, 8-9 June 1999.
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foreign policy becomes an important site, with the boundaries of the two now blurred. A 
domestic analogy is drawn, whereby the context, both domestic and international, is 
increasingly similar, in that regardless of differences, the key issue faced is dealing with 
(responding to) globalisation. This, it is suggested, eclipses both the realist and idealist 
position (as it eclipses the old left and right position), and offers a third way in its place. 
I now turn to examine in greater detail, some of these issues, focusing on a number of 
key speeches.
Foreign Policy in an Age of Globalisation
From the analysis hitherto undertaken, I have argued that globalisation does not give rise 
to a universal experience, and is not a ‘thing-in-itself. As such, its current form is 
asymmetrical in impact. In being constituted by the ongoing interpretations of key 
agents, the current processes denoted as globalisation are therefore likely to reflect 
certain power differentials. Finally, in largely being synonymous with liberalisation, in 
many respects the process exacerbates economic division. We may, therefore, say that 
globalisation does not imply a global logic, nor does it suggest the same mixture of 
remedial policy responses.
In this next section I will critically examine in greater detail a number of the key themes 
articulated in various speeches concerned with globalisation, and judge the position in 
light of the above. For purposes of clarity I have divided these themes into a number of 
sub-sections. These areas refer to: (1) the need for greater co-operation and enlightened
21 Williams points out that by September 2000, an increasingly beleaguered Cook had all but stopped 
using the term ‘ethical dimension’ as a means of presenting foreign policy. Williams, The Rise and Fall o f
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engagement, giving rise to the possibility of pursuing a more ethically responsible 
position; (2) the need for a reappraisal of the national interest, which in the process leads 
to a redefinition of sovereignty, and holds to the possibility of moving beyond an 
essentially realpolitik position; and (3) the need for a more robust and far-reaching 
normative consensus on the values that unite the international community.
Pursuing an ‘Ethical Agenda ’ in Age o f Globalisation
In a speech given to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in January 2000, Cook 
outlines four ‘guiding principles’ to help shape foreign policy and realise the national 
interest ‘in a world changed by globalisation’.22 At the heart of the speech is an attempt 
to integrate thinking about globalisation into traditional thinking about realising the 
national interest. This is done in order to move beyond what Cook believes is an 
anachronistic a pproach t o f  oreign p olicy t hat h as t o d ate b een stuck i n t he p ast. To 
promote the national interest, Cook argues that we must “understand the modem world, 
and produce a strategy that relates to the world as it will be in this new century, not as it 
was in the last”.24 Central to this is an appreciation of globalisation. According to Cook,
9 <“[gjlobalisation r equires m ore b ridges a nd fewer b arriers”. B ut m ore t han t his, a s a 
result of globalisation, “the global interest is becoming the national interest” and “the
9 6global community needs universal values”.
the Ethical Dimension, op.cit., pp59-62.
22 Cook. ‘Foreign Policy and National Interest’, op.cit., emphasis added.
23 There is a certain irony here, in that New Labour set up an alternative Foreign Policy Centre because 
they felt that the RIIA was increasingly anachronistic in its orientation.
24 Cook. ‘Foreign Policy and National Interest’, op.cit.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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The allusion to bridge building, in the words of Cook, is an allusion to the need for states
97to accept the “norms of international behaviour” and to constructively engage. On this 
account, the norms of international society are given strength as a result of the 
ineluctable imperatives of the globalisation process. Dialogue becomes central, as 
globalisation “foreshortens the landscape of diplomacy”, throwing “us into intimate and 
frequent contact with other civilisations”. Cook argues that, as a result, states will find 
it increasingly difficult to  remain closed o ff from the international community. Thus,
9 0concomitantly, ‘globalisation’ also “removes barriers”.
This position is significant in that it amounts to something more ambitious than a call for 
increased contact in response to greater interdependence. According to Cook, 
globalisation not only spurs a need for greater dialogue, but generates a set of conditions 
that offers a unique opportunity for the potential coming together of the international 
community. This is because that which they now share in common unites the community 
in ways that are more significant than anything that had hitherto divided them.
For Cook, a policy of critical engagement refers to “the pursuit of political dialogue 
wherever it can produce benefits”.30 Globalisation however, means that it is increasingly 
likely that beneficial consequences will ensue. Britain will pursue dialogue with all
11
nation-states “without illusions about the regimes with which we negotiate”. Here 
Cook has in mind certain states that deviate from any ‘ideal’ norm. Cook cites the
27 Ibid.
28
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examples o f  Argentina, Cuba, Iran, Libya and Russia to illustrate his point. On each 
occasion, Cook argues that it has proven more beneficial to establish contact and 
constructively engage. This policy is represented as a pragmatic approach that balances 
the need to engage with the need to make clear British dissatisfaction when necessary. 
As Little points out, “[dialogue is postulated as a Third Way between ‘kowtowing’ to 
another regime and ‘rowing’”. This is also extended to the arena of ‘civilisational 
dialogue’, with the example of Europe and the Middle East.
Cook argues that the benefits that accrue from such a policy are clear. Not only does it 
enable Britain to secure greater prosperity through opening up the possibility of greater 
trade; it also enhances the universal values of human rights. On this view, it is held that 
Britain can promulgate an ethical agenda at the same time as it pursues its economic and 
commercial interests. This ties in with the much-publicised ‘ethical dimension’ of New 
Labour’s foreign policy outlined in New Labour’s mission statement.
Upon coming to power, Cook launched a mission statement for his department. This 
statement outlined four ‘goals’ for foreign policy.33 These goals concern the pursuit of 
security, prosperity, quality of life and more controversially mutual respect. In a much 
quoted passage relating to the last goal, Cook claims that “[t]he Labour government does 
not accept that political values can be left behind when we check in our passports to 
travel on diplomatic business. Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and
31 Ibid.
32 Richard Little, ‘Conclusions: the Ethics and the Strategy of Labour’s Third Way in Foreign policy’, in 
Little & Wickham-Jones, New Labour’s Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.256.
33 Cook, ‘British Foreign Policy’, op.cit.
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must support the demands of other peoples for democratic rights on which we insist 
ourselves.”34 Central to this ethical dimension then, and as the Annual Report on Human 
Rights stressed, is the issue of human rights. These are “not an add-on or a sidelined 
appendage, but an integral part of the way we see the world”. For Cook, human rights 
issues constitute “one of the legs upon which foreign policy stands”.
At first sight this dimension to thinking about the national interest might appear to 
augment the difficulty of engaging in dialogue with other states. A policy of critical 
engagement not only involves espousing a commitment to human rights, but also 
requires an undertaking from other states to positively respond. As one commentator has 
it, “[tjaking a tough moral stand in such cases may mean sacrificing export orders and 
jobs at home. That is a legitimate choice, but one which the government must have the 
political courage to defend if its approach is to be credible”. This reflects ‘traditional 
thinking’ according to Cook, which holds that an approach of ‘critical engagement’ can 
only serve to alienate certain states, and as a result jeopardise the possibility of fully 
realising the other goals of security and wealth creation.
34 Ibid. For an account o f the response to Cook’s launch of this ‘ethical dimension’ see Mark Wickham- 
Jones, Labour’s Trajectory in Foreign Affairs, op.cit., pp3-32.
35 FCO and DFID, Annual Report On Human Rights (London: TSO, 1998), p.5. Of course Cook is not the 
first person to include human rights as an important consideration. See Sally Morphet, ‘British Foreign 
Policy and Human Rights: From Low to High Politics’, in David Forsythe, (ed.), Human Rights and 
Comparative Foreign Policy. (Tokyo: UN University, 2000); Williams, The Rise and Fall o f the 'Ethical’ 
Dimension, op.cit, pp55-56.
36 Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Policy and Human Rights, first report, HC369 (London: TSO, 
1998), p. 162. Quoted in Davina Miller, ‘British Foreign Policy, Human Rights and Iran’, in Wickham- 
Jones & Little, New Labour’s Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 187. See also Robin Cook, ‘Human Rights- A 
Priority o f Britain’s Foreign Policy’, speech delivered at the Foreign Office, 28th March 2001.
37 Financial Times, 13th May 1997, quoted in Mark Wickham-Jones, ‘Introduction’ in New Labour’s 
Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 10.
38 In fact the presumption of novelty is seen to be somewhat disingenuous. See Douglas Hurd, ‘Foreign 
Policy and Human Rights’, Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes o f Evidence, 16 December 1997, p.25. 
Ken Booth, ‘Exporting Ethics in Place of Arms’, Times Higher Education Supplement, 7th November
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According to Cook, the altered context associated with globalisation now renders 
anachronistic any ‘either/or’ trade off of national goals. Cook sees no contradiction 
between promoting British values on the one hand, and pursuing British interests on the 
other because, “[i]n the global age it is in Britain’s national interest to promote British
I Q
values of freedom and democracy”.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the idea that the British national interest and ‘global interests’ 
can be the same thing is not an entirely new phenomenon. Frankel, writing of the period 
before the Second World War, believed “[t]he outstanding characteristic of British 
foreign policy and diplomacy is found in what Sir Harold Nicholson called its ‘civilian’ 
character... It was possible to assume... that what was good for the world was good for 
Britain, which amounted in fact to saying also that what was good for Britain was good 
for the world”.40
This position is once more made tenable because it is now assumed that the national 
interest increasingly approximates a global interest, both of which are understood in 
terms of the imperatives derived from globalisation and the global knowledge economy. 
The argument takes the following form: the novel context generates a universal set of 
requirements following on from a universal set of experiences, that allow for meaningful 
constructive dialogue, and provide a strong impetus in the long term for the resolution of
1997. Tony Baldry, ‘New Labour, New Foreign Policy? A Conservative Perspective’, Oxford 
International Review, Vol.9, N o.l, 1998/99, pp31-3.
39 Cook, ‘Foreign Policy and the National Interest’, op.cit.
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any disagreements. The significance of greater interconnectedness is that it provides a 
greater legitimacy for raising human rights issues, because, as with a number of other 
issues, they are now located within a context that vitiates particularistic difficulties.
i
These ‘particularistic’ difficulties, which have dogged human rights discussions for 
many decades, relate to the status of human rights not only as a foreign policy issue, but 
also ‘ontologically’, and explain why the human rights debate is frequently seen as 
inherently Western, especially by non-Western actors.41 On this view, at heart, the idea 
of a human ‘right’ is an essentially western construct, reflecting a modem liberal 
position on the relation between the individual and society that can be traced back to the 
enlightenment and beyond. In dealing with this dilemma, Cook now posits that human 
rights i ssues can be promoted on a differing (though c omplimentary) basis to one of 
conviction.
Three elements to this argument are central here. Firstly, globalisation is experienced 
universally, as a homogenising process ‘out there’. Secondly, this compels a similar set 
of changes in each of the (essentially homogenous) entities globalisation impacts upon 
(in this case, states). Thirdly, underlying this view is an economic argument again 
derived from the interpretation of globalisation and the new global environment. Cook 
posits that human rights issues and issues of freedom and democracy are now linked to
40 Joseph Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945-73. (Royal Institute of International Affairs/ Oxford 
University Press: London, 1975), ppl 19-20. Quoted in Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power: British 
Foreign Policy Since 1945. (Zed Books Ltd: London, 1995), p.2.
41 See Raymond J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986).
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economic growth in a knowledge-based (that is global) economy. According to Cook,
“[r]espect for human rights is not a luxury of growth, but the condition of that growth”:42
Regimes which govern their c itizens b y fear and repression c annot expect the 
same people to display the creativity and innovation in the workplace which are 
essential for a knowledge-based economy. 43
Thus, in promoting values associated with human rights, democracy, open and 
transparent government and the rule of law (‘British’ values), one is not only promoting 
rights which are seen (for Cook) as universal (a contentious point), they are now 
moreover, values that are increasingly becoming a precondition for economic growth. 
Therefore, it is in the interests of all nation-states to respect such rights.44 And 
reinforcing this position, the actions governing the state are predetermined in light of a 
contextual postulate that, given the agentless conceptualisation of globalisation, is, to all 
intents and purposes, neutral. Thus, as with the domestic context, such a response is 
depoliticised.
There are however significant limitations to this argument, specifically in respect of the 
erroneous view of globalisation, and its association with a particular economic 
argument. This Cookean view fails to recognise that qua liberalisation, the process 
favours some at the expense of others, creating winners and losers, in certain instances 
exacerbating inequalities, fragmenting as well as unifying communities, and where a 
policy of openness, deregulation and liberalisation are proffered, potentially hindering
42 Cook, ‘Foreign Policy and the National Interest’, op.cit.
43 Ibid.
44 See also Robin Cook, ‘Human Rights -  A Priority of Britain’s Foreign Policy’, London, 28th March 
2001; John Battle, ‘Human Rights in the 21st Century: A Global Responsibility’, speech to Human Rights 
Commission, Geneva, 22nd March 2001.
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development.45 It is a position that in fact silences the heterogeneity of entities impacted 
by ‘partial’ liberalisation, playing down the extent to which this heterogeneity may call 
for differing approaches, that is some cases call for forms of ‘protectionism’.
The assumption is made that all states (or elites of regimes) wish to ‘develop’, and that 
the path to development follows a trajectory whose ultimate destination is understood to 
resemble the UK economy - whereby wealth is generated as a result of exploiting the 
skills demanded of a ‘knowledge-based economy’.46 This teleological version of 
development assumes that globalisation will encourage all economies to become 
‘knowledge-based’, and that this process is achieved through a particular kind of 
(partial) liberalisation.47 Should an economy thus not emulate this ideal however, or if it 
were the case that globalisation (selectively understood) does not lead to a knowledge- 
based economy, then the above view would not hold. A sa  result, relations with that 
country, for example in terms of pursuing commercial interests, will once more be 
potentially antithetical to the pursuit of human rights as a policy commitment.48
45 See Rob Dixon & Paul Williams, ‘Tough on Debt, Tough on the Causes o f Debt? New Labour’s Third 
Way Foreign Policy’, British Journal o f Politics and International Relations, Vol.3, No.2, June 2001, 
ppl50-172. The relationship between economic growth, globalisation and development will be examined 
in chapter seven.
46 See Rita Abrahamson & Paul Williams, ‘Ethics and Foreign Policy: The Antinomies of New Labour’s 
‘Third Way’ in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Political Studies, Vol.49, No.2, 2001, pp249-264.
47 That is, opening one’s economy and specialising - given the constraint of high agricultural subsidies 
remaining in the US and Europe.
48 Cook argues that this policy reaps benefits in other respects as well, for example in terms o f security and 
the environment. This follows a similar line of reasoning. A democratically accountable polity is less 
likely to be an aggressive state, or a state that ignores environmental issues. “Governments which respect 
freedom o f expression are more likely to provide the transparency to be secure trading partners. Countries 
which observe the rule of law at home, are more likely to accept their international obligations to fight the 
drugs trade or halt weapons proliferation. Promoting our values enhances our prosperity, and reinforces 
our security”. Cook, ‘Foreign Policy and the National Interest’, op.cit.
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And in terms of actual changes on the ground, the idea that one can pursue both an 
ethical human rights policy as a central policy plank whilst not compromising UK 
commercial interests has, at best, remained only partially successful. In its auditing of 
New Labour’s position for example, Amnesty International concluded that the 
Department of Trade and Industry is “not meeting its responsibility to promote trade in a 
manner not harmful to human rights”.49
Cook’s position nonetheless is that a new historical epoch at the international level is 
coming into being, in which British values can c onfidently be espoused because they 
take on the status of being grounded in a global interest, and are thus not compromised 
ethically. This follows from the belief that certain realist conclusions associated with the 
anarchic nature of international politics are now increasingly less applicable. Thus it is 
to this idea that I now turn, because, as we shall see, it draws heavily on a particular 
reading of the consequences of globalisation.
The Global and the National Interest
A  second ‘guiding principle’, helping to shape foreign policy and realise the national 
interest in a world changed by globalisation, stems from an increasing ‘coincidence’ of
49Amnesty International, ‘Human Rights Audit of UK Foreign and Asylum Policy’, sep 23rd 1999. For a 
critical appraisal o f New Labour’s ethical dimension with respect to Iran, see Davina Miller, British 
Foreign Policy, Human Rights and Iran, op.cit, pp 186-200. On their approach to China, Indonesia and 
East Timor, see Dunne & Wheeler, Good International Citizenship, op.cit. For a broader set o f criticisms 
with respect to New Labour’s record on arms sales, see Neil Cooper, ‘Arms Exports, New Labour and the 
Pariah Agenda’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.21, No.3, 2000, pp54-77. On New Labour’s human 
rights record in conjunction with the European Union and with respect to China, see Anne Deighton, 
‘European Union Policy’, in Anthony Seldon, (ed.), The Blair Effect. (London: Little, Brown, 2001), 
pp331-353; and Angela Bourne & Michelle Cini, ‘Exporting the Third Way in Foreign Policy: New 
Labour, the European Union and Human Rights Policy’, in Little and Wickham-Jones, New Labour’s 
Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp 179-83.
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national and global interests. According to Cook, “our national interest will more and 
more coincide with the global interest”.50 As a result it is no longer correct to think in 
terms of the ‘old balance of power’, zero sum game. A particular version of 
globalisation plays a central role in this respect. Firstly, Cook and Blair are led to a 
redefinition of sovereignty following this understanding, with ‘globalisation’ 
legitimising this new stance. Secondly, in articulating such a view, New Labour move 
away from the minimal ‘values’ of non-intervention and sovereignty, stressing instead 
the need for a more profound form of unity, one that in fact displays certain ‘solidarist’ 
features in its orientation.51
1. Redefining Sovereignty
Challenging a view he associates with realists such as Morgenthau, Cook argues that the 
world is not “a jungle in which the only guiding star is unilateral self-interest”. Rather, 
there now exists a global set of interests stemming from the need to avoid turmoil in the 
financial markets and curtail the spread of the drugs trade, the need to inhibit the 
proliferation of nuclear and chemical and biological weapons, as well as the need to co­
operate on issues pertaining to the environment:53
[t]oday the more immediate challenges to our national interests are likely to be 
transnational forces...There is no greater national duty than the defence of our 
shoreline. But the most immediate threat to it today is the encroaching sea, rising 
as a result of climate change which we can manage only by global action.54
50 Cook, ‘Foreign Policy and the National Interest’, op.cit.
51 This concept will be elaborated later in the chapter.
52 Ibid. See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Amongst Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Revised by 
Kenneth T. Thompson, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1993).
53 Cook, ‘Foreign Policy and National Interest’, op.cit..
54 Ibid.
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In place of a realist position that stresses unilateral self-interest, Cook argues for an 
approach that is guided by ‘enlightened self-interest’. This requires that a country 
recognise that its national interest can only be realised through multilateral bodies, as 
‘the global interest’ cannot successfully be pursued alone.
Speaking in 1999, Blair makes it clear why there needs to be a more flexible 
understanding of the term sovereignty.55 According to Blair, ‘economics’ have 
transformed the world and led to a “sudden shift in the international political agenda.”56 
However for Blair, “globalisation is not just economic, it is a political and security 
phenomenon”.57 This marks an important development in Blair’s approach towards 
globalisation. Indeed it represents a shift towards a more capacious and less ‘truncated’ 
analysis, incorporating the implications of globalisation for thinking about the 
international realm.
Not only is economics now ‘global’, but so also is politics and security. As a result, “in 
every sphere, increasingly nations are having to accept they can only advance their own 
interests by working with others”.58 What is more, because the forces associated with 
globalisation will increase in significance; “[o]ur prosperity and our security will 
become increasingly interdependent”.59
55 Tony Blair, ‘Shaping a Pivotal Role For Britain in the World’, speech delivered at the Guildhall, 22nd 
Nov 1999.
56 Ibid.
57 Tony Blair, ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ speech to the club of Chicago, 22nd April 1999.
58 Ibid.
59 Cook, ‘The Challenges of Globalisation’, op.cit.
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In response to this situation, Blair is compelled to offer a picture of increased 
multilateral co-operation as a significant part of the solution, which involves 
compromise on an increasingly profound agenda at an intergovernmental level. Co­
operation is crucial. Though the forces associated with globalisation are essentially 
‘neutral’ (disembodied), and universally beneficial, they still require by way of response 
a degree o f  governmental intervention. Though, on the economic front, protectionism 
‘makes no sense’, there still remains an important role to be played by governments in 
securing interests in the political and security realm.
This leads Blair and Cook to a redefinition or modification of the concept of 
sovereignty, whereby sovereignty is strengthened when ‘pooled’. Contrary to the strong 
thesis associated with the likes of Ohmae, globalisation does not necessarily undermine 
or ‘hollow out’ the state, rendering it functionally obsolete.60 Government can still play 
a decisive role.
The position is also held up in contrast to the ‘realist’ position. According to Cook, this 
view holds that “foreign policy [is] a zero sum game, with advantage to one player 
automatically resulting in disadvantage to another.”61 Such a view “expresses the 
objective of foreign policy as an equilibrium of opposing forces in which the greatest
( \7threat to the national interest [comes] from other nations”. By way of contrast, both 
Cook and Blair reposition the New Labour view of the state in light of their
60 There is, perhaps unsurprisingly, an extensive literature on globalisation and sovereignty. For a review 
of this literature, see Anthony McGrew & David Held, (eds.), The Global Transformations Reader: An 
Introduction to the Globalization Debate. (Maid. Mass.: Polity Press, 2000).
61 Cook, ‘Foreign Policy and the National Interest’, op.cit.
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understanding of the ‘modem world’ such that a multilateral approach now functions to 
strengthen sovereignty. In line with liberal theory, the idea of a zero sum game is 
dismissed, and in its place is the view that all potentially gain from the cooperation that 
follows from ‘pooling’.
According to Blair, the view that holds that governments do not have a role to play in
globalisation is associated with those who argue for a unilateral position, and conflate
national sovereignty with independence and isolation. He argues that this view is
particularly prevalent in the British media, and ‘extreme’ left and right groups:64
In Europe and America, there are some who argue that the end of the Cold War 
in fact opens the door to a new era of national sovereignty. They argue that, 
without common threat, nation states can again afford to withdraw from 
international commitments, to act unilaterally rather than in partnership. They 
believe that governments don’t have a role in globalisation, that this can and 
should be left solely to the markets. To these advocates of unilateralism and 
isolation, sovereignty is finite.65
Blair unequivocally posits that “it is wrong”, because it erroneously,
defines national sovereignty as standing alone and then confuses it with national 
strength. And it grossly underestimates the impact of globalisation on the power 
of an individual nation state. If sovereignty means control over one’s destiny and 
strength, then strength and control, in today’s world, means forging alliances or 
falling behind.66
It is only “[b]y working together [that] nation states [can] collectively reclaim the
f\H  •sovereignty they lost to globalisation while reaping its benefits”. As with the ‘row’ or 
‘kowtow’ option, Blair also adopts this ‘either/or’ strategy to define and locate this
62 Ibid.
63 Blair, ‘Shaping a Pivotal Role for Britain in the World’, op.cit.
64 Ibid.
65 TUiJ
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argument. In this case he defines his position against the previous understanding, which 
he claims only allows for ‘isolation’ or loss of strength and sovereignty.
Blair locates this redefinition within the context of globalisation, and yet is clear that 
globalisation does undermine sovereignty, and will continue to do so, should a 
government operate on the basis o f an outdated view o f the meaning o f that term. But in 
altering the meaning of the term, away from any outdated ‘finite’ understanding, 
globalisation no longer poses a threat to sovereignty, and so any pejorative connotations
ASto the process can be dismissed accordingly.
However, one is lead to question the validity of a strategy that posits a solution to the 
‘problem of sovereignty’ by simply offering a redefinition of the meaning of the term, to 
mean ‘control over one’s destiny’. What is more, this redefinition also draws attention to 
the problematic assumption that, given the particular understanding of globalisation, it is 
still possible to control one’s destiny. This position is particularly problematic when 
judged as a perspective applicable to all states in an era of globalisation. When 
examined, such a view in fact draws attention to the British interests that such an 
account (disproportionately) favours.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 This draws attention to an ambiguity if  not contradiction in Blair’s own position -  doubtless reflecting 
his developing thoughts on the subject. In focussing on the domestic consequences of globalisation, the 
discourse suggests responding to an inevitable and unavoidable process, and accepting it ‘on its own 
terms’. Yet now Blair moves to a position that stresses how sovereignty is lost on this view, suggesting, in 
the process, that this is a bad thing.
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In order to forge onwards, and ‘reclaim’ any lost sovereignty, Blair and Cook advocate a 
policy that seeks multilateral co-operation on an increasing number of issues of an ever­
more profound kind. This is ‘sold’ domestically in terms of the idea that Britain is well 
placed because it is able to punch above its weight. New Labour advocates a policy that 
exploits Britain’s unique position as a ‘pivotal’ power, geared towards “building 
strength and shaping the future”.69 Blair addresses this issue in a speech entitled 
‘Shaping a Pivotal Role for Britain in the World’.70 Two elements in particular are worth 
highlighting from this speech; one ideational, the other more pragmatic. Each draws 
attention to the fact that the redefinition in its turn must be sold abroad, and in a 
particular form.
This first ideational element stresses the importance of the debate on Third Way 
thinking, which Blair argues Britain is at the forefront in developing. This so-called 
‘global Third Way’ debate is significant in its attempt to forge a particular consensus on
71dealing with (and understanding in a particular way) globalisation and change. 
Concerned with convincing others of the particular conceptualisation of globalisation to 
which the likes of Blair hold, the view holds to an economistic understanding of 
globalisation as a ‘thing-in-itself, something that everyone benefits from, and as such, a 
thing that cannot (and should not) be resisted. In other words globalisation is something 
that universally entails further liberalisation.
69 Tony Blair, ‘Shaping a Pivotal Role for Britain in the world’, speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 
Guildhall, London 22nd November 1999.
70 Ibid.
71 See Anthony Giddens, (ed.), The Global Third Wav Debate. (Malden Mass.: Polity Press, 2001).
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What is important to recognise in this respect, is that the third way programme depends 
for its success on this shared outlook, reflecting the fact that “[i]deas matter. Political
debate and intellectual debate matters. Because today’s ideas become tomorrow’s jobs,
notomorrow’s schools, tomorrow’s living standard’s, literally tomorrow’s world”.
But, as suggested earlier, Britain is particularly fortunate, because:
Britain is at the forefront of the debate about new ideas in modem progressive 
politics. There is a real interest in Britain abroad today, and we have to turn that 
to our advantage.73
Such a position in certain respects comes close to the sort of conceptualisation of 
globalisation that this thesis has argued for, that is one sensitive to the importance of the 
interpretation of globalisation, and its significance as a constituted process. The success 
of Third Way theory (domestic and international), as tacitly recognised here, stands or 
falls on the ability of Blair and others to convince the wider international community of 
the validity of the diagnosis that they propound. Should they fail in this task, then so will 
the ability of Third Way theory fail to offer any ‘third way’.
This goes to the very heart of points made at the beginning of the thesis. Ideas do indeed 
matter, though in a more fundamental sense than that they create tomorrow’s jobs and 
schools. They play a constitutive role. They not only demarcate that which is seen to be 
possible from that which is not, but in laying claims to truth within structured contexts, 
ideas also function to produce and reproduce a world in this image. Globalisation, as an 
idea, one that grounds Blair’s Third Way, must, in order to be effective, be accepted as
72 Ibid.
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correct and true. It must be understood as a process that determines a particular set of 
responses (opportunities) and must not be seen as a threat (thus eliciting ‘closure’).
This brings us to the second more ‘pragmatic’ corollary of this point, drawing attention
to the fact that Britain is doubly fortunate, in that it also benefits from its ‘pivotal status’,
which confers upon Britain a unique opportunity to direct and manage globalisation and
change, that is ‘control its destiny’. Blair draws attention to a unique set of strengths and
connections, including:
our formidable network of international contacts. Our extraordinary close 
relations with nations in every part of the globe through the commonwealth. Our 
membership o f  the UN Security Council, o f  N ATO and o f  the G 8. The close 
relationship forged through two world wars and the Cold War with the USA. 
And our crucial membership of the European Union. We are at the pivot of all 
these inter-connecting alliances and groupings.74
This is further reinforced by the excellence of the armed forces and by British values, 
which include certain democratic credentials, tolerance, an ‘outward-looking’ bias and a 
multi-cultural populace. However, Blair, as with Cook, assumes that the direction this 
takes is mutually beneficent, that is, ‘what is good for Britain is good for the world’.
It is now possible to return to the argument that ‘pooling’ in the face of globalisation 
does not undermine sovereignty. Though globalisation undermines sovereignty 
‘traditionally understood’, in the context of the UK fears are allayed because Britain is 
both at the forefront of ideas on how to deal with this new agenda as well as being rather 
well placed thanks to a particular conjunction of historical factors. ‘Pooling’ thus
73 Blair, ‘Shaping a Pivotal Role’, op.cit.
74 Ibid.
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becomes one respect in which agency is reclaimed in the face of globalisation. It is sold 
as an idea, thanks to the fact that Britain is able to exercise a degree of control.
However, the analysis of agency here is largely confined to the British situation, with the 
subsequent assumption being that the ‘destiny’ pursued by Britain is nonetheless a 
common destiny. To the extent that this is the case, the argument holds water. However, 
where British interests deviate from the interests of others then the argument becomes 
increasingly untenable. And as suggested from the outset, ‘globalisation’, in as much as 
it i s a s et o f  p rocesses t hat m ight m ore a ccurately b e d  enoted as b eing 1 iberalisation, 
does not give rise to a universal experience, and in that it is asymmetrical in form, does 
not imply a universal logic.
This in fact represents a fundamental problem, as, by his own admission, globalisation 
does undermine sovereignty (traditionally understood). A Third Way analysis along 
these lines suggests that other states would be more or less effective in having a hand in 
shaping their future, depending upon their own particular circumstances. In fact, on this 
analysis, ‘globalisation’ for some states, suggests only capitulation and acceptance 
(responding to the inevitable), and not shaping the future, but rather having there future 
shaped by others. On this reading, the metaphor o f  ‘pooling’ sovereignty in order to 
‘reclaim’ it instead returning us to a more ‘finite’ definition of sovereignty for those 
countries less able to exploit any s uch fortuitous conjunctions as those favouring the 
UK, in that strength and ability to control to determine their own futures eludes them.
75 Ibid.
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Differences, centring on the progressive and conservative reactions to globalisation and 
change, each holding to their own view of sovereignty and autonomy, thus do not reflect 
differing positions in time (the latter depicted as anachronistic), but invalid categories. 
Based less on a set of logical presuppositions determined by situation, and more on an 
invalid diagnosis of a putatively neutral process and homogenous entity, the 
‘progressive’ response to globalisation - advocating ‘pooling’ -  now seems less 
obviously desirable than Third Way theory might have us expect. In fact, on this 
conceptualisation, the ‘conservative’ position appeals, because it at least gives the 
appearance of agency and the opportunity to affect one’s destiny where the conjunction 
of historical factors does not allow for the country to exploit for example any ‘pivotal’ 
role. Sovereignty, redefined, offers control in the face of globalisation through pooling 
to only a limited few.
However, as discussed in the previous chapter the Third Way analysis of globalisation
and change is associated with forces that are essentially irresistible. Fatalism, it would
seem, is not avoided at the international level for most countries in the face of
‘globalisation’ so understood, suggesting a possible tension:
We are now... in an era in which the authority of the state is being limited by 
developments on the domestic economy, on the international stage. 
Internationally, no country is an island from the powerful trends of the global 
economy. No state has its authority unimpeded by the development of 
international organisations in the wake of globalisation, such as WTO.7
Yet Blair and Cook remain upbeat about the implications of globalisation. As a partial 
analysis, agency is forgone at the domestic level, only to be retrieved at the international
76 Cook, ‘The Influence of Ideas of 1989 On Foreign Policy’, op.cit.
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level. The formulation does not domestically guarantee a valid role for the nation-state 
as an important structural feature of the international system. The analysis in this respect 
is therefore only partial, and not universally applicable, failing to recognise the sense in 
which some states are more or less able to benefit from co-operation - assuming that co­
operation concerns realising a variety of national interests. Centrally, the analysis 
glosses over the variance in ‘power’, judged here in terms of the constitutive and 
shaping role played in the production and reproduction of a particular set of processes 
and made possible in part thanks to a disproportionate role a country such as Britain has 
at the heart of institutions now portrayed as central.
This analysis, it may be said, purposely avoids recognition of how globalisation impacts 
states differently, favouring some disproportionately according to the differing 
circumstances of each locale. Rather, and underlying this view, there resides at a deeper 
level the assumption that the forces of globalisation are universally favourable. That is, 
this view is premised on a belief in an underlying and natural harmony of interests and a 
common destiny, which can be explained in terms of the teleological assumptions 
contained in the conceptualisation of globalisation.
2. Solidarism and the ‘Natural’ Harmony o f Interests.
Of course, the idea of a ‘harmony of interests’, and reflections on its role in international 
relations is not new. It in fact persists as a key theme in the discussions on the nature of 
state-to-state relations, underlying a more ‘idealistic’ as opposed to ‘realist’ view.
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For Carr, the idea is based on the assumption “that the highest interest of the individual
and the highest interest of the community naturally coincide. In pursuing his own
interest, the individual pursues that of the community, and in promoting the interest of
the community he promotes his own.”77 So it is in the international domain, this time
with the interests of the community referring to the international community, and the
individual referring to the state. Carr was sceptical of any such state of affairs, including
a harmony of interests in international economic relations, and concluded that “we
must... reject as inadequate and misleading the attempt to base international morality on
an alleged harmony of interests which identifies the interest of the whole community of
nations with the interest of each individual member of it:”78
The doctrine of the harmony of interests... serves as an ingenious moral device 
invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups in order to justify and 
maintain their dominant position. 9
Carr’s chief point in critiquing the idea of a natural harmony of interests in The Twenty
Years Crisis have been summed up by Wilson. According to Wilson:
The notion of a natural harmony of interests of all in laissez faire... was not, for 
Carr, a truth or axiom of universal validity, but the special ideology of the rising 
commercial class...Similarly, the supposed absolute and universal principles of 
the utopian - free trade, international law and order, the indivisibility of peace - 
were not principles at all, but the unconscious reflections of national policy 
based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time'.
Whereas Carr was writing during the difficult period of the 1930’s, the question is does 
such a c ynical c onclusion s till h old t oday? A s o utlined, for N ew Labour t imes h ave
77 Edward Hallet Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction To The Study of  
International Relations. (MacMillan & Co. Ltd: London, 1962), p.42.
78 Ibid., p.60.
79 Ibid., p.80.
80 Peter Wilson, ‘E.H.Carr: The Revolutionist’s Realist’, www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/global-librarv/. First 
published 2000. (The last sentence is borrowed from Carr himself).
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changed and with them the nature of international politics. Globalisation, the new global 
economy and change have all contributed to undermining the validity of any narrow 
realist approach to foreign policy, but not to be replaced by idealism. Contained in this 
position rather, is a belief that the process of change dubbed globalisation favours all, as 
it allows for the nascent development of a global interest. Globalisation drives a process 
whereby states come to recognise a common destiny, and are unified by the common 
objective experience that it gives rise too. But more than this, it also holds out the 
possibility for the development of a universal set of values.
In this final section I want to do two things. First, and contrary to the above account, I 
will suggest that because their own diagnosis of globalisation is untenable, Carr’s 
underlying scepticism is perhaps not misplaced even today, particularly when one 
considers the appropriate response to globalisation advocated by New Labour 
(liberalisation, openness and deregulation). Second, and in order to better make my 
point, I first make sense of the New Labour position by drawing parallels to the 
solidarist conceptualisation of international society, associated with the ‘English 
School’. This is because in alluding to the need for agreement on universal values, and 
in taking a ‘third way’ position beyond realism and idealism, Cook and Blair espouse a 
view of international relations that shares in common many features associated with this 
view, particularly in their determination to re-examine the two key norms of sovereignty 
and non-intervention.81
81 See Tim Dunne & Nicholas Wheeler, ‘The Blair Doctrine: Advancing the Third Way in the World’, in 
Little & Wickham-Jones, ‘New Labour’s Foreign Policy’, op.cit., p.63.
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A solidarist conception of international relations begins from the assumption that
relations between states are such that they form an international society. Contrary to a
realist outlook, anarchy does not preclude the possibility of certain values being shared
between states. Indeed the existence of a limited set of values is what in fact defines an
international society. Bull describes an international society in the following terms:
a society of states... exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common 
interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one 
another and share in the working of common institutions.82
Obvious parallels can be seen here between this view and the view of Blair and Cook. 
Where Bull refers to international society, Blair and Cook refer to ‘community’. Both 
recognise the primacy of the state and the centrality of security, yet both eschew that any 
‘logic’ derived from the anarchic nature of the system must determine that security is a 
zero sum game, or that ‘global interests’ might not also play a part in determining 
national policy.
However, Bull spells out two possible conceptualisations of international society - one 
pluralist and the other solidarist.83 For Bull, the pluralist conception of international 
society is one where “states are capable of agreement only for certain minimum 
purposes, the most crucial being reciprocal recognition of sovereignty and the norm of
82 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. (London: MacMillan, 1977), 
p. 13. See also Hedley Bull & Adam Watson, (eds.), The Expansion of International Society. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), p.l.
83 Hedley Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, in Herbert Butterfield & Martin Wight, 
(eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London : Allen and 
Unwin, 1966), pp35-50. See also Nicholas Wheeler, ‘Pluralist and Solidarist Conceptions of International 
Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention’, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, 
1992, Vol 21, Number 3, pp463-488.
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non-intervention”.84 Such a view holds that “states are able to agree on the need for 
order despite their competing views of justice”.85 Thus a pluralist conception interprets 
justice to be subjective and as a result potentially subversive of international order, 
where international order connotes that “pattern of activity that sustains the elementary 
or primary goals of the society of states”. Amidst competing views on values, a 
pluralist conception settles for a status quo that privileges this order, and as a result the 
society o f  states, over justice. On this view, sovereignty and non-intervention are the 
implacable norms upon which co-existence are founded, and the continuation of the 
society of states thus guaranteed.
However, according to Blair, though international order in the past had been built on the
foundation of “the principle of non-interference”, this must now be “qualified in
important respects”:87
Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter. When oppression 
produces massive flows of refugees which unsettle neighbouring countries, then 
they can properly be described as ‘threats to international peace and security’. 
When regimes are based on minority rule they lose legitimacy -  look at South 
Africa.88
Thus, in addition to offering a reformulation of the meaning of the term sovereignty, 
Blair also formulates an agenda that is increasingly subversive of the principle of ‘non­
interference’. It is in these twin respects that it may be said that New Labour adumbrates 
a more ‘solidarist’ conception of international society.
84 Tim Dunne & Nicholas Wheeler, ‘Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism o f the Will’, 
International Affairs, Vol.72, No. 1,1996, p.94.
85 Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism. (London: MacMillan, 1990), p.20.
86 Bull, The Anarchical Society, op.cit., p.8. See also Hedley Bull, Justice in International Relations.
Hagey Lectures, University of Waterloo, 1984, p. 13.
87 Blair, ‘Doctrine o f the International Community’, op.cit.
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A solidarist view of international society centres on the rights and duties of the 
individual. Questions of justice concern “what is due not only to states and nations, but
O Q
to all individual persons in an imagined community of mankind”. On this view, 
extending questions of justice function to sustain and develop international society 
beyond the minimal value of international order. Bull himself became increasingly 
persuaded that in o rder to perpetuate an international society of states (something he 
held as an obviously desirable thing), questions of justice must increasingly play a part. 
In other words, rather than being subversive of international society, current 
circumstances meant that questions relating to ‘third world’ equity (i.e. questions of 
justice) for example, must be taken into account. Failure to do so, may, in the long term, 
have the effect of undermining the possibility of international society.
Both Blair and Cook are in effect in agreement with this view, with Blair stressing the
importance of qualifying the norm of non-interference, and Cook, of issues relating to
human rights and also equity.90 Blair points out that:
[w]e live in a world where isolationism has ceased to have a reason to exist. By 
necessity we have to co-operate with each other across nations. Many of our 
domestic problems are caused on the other side of the world. Financial instability 
in Asia destroys jobs in Chicago and in my own constituency in County Durham. 
Poverty in  the C aribbean means more drugs on the streets in Washington and 
London. Conflict in the Balkans causes more refugees in Germany and here in 
the US. These problems can only be addressed by international co-operation. We 
are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not. We cannot refuse to 
participate in global markets if we want to prosper. We cannot ignore new
88 Ibid.
89 Bull, Justice in International Relations, op.cit., p. 18.
90 It should be pointed out however, that intervention is also considered as a central issue for Cook. For 
Cook, “[t]he biggest unresolved question in upholding universal values is when is it right for the 
international community to intervene and who decides that it is right?”. Cook, ‘Foreign policy and the 
National interest’, op.cit.
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political ideas in other countries if we want to innovate. We cannot turn our 
backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we 
want still to be secure. On the eve of a new Millennium we are now in a new 
world.91
In order to facilitate greater solidarity, Blair, in articulating a ‘new doctrine of the 
international community’ therefore qualifies the norm of non-interference, offering five 
considerations that must first be applied before it is permissible to break with this norm, 
and actually intervene: first, certainty -  “are we sure of our case”; second; have all 
diplomatic options been exhausted; third, can the military option be undertaken in a 
‘sensible and prudent’ way; fourth, is the international community ‘prepared for the long 
term’; and fifth, is the national interest involved.92 Taken together, Blair argues that 
these tests provide validity and legitimacy to any future decision on “when and whether 
we will intervene”. Underlying such a view is the assumption of an international 
community, suitably unified to the extent that agreement can now be expected in 
qualifying this norm.
Thus it can be seen that Blair and Cook reorient foreign policy along solidarist lines, 
presenting this response as credible in light of the ‘new times’ associated with 
globalisation, demanding as a result, the need for universal values (that is the increased 
need for questions of justice to be incorporated). The question is how credible is this 
position, given the understanding of globalisation that New Labour hold? Centrally, this 
view draws attention to the need for a universal set of values
91 Blair, ‘Doctrine o f the International Community’, op.cit.
92 Ibid.
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A key problem or tension, as Bull recognised, concerning the international society 
approach, and particularly the solidarist formulation, concerns the role that a common 
culture plays in validating the idea of certain shared values and interests at the 
international level. As Wight argues, to come into existence, international society 
implies a prior shared c ulture of sorts. This he believed did not exist globally.94 Bull 
agrees; “all historical international societies have had as one of their foundations a 
common culture”.95 Thus a global international society, it would seem, presumes a 
global culture of sorts. Indeed, Cook himself points out that “even the strongest global 
institution will sound an uncertain note if it is not clear as to the values which it is meant 
to promote”.96
07Hence “the need for universal values” Both Blair and Cook see these values as 
‘emanating’ from the ‘international community’, since it is the international community 
that adheres to them, acts in accordance with them and develops them as if they were
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responsibilities. Such a view however is problematic in that talk of universally ‘shared 
values’ is to many invalid. According to Bozeman for example, when we talk of
93 Ibid.
94 Wight argued that “we must assume that a states-system [i.e. an international society] will not come into 
being without a degree of cultural unity among its members.” Martin Wight, System of States. (Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1977), p.33. As to whether international society - its genesis and further 
development - necessitates a shared culture, see Barry Buzan, ‘From International System to International 
Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School’. International Organisation, 
Vol.7, Summer 1993, pp327-352. Buzan argues that a ‘logic of anarchy’ provides the necessary sense of 
‘we-ness’, understanding society along ‘gesellschaft’ as opposed to ‘gemeinschaft’ lines. This therefore 
precludes the need for a common global culture.
95 Hedley, The Anarchical Society, op.cit., p.304.
96 Cook, ‘Foreign Policy and the National Interest’, op.cit.
97 Ibid.
98 See Blair, ‘A New Era of International Partnership’, op.cit.
190
universal values, we are in fact usually referring to the values of the ‘west’. 99 Likewise, 
when we talk of globalisation, to many, we are referring to ‘Westernisation’.
Writing in the 1980s Bull himself argued that there may indeed be a common ‘world 
view’ developing, borne out of the experience of ‘modernity’.100 Bull argued that 
although industrialisation, modernisation and state formation would not necessarily 
produce social and political homogenisation, “it would be facile to imagine that [they] 
can take place without affecting the cultures of the societies in which [they] operate”.101 
Whereas Bull talks of the potentially unifying processes associated with ‘modernity’, 
Blair and Cook instead focus on the change brought about by globalisation, effectively 
justifying their solidarist position. The assumption is that the international community is 
increasingly unified in the face of change. As each state experiences globalisation in 
much the same way, each state as a result increasingly recognises the shared risks and 
opportunities associated with these new times. Response to this state of affairs is 
therefore relatively uniform; it does not pull states in different directions.
As discussed, human rights constitute just one area in which the values of the 
international community are increasingly one and the same. On this issue it was seen 
that globalisation and change functioned to depoliticise this issue. As Cook argued, in a 
knowledge based economy respect for human rights was becoming a sin qua non of
99 For example see Adda Bozeman, ‘The Future of International Society in a Multicultural World’, in 
Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion o f  International Society, op.cit., pp372-386. For an 
alternative position, one that posits the existence of a global international society, see Chris Brown,
‘Ethics of Coexistence: The International theory o f Terry Nardin’, Review o f  International Studies,
Vol. 14, No.3, 1988, pp.213-222.
100 Bull, The Third World and International Society, op.cit., p.30.
101 Ibid.
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economic growth. As isolation from the global marketplace is simply not a rational 
option, ultimately curtailing human rights is not an option either.
And yet, for the reasons outlined already, it is not possible to assume that ‘globalisation’ 
creates a shared ‘world culture’ that might allow for thinking about globalisation and its 
impact on the international system along ‘solidarist’ lines. It is hard to imagine that the 
necessary universal values will ‘emanate’ from the context generated by globalisation. 
As a constituted process, it necessarily manifests itself in line with certain powerful 
interests - explaining why it is so often considered as ‘corporate’ globalisation. 
Moreover, it impacts upon different states according to circumstances specific to them. 
Neither implying growth nor development, it is invalid to assume an underlying natural 
harmony of interests in this respect. Therefore, we ought not to assume that a more 
pluralist conception is in fact more appropriate for sustaining the international society in 
the long-term.
This returns us to a more sceptical position, one that is closer to that of Carr. When we 
return to some o f  the i mplication o f  ‘ globalisation’ in  this respect and reconsider the 
argument, we see that it does not allow all to control their destiny, though an argument is 
proffered as if this were not so. We see that the process is presented as neutral, even 
though it clearly is not so. We see that ‘British’ values, remain unaltered, but are now 
sold as if universally valid. And we see that the difficult circle is squared, on the matter 
of pursuing British economic interests, and giving the appearance of pursuing an 
ethically driven agenda. The common destiny is the British destiny, and as such we 
ought to be suspicious.
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Conclusion
From the analysis undertaken in this chapter, it can be seen that globalisation at least 
appears to have spurred a comprehensive rethink on foreign policy, holding out the 
possibility of a sort of ‘third way’ in international affairs. The centrality afforded to 
global matters - globalisation, global interests, global community, universal values - is 
striking, reflecting the degree to which New Labour, through Cook and Blair, have 
imbibed key elements of the globalisation discourse.102 Thus ‘globalisation* is of 
considerable significance. And in as much as this is the case, significant limitations to 
this approach can be identified.
A first point to make in this regard is the close relationship between the initial domestic 
exegesis, and the subsequent argument made when developed to encompass the 
international realm. Many of the assumptions animating the domestic exegesis play an 
important determining function in this area. In line with the domestic exegesis, 
globalisation is seen as something ‘out there’, natural and unavoidable, yet ultimately 
desirable and not a threat. As a process without a subject, it therefore takes on a neutral 
connotation, and in combination with the idea of liberalisation, an underlying ‘natural 
harmony of interests’ pervades the analysis, whereby British interests can be seen to 
equate with the interests of the international ‘community’ as a whole. This allows Blair
102 By way o f contrast, the four strategic aims listed alongside the original mission statement lacked such 
an obvious and radical ‘global’ dimension. These strategic aims were; “to make the United Kingdom a 
leading player in a Europe of independent nation states; to strengthen the Commonwealth...; to use the 
status o f the UK in the United Nations to secure more effective international action; to foster a people’s 
diplomacy through services to British citizens abroad and by increasing respect and goodwill for Britain 
among the peoples of the world...”. Cook, ‘British Foreign Policy’, op.cit.
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and Cook to develop the significance of the ‘new times’ in a direction that posits a ‘third 
way’ in international affairs, one that inexorably moves us in a common direction.
Nevertheless, whereas at the domestic level the possibility of a Third Way only requires 
convincing a domestic constituency of the imperatives associated with a particular 
version of globalisation, such an aim becomes all the more ambitious when attempted at 
the international level. The problem for such a view therefore relates to the ability to 
forge an original position at the international level (that is proffer a particular foreign 
policy) in light of globalisation, which ultimately depends for its success on convincing 
other states of the correctness of this position. The understanding of globalisation when 
considering the domestic impact derives in large part from a process that exists as 
something ‘out there’, a ‘thing-in-itself. Because the spectre of globalisation looms 
large, the possibility of convincing people of this position is more obtainable. And yet 
the variety in circumstances, perspectives and interests that characterise the broader 
international realm, calls into question the possibility of a global consensus forming in 
this regard. And this is crucial because the possibility of instantiating New Labour 
foreign policy along the desired declared lines, ultimately stands or falls on the ability to 
convince others of its essential correctness. And the logic of this position is to throw 
light back on the longer-term possibility of a domestic third way.
Combined, the above assumptions silence a more negative and less glib analysis. I have 
argued that in fact, the trends ascribed to globalisation do not necessarily give rise to co­
operation, nor do they necessarily encourage the development o f  global interests and 
universal values. In terms of agency, only some states may be said to have any
194
determinative role, i.e. are able to shape ‘globalisation’ (judged in terms of New 
Labour’s own analysis). Thus ‘pooling’ sovereignty as a means of recovering control in 
the face of ‘globalisation’ (selectively understood), is not an option for most states. 
Consequently, questions arise as to why a country should then consider the ‘pooling’ of 
sovereignty as desirable. This becomes particularly prescient when considering the 
almost symbiotic relationship of globalisation to liberalisation.
Resisting any fatalistic argument instead holds out a different set of options for most 
states, options that do not point to a ‘third way’, as power cannot be recovered through 
multi-lateral cooperation, or through exploiting a ‘pivotal’ status. Much rests on the 
degree to which liberalisation is actually seen to favour all, both across and within states. 
In other words, should it become clear that the current processes of change do not favour 
all, then so the argument begins to unravel.
Secondly, the desire on the part of New Labour to place human rights at the heart of 
foreign policy, and to do so in a way that suggests that it is now less problematic is also 
flawed. ‘Rights’ cannot be grounded in terms of being the sin qua non of economic 
success.
Finally, as I will develop in the next chapter, a decidedly realist position can be 
interpreted in this analysis, in that rather than providing a viable solidarist policy, the 
position seems to favour, perhaps at the cost of others, an exclusive British set of 
national interests. Britain’s particular circumstances mean that it has strong vested 
interests in perpetuating ‘globalisation’ (qua continued liberalisation and free trade),
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which in turn requires convincing others of the worth of globalisation (selectively 
understood, as a thing-in-itself, determining specific responses). Thus it is in the 
interests of the British government to articulate a particular account of globalisation that 
is palatable abroad (as well as domestically). Promulgating an approach that shares key 
features of the strong thesis in fact functions to realise this.
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Chapter 6
Re-Interpreting the Significance of Globalisation to New Labour
“Globalisation is with us. It is not just here to stay. It is here to accelerate”.1
“We have been elected as New Labour, and we will govern as New Labour*'? 
Introduction
The manner in which globalisation and change are depicted in the New Labour 
discourse is unacceptable. The nature of the new programme and the type of 
redefinition explained in terms of globalisation is unsustainable. Third Way theory, at 
least as articulated by Blair, is as a result open to question.3 In essence, there is in fact 
more room for manoeuvre than is recognised by New Labour. The question is, how to 
account for a view of globalisation, central as it is, that is nonetheless so flawed?
In order to explain this apparent anomaly, in this chapter I posit that one can 
reinterpret the ‘significance’ of globalisation. To make the argument the chapter will 
take on the following form. In  the first section, I return to consider the method of 
depth hermeneutics discussed in chapter two, drawing attention to the concept of 
ideology and its application in considering ‘globalisation’ in this context. Following 
this I then revisit the arguments of the previous chapters with an eye to identifying the 
ideological strategies that they now might be said to display. However, and in order to
1 Robin Cook, ‘The Challenges o f Globalisation’, speech to the Trilateral Commission at the 
International Institute o f Strategic Studies, London, 9th March 2001.
2 Tony Blair, Victory Speech at the Royal Festival Hall, 2nd May 1997.
3 This is reflected in the recent set o f interventions on Third Way Theory, in which Anthony Giddens, 
following Wolfgang Merkel, argues for the need to distinguish four ‘third ways’. Anthony Giddens, 
Where Now For New Labour? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), p.4. See also Wolfgang Merkel, ‘The 
Third Ways o f Social Democracy’, in Anthony Giddens, (ed.), The Global Third Wav Debate.
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validate these strategies as ‘ideological’, I first contextualise the New Labour position, 
drawing attention to certain social-historical circumstances, before finally offering a 
re-interpretation.
Depth Hermeneutics and the Interpretation of Ideology: Approaching the New Labour 
Discourse
Understood as a version of the depth-hermeneutical procedure, the 
interpretation of ideology draws upon the phases of social-historical analysis 
and formal or discursive analysis- but it also goes beyond these phases: it puts 
forward an interpretation, a creative and synthetic proposition, concerning the 
interelations between meaning and power.4
It is not enough to simply question any understanding of globalisation empirically, 
that much has been said already. But what are the consequences of rejecting an 
approach that attempts to understand globalisation purely in terms of the facts, in 
favour of an alternative reading that highlights a non-positivist social constructivism? 
In this section I return to an examination of the depth hermeneutic technique and what 
it entails in light of an assessment of the New Labour discourse.
A first point to make is that in adopting a depth hermeneutical approach, the analyst 
must examine how the meaning of globalisation is promulgated and received in the 
social realm; by whom, and in what circumstances. Sensitive to the possibility that 
the idea of globalisation will be appropriated and manipulated as a result of its 
amorphous nature, it becomes incumbent upon the analyst concerned with the 
significance of globalisation to New Labour, not just to consider the argumentative 
flaws of the original position judged empirically (part of the formal analysis of
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pp50-73; Stuart White, ‘The Ambiguities o f the Third Way’, in Stuart 
White, (ed.), New Labour: The Progressive Future? (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp3-17.
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chapters four and five), but also to critically examine the form that the argument takes, 
mindful o f  t he b roader social h istorical field i n w hich t he a rgument i s played o ut. 
Once factored into the argument, this dimension allows for a critical 
(re)interpretation; something Thompson, in the above quote, refers to as a ‘synthetic 
proposition*.
On the basis of the approach advocated thus far, it can be said that there exists no 
‘Archimidean’ point by which one may conceptualise the New Labour position vis-a- 
vis others j udged in  terms o f  something cailed ‘globalisation’ and distinguished in  
terms of ‘ideology*. By this I mean that there is no thing denoted as ‘globalisation’ 
that can be understood in separation from the social actors who constitute and 
reproduce it in a particular form as a result of their particular interpretations. The 
limitations inherent to an approach can be seen in the case of Clift.
In conducting a comparative analysis of the British Labour party judged against other 
Western European social democracies, Clift argues that “we may conceptualise the 
ideological tension between New Labour and European social democracy turning on 
the i mplications o f  g lobalization, first, for s ocial d emocratic egalitarianism ( and i n 
turn redistribution), and secondly, for the role of the state in the economy”.5 Clift 
offers a convincing argument with respect to the idea that a variety of approaches can 
be distinguished between parties, stemming from the way in which the environment is 
construed. Nonetheless, to conceptualise the differences as ‘ideological’, and turning 
on the implications of globalisation, is in part misleading. The problem with this
4 John B. Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era o f Mass 
Communication. (Oxford: Polity Press & Blackwell Publishers, 1990), p.320.
5 Ben Clift, ‘New Labour’s Third Way and European Social Democracy’, in Steve Ludlum & Martin J. 
Smith, (eds.), New Labour in Government. (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2001), p.62.
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statement is twofold, relating to both the essentialist reading of globalisation it 
implies (in effect reifying the notion ‘globalisation’), and to the ‘neutral’ 
understanding of ideology underpinning the approach. Each are in fact related.
In positing an essentialist reading of globalisation and adopting a neutral conception
of ideology Clift continues:
The European social democratic parties are more similar now than at any time 
this century. However, the importance of the national context to each 
formation engenders enduring and significant differences between these 
‘sister’ parties. Underlying these differences are a range of conceptions of the 
implications of globalization for social democratic commitments to 
egalitarianism and full employment.6
On the first part of this quote both Clift and I can agree. Such a position recognises, 
or at least does not preclude the importance of, the interpretative dimension - as each 
‘sister’ party makes sense of and acts according to a set of partially unique national 
factors. However, the meaning of globalisation proffered by each party does not 
derive from a different reading of the same thing, i.e. ‘globalisation’. There does not 
occur a convenient distinction between the object (globalisation) and the subject 
(those interpreting and as a result constituting a phenomenon denoted as 
globalisation). Instead, one must consider the fact that interests peculiar to the agent 
colour the interpretation and potentially constitute a process bearing the hallmarks of 
this particular interpretation.
It is this factor that draws attention to the possibility of an ideological dimension 
being present in the analysis; but, as discussed in chapter two, by ‘ideological’, I have
6 Ibid, p.71.
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in mind a view quite different to that of Clift. As Thompson has noted about the
concept of ideology:
Strategies of symbolic construction are the tools with which symbolic forms 
capable of creating and sustaining relations of domination can be produced; 
they are symbolic devices, as it were, which facilitate the mobilization of 
meaning. But whether the symbolic forms thereby produced serve to sustain 
relations of domination or to subvert them, to bolster up powerful individuals 
and g roups o r t o u ndermine t hem, i s a m atter t hat c an b e r esolved o nly by 
studying how these symbolic forms operate in particular social-historical 
circumstances, how they are used and understood by the subjects who produce 
and receive them in the socially structured contexts of everyday life.7
Hence the analysis of ideology “is concerned with the ways in which meaning is 
mobilized in the social world and serves thereby to bolster up individuals and groups
Q
who occupy positions of power”. This refers to the possibility of judging the 
significance in a negative fashion, as “the interpretation of ideology involves not only 
the projection of possible meaning, but also the claim that such meaning serves, in 
certain circumstances, to establish and sustain relations of domination”.9 It is this 
central fact about ideology, which in relation to an idea like globalisation requires an 
examination of its use in embedded circumstances. To merely label ‘globalisation’ in 
itself as ideological, or to point out that different approaches to it can be understood 
as connoting different ideologies, is therefore unsatisfactory. In effect, it silences an 
important avenue of critical enquiry.
In order to sustain an argument for an interpretation of ideology with regards to the 
significance of globalisation in the New Labour discourse, a prior set of assumptions 
must then ultimately be made, because “[w]e cannot read the ideological character of
7 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.67.
8 Ibid., p.56.
9 Ibid., p.294.
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symbolic phenomena off symbolic phenomena themselves”. 10 We must instead 
recognise that “[wjhether symbolic phenomena do or do not serve to establish and 
sustain relations of domination is a question which can be answered only by 
examining the interplay of meaning and power in particular circumstances”.11
A critique of ideology in the New Labour account of globalisation therefore requires 
an appreciation, not just of the particular understanding of ‘globalisation’ held by 
someone like Blair, but also the particulars of the conceptualisation, and the timing 
and situation in which this version of events is adumbrated. Each is an inseparable 
element, not only helping to explain the particular form that the argument takes, but 
also why it is that a particular set of processes are ultimately manifested as they are. 
So in the case of New Labour, what are these circumstances that allow for an 
ideological interpretation?
In this chapter I argue that the particular account of globalisation articulated by Blair 
through to 1999 (in other words that account which stressed the domestic implications 
of globalisation), in the main reflected the need to gain election and to sustain 
credibility once elected. In this respect, and in line with Grant, “Labour’s policy 
adjustments w ere n ot n ecessarily d riven b y globalization p e r  se. I n i  arge p art t hey 
were a response to domestic imperatives which meant that electoral success was 
perceived to be dependent on the party’s ability to differentiate itself from old
1 9Labour”. But, in contrast to Grant, it is important to recognise the function of 
‘globalisation’, seeing it, in line with my orientation, as in some way implicated in the
10 Ibid., p56.
11 Ibid.
12 Wyn Grant, ‘Globalisation, Comparative Political Economy and the Economic Policies o f the Blair 
Government’, CSGR Working Paper No. 08/98, University o f  Warwick.
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process, not merely functioning as an excuse, but rather helping to produce the 
necessary empirical conditions in order to reinforce this position in the long run, that 
is to create the idea of a third way as a permanent possibility.
Thus a particular set of circumstances -  interpreted as domestic imperatives -  are 
presented as if  compelling Blair to adopt an electoral strategy in a direction that 
without ‘globalisation’ would quite simply have been regarded as a move to the 
right. 13 A particular reading of globalisation can therefore be interpreted as 
functioning in a number of ways to give legitimacy to this change. Certain strategies 
of symbolic construction can be observed, for example naturalisation and reification, 
and interpreted as ideological because they enable Blair and New Labour to 
adumbrate a particular position conducive to gaining (and retaining) power which, if 
then enacted upon, will function to realise those very conditions.14
As a technique, this method can be extended to an analysis of the subsequent role 
globalisation plays in foreign policy formulation and their attempt to also shape this 
environment. Here I argue that both Cook and Blair are able to pursue an otherwise 
problematic set of (‘national’) interests, thanks to the ‘imperatives’ derived from a 
particular reading of globalisation. In  this case strategies such as passivisation and 
universalisation can be read off of the discourse, functioning to obscure and make
131 do not mean to suggest any essentialist reading o f Social Democracy. As Tony Wright and Andrew 
Gamble point out, as a doctrine, social democracy is not fixed. Nonetheless, judgement can be made in 
light o f what these changes would signify; without what I believe to be an erroneous understanding of
‘globalisation’. For a series o f discussions on the nature o f Social Democracy see Andrew Gamble & 
Tony Wright, (eds.), The New Social Democracy. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). For a useful set of 
discussions o f what it is exactly that distinguishes social democracy from neo-liberalism see Eric Shaw, 
The Labour Party Since 1979: Crisis and Transformation. (London: Routledge, 1994), p.6; Raymond 
Plant, ‘Crosland, Equality and New Labour’, in Dick Leonard, (ed.), Crosland and New Labour. 
(Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1999), pp 19-34; Colin Hay, The Political Economy o f  New Labour: 
Labouring Under False Pretences?. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp54-58.
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palatable a broader policy of liberalisation. In other words, a policy of liberalisation 
can be promulgated as universally favourable, thanks to the adoption of certain 
strategies associated with a particular version of globalisation. Furthermore, these 
strategies can then be explained in terms of the conditions that they aspire to create; 
conditions that also function to underpin a possible ‘third way’ in international affairs.
Taken together, these contextual imperatives suggest a wilful attempt on the part of 
New Labour to permanently resolve a hitherto intractable set of difficulties by 
bridging a set of divides (in both the domestic and international area), by a discursive 
method that in time becomes real. And it is in this respect therefore that globalisation 
is central.
However, and before developing the analysis, a few things need to be said by way of 
qualification. First, I do not attempt to prove whether or not this shift is being 
intentionally ‘masked’. Ideological judgement does not rest upon the ability to show 
in some conspiratorial fashion that globalisation is adopted in order to dupe the wider 
public and party. A critique of ideology, in this sense, is not concerned with issues of 
‘false consciousness’, or based on some simplistic ‘top down’ understanding of 
ideology, whereby a ‘ruling class’ determines ideas. Nor is it the aim here, to critique 
their account on the basis of some epistemologically flawed desire for recognition of 
the objective ‘truth’. The mode instead, concerns itself with how the meaning of 
globalisation can be seen to function to serve particular interests (meet certain 
‘imperatives’).15
141 refer the reader to chapter two for a description o f the general modes o f operation o f ideology, and 
the various strategies o f symbolic construction associated with these modes.
15 That said however, one would be naive to hold to the possibility that this does not, in part, actually 
occur in the case o f Blair. Referring to the apparently conservative nature o f the Labour programme in
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In addition to the kind of critique being offered, we need also to be clear about its
‘status’. The depth hermeneutic method, by its nature, eschews any definitive
argument; it cannot provide the last say on the matter. Instead, all that can be offered
is a more or less convincing argument that must nonetheless retain the status of an
interpretation. As Thompson points out:
In analysing ideology, in seeking to grasp the complex interplay of meaning 
and power, we are not dealing with a subject matter that admits of 
incontestable demonstration (whatever that may be). We are in the realm of 
shifting sense and relative inequalities, of ambiguity and word-play, of 
different degrees of opportunity and accessibility, of deception and self- 
deception, of the concealment of social relations and of the concealment of the 
very process of concealment. To approach this realm in the expectation that 
one could provide incontestable analyses is like using a microscope to 
interpret a poem.16
In this vein such a method is decidedly unscientific. However, though any 
interpretation will remain contestable, it does not mean that it should in some way be 
afforded the status of being arbitrary. As Thompson points out “[tjhere may be good 
reasons for offering a particular interpretation and adhering to it, reasons which may 
be quite convincing in the circumstances even if they are not altogether conclusive”.17
This shades into a second difficulty deriving from the sort of conceptualisation of 
ideology offered up by Thompson. For Thompson, ideology is ultimately concerned 
with how meaning and power intersects in such a way as to reinforce ‘relations of
the immediate run up to the 1997 election, Blair is quoted as saying the following: “I am o f the centre- 
left and I want the left to be part o f this project. I want the left to realise that i f  we win this election, we 
will have done so without ceding any ground that cannot be recovered. I’m going to be a lot more 
radical in government than many people think.” This quote highlights two things. First, that Blair 
delineates between a programme that is publicly declared, and one that is kept secret. Secondly, that in 
attempting to gain election, ground had to be ‘ceded’; though this will then be ‘recovered’, with 
recovery undertaken somewhat ‘stealthily’. Interview given to the Observer, 27th April 1997. Quoted in 
John Rentoul, Tony Blair: Prime Minister. (London: Warner Books, 2001), p.312.
16 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit, p.71.
17 Ibid.
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domination’. Obviously, such a statement in turn rests upon a broader commitment to 
realising a set of social relations presumably characterised as ‘less dominant’. This is 
a more contentious and more difficult position to validate, potentially drawing one 
into a discussion about what might characterise a less dominant state of affairs.
Should you begin from the position that the current status quo ante is not inherently 
exploitative, then so it would follow that a narrative that further entrenches this state 
of affairs is itself fine. At the other end of the spectrum, one may hold to the view that 
societal relations are deeply skewed in favour of a small minority able to exploit 
power structures in order to reproduce certain relations of domination to their 
advantage. Here, a narrative whereby the status quo is naturalised would tend to be 
considered as pernicious, and in need of unmasking.
These are vexing issues, beyond the scope of this paper. The thrust of the critique
contained in this chapter however derives from a limited set of assumptions, that I
maintain, nonetheless qualifies the critique as ideological. As Zizek points out
concerning ideology:
the starting point of the critique of ideology has to be full acknowledgement 
of the fact that it is easily possible to lie in the guise o f truth. When, for 
example, some Western power intervenes in a Third World country on 
account of violations of human rights, it may be ‘true’ that in this country the 
most elementary human rights were not respected, and that the Western 
intervention will effectively improve the human rights record, yet such a 
legitimization none the less remains ‘ideological’ in so far as it fails to 
mention the true motives of the intervention (economic interests, etc.).18
Such an outlook (though with certain qualifications in mind) can be applied to 
thinking about New Labour and the function globalisation plays in the discourse. That
18 Slavoj Zizek, ‘The Spectre o f Ideology’, in Slavoj Zizek, Mapping Ideology (London: Verso, 1994), 
p.8. Emphasis in original.
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which Blair adumbrates as if ‘true’, indeed obvious, is in fact often untenable. The so 
called unavoidable consequences o f ‘globalisation’ are avoidable, ‘globalisation’ does 
not allow for a ‘non-ideologicaT third way, the global economy need not be accepted 
‘on it’s own terms’, and so on. Where this is the case, and given certain assumptions 
relating to the utility of such a position to New Labour, then so one can begin a 
critique of ideology. Thus if we take Zizek’s view of truth to refer to mean ‘Blair’s 
truth’, or ‘Cook’s truth’, then in this respect judgement is valid.
Moreover, that New Labour is relatively powerful vis-a-vis other individuals and 
institutions within the domestic realm is, I believe, indisputable. Such a position 
bestows upon the likes of Blair and Cook a degree of dominance within the country 
and further afield. This is to an extent simply assumed here. Hence negotiating the 
difficult idea of ‘relations of domination’ is, in the case of an analysis of the 
significance of globalisation and New Labour, perhaps reasonably clear-cut. What 
remains, as a contentious point open to dispute, is the degree of significance -  
particularly in assessing the significance of globalisation applied to the international 
realm -  rather than whether or not it is at all significant.
With this in mind, I now turn to the specific task of re-interpreting the significance of 
globalisation. To do this I first offer a brief examination of what I label as ‘contextual 
postulates’ that explain the imperatives that give rise to the possibility of interpreting 
an ideological component. For clarity, I divide up the remainder of the chapter into 
two sub-sections; beginning with a re-examination of the domestic significance of 
globalisation, then followed by a reinterpretation of its significance for foreign policy 
formulation.
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Re-Interpreting the Domestic Significance o f Globalisation: Getting Elected
The essence of Blair and New Labour is an attempt to resolve these problems: 
to end electoral decline; to reduce the potential for party conflict; and to 
provide an ideology which can retain some of Labour’s historical 
commitments to social justice without alienating the middle income support 
necessary for electoral victory.19
In this section I examine in greater detail the above considerations which I argue 
accurately capture the New Labour strategy, and subsequently account for the 
apparent ‘anomalies’ relating to globalisation as understood in terms of its domestic 
significance. I build upon these insights, relating each in terms of a number of 
additional considerations. These c onsiderations relate to the notion of globalisation 
predominating at the time, which derives from a broader Weltanschauung associated 
with an ascendant neo-liberalism; as well as certain functions associated with the 
particular nature of the B ritish economy and perceptions relating to the constraints 
that this imposes. These contentions provide for a particular (re)interpretation of the 
significance of globalisation to New Labour, helping to make sense, not only of the 
specific strategies that are observable in the context of the discourse over time, but 
also why a particular set of processes are, as a result, made manifest.
The first of the above factors draws attention to the outlook, or following Gill, the
90‘hegemonic view’ prevailing at the time New Labour sought election. Two 
considerations warrant mention in this regard, referring in the domestic context to the 
‘Thatcherite legacy’, and more generally the impact of neo-liberalism.
19 Martin J. Smith, ‘Tony Blair and the Transition to New Labour: 1994-2000’, in Brian Brivati & 
Richard Hefferman, (eds.), The Labour Party: A Centenary History. (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press 
Ltd., 2000), p. 143.
20 Stephen Gill, ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism’, Millennium: 
Journal o f  International Studies, Vol. 24, No.3, 1995, pp399-423.
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The latter, as I have argued in chapters three and four, has had a profound impact in 
shaping how ‘globalisation’ is generally conceptualised. In  significant respects, the
Blairite understanding shares in common important features found in the influential
91strong thesis formulation. This I have discussed in the previous chapters, and so I 
will not elaborate on here.
The legacy of the ideas and policy c hanges a ssociated with Margaret T hatcher are 
also an important consideration because they function to subsequently constrain what 
New Labour believed they could achieve, given the need to be electorally viable. In 
addition to entrenching the above orthodoxy, the legacy of eighteen years of 
conservatism significantly altered electoral perceptions as to the role of government, 
particularly the perceptions of that segment of the electorate dubbed ‘middle 
England’. In response, influential advisors such as Philip Gould pointed out that the 
electorate had markedly altered. 22 Following a longer-term general trend, 
conservative rule w as understood to have precipitated a more individual, non-class 
based electorate, whose allegiance could no longer be assumed or predicted on the 
basis of social background. In particular, key marginal voters were now perceived 
to be more averse to the idea of income tax increases and a tax regime generally
21 This conflates globalisation with liberalisation, and assumes a global logic o f deregulation, openness 
and flexibility. Globalisation is seen as a ‘thing-in-itself, and so agency remains obscure. The process 
is nonetheless assumed to be progressive and in the interests o f all. Thus politics plays a marginal 
‘managerial’, ‘pragmatic’ or ‘facilitative’ role in the face o f the largely irresistible forces o f  the global 
economy.
22 Dennis Kavanagh, The Reordering o f British Politics: Politics After Thatcher. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), p.217.
23 Gould points out that in the forty-year period following the war: “Labour’s average vote fell from 
44.5 per cent to 31.8 per cent”. Phillip Gould, The Unfinished Revolution: How the Modernisers Saved 
the Labour Party. (London: Little, Brown, 1998), p.21. See also Peter Mandelson & Roger Liddle, The 
Blair Revolution: Can Blair Deliver? (London: Faber & Faber, 1996).
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be more averse to the idea of income tax increases and a tax regime generally geared 
towards redistribution.24
In light of this, and given the near obsessive concern on the part of Blair and his inner 
circle that they succeed in getting elected, it was held as crucial that the party capture
9 ^the centre ground. Speaking to the Observer newspaper in 1996, Blair argued that:
Politics will alter dramatically in the next few years. But I cannot forsee 
exactly what shape it will take. There is no doubt that if  we continue to 
occupy the centre ground, if  we become the One nation political party, if we 
can attract support from the centre as well as the centre-left, then we will be 
able to benefit significantly.26
As Smith points out, the need to pursue a radically new agenda was brought home, 
first by the disastrous electoral failure in 1983, and latterly by the failure of Neil 
Kinnock in 1992. In the case of the former, the size of the defeat “highlighted the 
scale of the electorate’s disillusionment with the party”, undermining the legitimacy 
of the more radical left faction that had secured a temporary victory over the (Labour) 
right, but at the cost of a set of manifesto policies subsequently dubbed the longest
• 9 7suicide note in history. The lesson drawn from the defeat of Kinnock also seemed
9ftclear. The party was still not ‘radical’ enough.
24 Gould, The Unfinished Revolution, op.cit., p.21.
25According to Skidelsky, we may in fact say that “New Labour is a vehicle [designed] to capture and 
maintain power”. Robert Skidelsky, ‘Five Years Labour’. Prospect, May 2002.
26 The Observer, 5th May 1996. (Interviewed by Anthony Bevins) and quoted in Rentoul, Tony Blair, 
op.cit., p.290. According to Wickham-Jones, “Blair’s intention, arguably at any rate, was to place the 
party to the right o f the median voter so as to ensure electoral victory by depriving the Conservatives 
of their core support”. Mark Wickham-Jones, ‘Introduction’ in Richard Little & Mark Wickham-Jones, 
New Labour’s Foreign Policy. A New Moral Crusade? (Manchester University Press: Manchester,
2000), p.6.
27 Smith, Tony Blair and the Transition to New Labour, op.cit., p. 144.
28 According to Sassoon, “Blair’s political courage has been mainly directed towards the 
transformation o f  the Labour Party into a powerful electable force, purging it from the remnants o f a 
puerile radicalism. Much o f this has required the deliberate occupation o f  a political space previously 
occupied by Conservatives.” Donald Sassoon, ‘European Social Democracy and New Labour’, in 
Gamble & Wright, The New Social Democracy, op.cit, p.33.
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In light of this legacy, New Labour believed that further changes were needed to 
capture the ‘middle ground’, changes which by the time Blair sought victory 
translated to mean meeting the preferences o f ‘middle England’. 29 This more 
fundamental shift of preference accommodation nonetheless presented a difficulty to 
Blair, given t he n ature o f  t he c onstraints t hat h e f  aced; n amely t he n eed to e  obble 
together “a strategy for permanently linking the working class, the lower middle class 
and a significant element of middle class support”.
While appealing to the preferences of ‘middle England’, New Labour still needed to 
appear to remain ‘true’ to their values and ‘traditional’ constituencies, which was 
problematic in that New Labour held to the view that the appropriate strategy to 
capture and retain the middle ground from the conservatives was essentially to appear 
more ‘competent’ in the field of economic management. Thus the desire to appear as 
a responsible, moderate and competent alternative, now translated to mean taking a
- i i
‘hands o ff  attitude in the economic field. This draws attention to the significance 
of pursuing the ‘centre’.
Though a concern to capture the centre ground has in fact been a perennial one for 
Labour, following eighteen years of conservative rule, in economic terms, the ‘centre 
ground’ was now a decidedly neo-liberal place. Whereas prior to the mid-1970s, both 
Labour and Conservatives alike adhered to a ‘post war consensus’ of sorts, in which 
full employment was considered a worthwhile and achievable policy goal, best
29 See Colin Hay, ‘Anticipating Accommodation, Accommodating Anticipations: the Appeasement o f  
Capital in the ‘Modernisation’ o f the British Labour Party, 1987-1992’, Politics and Society, Vol.25, 
No.2, 1997, p.25.
30 Smith, Tony Blair and the Transition to New Labour, op.cit., p. 145.
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arrived at via certain Keynesian economic policies, by the 1990s this orthodoxy had 
been all but supplanted. In its place, as Hay argues, this perceived need to 
‘accommodate’ preferences, meant that New Labour ended up pursuing an  agenda 
profoundly tied up with the immediate conservative legacy, a ‘politics of catch-up’, 
that may fairly be judged in important respects to be neo-liberal.33 Hence the 
difficulty: how to advocate such a policy and still be able to ‘reduce the potential for 
party conflict’ and provide an ideology retaining ‘Labour’s historical commitments to 
social justice’? 34
Compounding this difficulty, in approaching economic policy Blair and New Labour 
had to contend with an alternative and moderate position on the left that concentrated 
attention on certain ‘pathologies’ particular to the British economy.35 As Burnham
31 See Pippa Norris, ‘Anatomy o f a Labour Landslide’, in Pippa Norris & Neil Gavin (eds.), Britain 
Votes 1997. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Martin Harrop, ‘The Pendulum Swings: The 
British General Election of 1997’, Government and Opposition, 32, 1997, pp305-19.
32 Driver & Martell, New Labour: Politics After Thatcherism, op.cit., p. 182. See also Lawrence Black, 
Consensus or Coercion?: the State, the People and Social Cohesion in Post War Britain. (Cheltenham: 
New Clarion, 2001).
33 It is not my intention to enter into the debate concerning how ‘Thatcherite’ Blair and New Labour 
are. For a critical view, one that sees the policies o f New Labour and the Conservatives as essentially 
the same, see Colin Hay, ‘Labour’s Thatcherite Revisionism: Playing the “Politics o f  Catch-Up’” , in 
Political Studies, Vol.42, No. 4, 1994, pp700-707. For a more sympathetic reading, stressing 
significant distinctions, see Martin J. Smith, ‘Understanding the “Politics o f Catch-Up”: The 
Modernization o f the Labour Party’, Political Studies, Vol.42, No.4, 1994, pp708-715; Gerald Taylor, 
Labour’s Renewal?: The Policy Review and Beyond. (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1997). For a view that 
stresses the ‘post-Thatcherite’ nature o f the settlement, i.e. suggesting a transcendence o f both left and 
right in certain key respects, see Stephen Driver & Luke Martell, New Labour: Politics After 
Thatcherism. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), ppl58-173.
34 For a discussion o f certain parallels with Wilson’s ‘big idea’ - a New Britain forged in the ‘white 
heat o f technological revolution’ - see Hay, The Political Economy o f  New Labour, op.cit., p.6. For a 
critical examination o f the gulf between Wilson’s rhetoric and the reality o f compromise see David 
Howell, British Social Democracy: A Study in Development and Decay. (2nd ed.) (New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 1980), chapter nine. For an account that draws attention to a more perennial theme of  
Labour ‘compromise’ when in power see David Coates, The Labour Party and the Struggle for 
Socialism. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp42-74.
35 According to Wickham-Jones, the immediate period prior to Blair was motivated by the desire to 
“develop in the United Kingdom the kind o f organized capitalism they perceived West Germany to 
enjoy”. This is reflected in the manifesto and other documents over this period. Such policies as 
strengthening the Department o f Trade and Industry, the creation o f a state investment bank, industrial 
training schemes, and active intervention to curtail corporate takeovers. See Mark Wickham-Jones, 
‘Anticipating Social Democracy, Preempting Anticipations: Economic Policy-Making in the British 
Labour Party, 1987-1992’, Politics and Society, Vol.23, No.4, 1995, p.468.
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points o ut, “ [a] q uick s urvey o f  the history o f  ‘governing Britain’ i n t he t wentieth 
century is apt to reveal that, despite much rhetoric, governments [have been] unable 
to solve the fundamental problems that beset the British economy (the relative 
productivity problem, the decline of the staple industries, recurrent inflationary 
pressure, the ‘boom and bust’ cycle”.36
Hutton points out that, in contrast to certain continental economies, the British 
economy suffers from the fact that it is “organised around a stock-market-based 
financial system and clearing banks averse to risk”.37 This, it is held, explains why 
corporate s trategy i s o n t he w hole m ore i nclined t owards t he p ursuit o f  s hort-term 
profit, w ith b usiness s trategies geared t o b oosting s hort-term s hare p rices. W hat i s 
more:
The UK’s flows of inward and outward investment are the highest in relation 
to national output for any industrial country. Britain invests more overseas 
than others, but also receives more inward investment. Therefore its own 
business community continually emphasises the virtues of free trade and 
minimal regulation. 8
Hutton argues that this explains why the interests of the City and more broadly the 
international financial community have exercised a particularly influential role. 
Ultimately, Hutton points out that the effect of this is to “sanctify the New Right’s
-IQ
calls for budgetary austerity, free trade, and price stability.” And this is unfortunate 
according to Hutton, in that it is this new right economic agenda that perpetuates the 
continued pathologies of boom and bust, under-investment, and decline of the ‘staple’ 
industries.
36 Burnham, Peter. ‘New Labour and the Politics of De-politicisation’, British Journal o f  Politics and 
International Relations, Vol.3, No.2, June 2001, p. 127.
37 Hutton, Will. The State W e’re In. (London: Jonathon Cape, 1996), p.21. See also, Hay, The 
Political Economy o f  New Labour, op.cit., p.27.
38 Ibid.
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What is more, this is also problematic for reason that many on the Left see a policy 
that favours budgetary austerity and free trade as disproportionately favouring certain 
sectors (and regions) at the cost of others.40 As an example of this conflict of interests, 
Hutton points to manufacturing industry. In pursuing interest rates designed to deliver 
a low inflation rate (and thus less concerned with the exchange rate), Labour meets 
the concerns of the financial community (the ‘City’). This nonetheless comes at a 
price, handicapping manufacturing industry through an overvalued pound, resulting 
in uncompetitive exports.41 For Blair and New Labour then, the problem therefore 
concerns how to balance what is believed on the left to be a clear conflict of interests; 
arbitrating between a powerful electoral force on the economic right, at the same time 
as placating certain ‘losers’ traditionally constituting much of the traditional Labour 
vote.
Indeed, the above analysis points to difficulties that are perhaps perennial -  given that 
the party is at least nominally claiming to remain of the left (if not ‘old left’) 
operating in the context of the UK (thus needing to capture and hold onto the ‘middle 
ground’). So, and with these difficulties in mind, I now turn to re-interpret the 
significance of New Labour’s understanding of globalisation. It will be seen that 
‘globalisation’ does not simply act as a smokescreen, but rather functions to
39 Hutton, The State We’re In, op.cit., p.23.
40 This is summed up in what is referred to as the modified structural dependence argument. Essentially, 
this refers to the idea that “since the state is structurally dependent upon capital, it must internalise the 
prefemces o f the latter and hence engage in preference-accommodation or capital appeasment”. Hay, 
The Political Economy o f  New Labour, op.cit., p i 73.
41 According to Coates and Hay, “throughout the post-war period manufacturing activity within the UK 
has been characterized by relatively low rates of productive investment, reflective o f the high cost o f  
capital and the endemic short-termism, risk aversion and overseas orientation o f UK-based financial 
institutions”. David Coates & Colin Hay, ‘The Internal and External Face o f New Labour’s Political 
Economy’, Government and Opposition, Vol.36, No.4, 2001, p.461. See also Simon Bond & Tim
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potentially create in the long-term the very conditions needed to surmount these 
apparently intractable difficulties. And it is this respect, getting at a deeper 
significance to globalisation, that I now turn to re-examine the elements of the 
conceptualisation that operate to create these circumstances.
Identifying the Modus Operandi in the New Labour Discourse in light o f the 
Domestic Imperatives: Reification and Legitimisation.
Reification refers to when “relations of domination may be established and sustained
by representing a transitory, historical state of affairs as if  it were permanent, natural,
outside of time. Processes are portrayed as things or as events of a quasi-natural kind,
in such a way that their social and historical character is eclipsed”.42 Associated with
this are a set of strategies that include ‘naturalization’, ‘etemalization’ and
‘nominalization’/ ‘passivization’. Naturalization assumes that such events are in some
way natural, that such outcomes are inevitable and ineluctable as a result of their
‘natural characteristics’. Etemalization, denies the social-historical character through
the portrayal of events as “permanent, unchanging and everrecurring”. 43
Nominalization refers to when identifiable agency is ‘erased’ and replaced with the
use of a noun, with passivization similarly referring to the rendering of verbs into the
passive form, with the effect that:
Nominalization and passivization focus the attention of the hearer or reader on 
certain themes at the expense of others. They delete actors and agency and 
they tend to represent processes as things or events which take place in the 
absence of a subject who produces them. 4
Jenkinson, ‘The Assessment: Investment Performance and Policy’, Oxford Review o f  Economic Policy, 
Vol.12, No.2, 1996, ppl-29.
42 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.65.
43 Ibid., p.66
44 Ibid.
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By this stage, it should be clear that it is possible to readily identify the above 
strategies existing in relation to ‘globalisation’. There are many instances in which 
the depiction of globalisation in the discourse can be critiqued in terms of its reifying 
properties. Clare Short for instance, writes: “globalisation is a historical fact. People 
have accused me of being in favour of globalisation. This is equivalent to accusing 
me of being in favour of the sun rising in the morning”.45 According to Cook, it is not 
a matter of whether one is or is not in favour of globalisation. Rather the appropriate 
metaphor likens globalisation to the dawn, “[o]n balance, I think it is a good thing 
that the sun rises every day. But I also know there is nothing I can do to stop it even if 
I wanted to” 46
In this case Cook portrays globalisation as something ‘natural’, and thereby inevitable. 
What is more, the metaphor of the sun rising associates globalisation with something 
that is positive and good, i.e. there occurs a strategy of displacement, in which 
globalisation assumes certain positive connotations; ‘a new dawn’.47 This is by no 
means an isolated position. It can be witnessed in many of the statements on 
globalisation issued by the government. For example, Blair conflating globalisation 
with ‘change’, an even more obscure idea in the discourse, then refers to the ‘forces 
of change’. Its association in the way in which it unfolds with the ‘accretion of time’, 
further reinforces the futility of resistance, now looking more like resistance to the
45 Clare Short, ‘Shaping Globalisation to Benefit All -  Better Health for the Poor and Global Public 
Goods’, 19th October 2001, Geneva.
46 Robin Cook, ‘Foreign Policy and National Interest’, speech to the Royal Institute o f  International 
Affairs, Chatham House, London, 28th January 2000.
47 Displacement, in this context, connotes how positive features associated with an object or agent is 
displaced onto another. Interestingly, Blair’s opening comment at the Royal Festival Hall on May 2nd 
1997 was “a new dawn has come has it not”.
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laws of physics. To resist is “pointless and futile, like trying to keep the clock from 
turning.”48
In each of the above cases, the depiction has the effect of reifying globalisation, 
representing the process as a ‘thing-in-itself. However, the point about reification in 
the c ontext o f  t he p articular c oncept o f  i deology u sed h ere, i s t hat i t i s s ignificant 
because this in turn reinforces certain relations of domination (hence the need for a 
set o f  c ontextual c onsiderations), b y which 11 ake to m  ean t hat i t gives r ise t o t he 
possibility of ensuring in the longer term a middle ground conducive to Labour’s 
long-term electoral success.
Reifying globalisation resolves many of the difficult issues raised in the previous
section. It ‘smoothes the way’, not only in order to capture the middle ground whilst
appearing credible in the eyes of the left, but also, as a result, functioning to
potentially constitute in the long-run the necessary ‘real world’ conditions to maintain
this hold. Take the following:
No country is immune from the massive change that globalisation brings.49
The key issue facing all governments of developed nations is how to 
respond.50
Each of these quotes, understood in conjunction with a reified version of globalisation, 
highlights its ideological connotation. To begin to develop how this is so it is 
important to map out a secondary set of assumptions within the argument, as 
discussed in chapter four. Firstly, we need to be mindful of the fact that globalisation
48 Tony Blair, speech given at the Conference of British Industry Annual Dinner, 27th April, 1998.
49 Tony Blair, ‘Facing the Modem Challenge: The Third Way in Britain and South Africa’, Cape Town, 
South Africa, 8th January 1999.
50 Tony Blair, ‘The Global Economy’, speech to the Keindanren, Tokyo, 5th January 1996.
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is closely synonymous with liberalisation. Thus in saying that ‘[n]o country is 
immune from the massive change that globalisation brings’, a reified understanding 
of globalisation implies that no country is immune from liberalisation.
Secondly, Blair rates ‘globalisation’ as being of overriding significance in that ‘[t]he 
key issue facing all governments of developed nations is how to respond’. This means 
all governments of developed nations, regardless of differences, are locked into this 
fate: having to respond to liberalisation as a process, which is “irreversible and 
irresistible”.51
Thirdly, the consequences of reification become all the more stark in that the 
antithesis of globalisation is protectionism. Denoting a strategy of fragmentation, the 
logic of the argument is as follows: given that we live in an age of globalisation, “[i]f 
this is so, then to compete in the global market two things must be done. A country 
has to dismantle barriers to competition and accept the disciplines of the international 
economy”. The manner of this response then, is essentially one of acquiescence, and 
reinforces a hands-off position, thus moving away from a more interventionist 
(industrial) strategy -  the sort associated, as discussed, with both Neil Kinnock and 
John Smith (and latterly embodied in the idea of a ‘stakeholding’ economy).
It will be remembered that as a modus operandi of ideology, legitimization refers to 
the ways in which “relations of domination” are portrayed as “just and worthy of 
support”, with rationalization referring to how “the producer of a symbolic form 
constructs a chain of reasoning which seeks to defend or justify a set of social
51 Tony Blair, untitled speech at the fiftieth anniversary o f the World Trade Organisation (Ministerial 
meeting), Geneva, 1998.
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relations or institutions, and thereby to persuade an audience that it is worthy of 
support.” From the above, it may be said that a chain of reasoning is adumbrated 
such that acquiescence - here understood as uncritical acceptance of the disciplines of 
the international economy - is legitimated. According to Blair two things must be 
done. Reason determines that barriers to competition be dismantled, and the 
disciplines of the international economy accepted. This version of events thereby 
plays down (indeed silences), scope for action, and national difference.54
The effect of this position is to depoliticise those policies that, as discussed, have 
hitherto appeared controversial and more concerned with accommodating the 
narrower preferences of ‘the city’, or ‘middle England’. But rather than appearing to 
meet these particular interests, the significance of the above line of reasoning is that it 
gives the appearance of meeting all interests -  because they are no longer at odds. 
Conflicting interests are at once silenced, reconciled and eclipsed. Consequently, 
when globalisation qua liberalisation is unavoidable, the effect is to neutralise an 
opposing set of positions, those of middle England and the financial market on the 
one hand (more attuned to neo-liberal solutions), and on the other hand those on the 
left within the party representing the interests of various unions, manufacturing and 
working class interests that do not hold to a more hands off policy. Hence legitimacy 
is arrived at for a policy that does not favour the interests of the left, through an 
account of globalisation that manages to balance (by erasing and reconciling) the 
conflicting interests discussed above.
52 Blair, ‘The Global Economy’, op.cit.
53 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit, p.61.
54 Both of which, as argued in chapters three and four, remain as valid options.
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And this stance is reinforced by an account of globalisation that obscures and erases 
agency, highlighting, as a result, a strategy of passivisation. An agenda that prioritises 
response, benefits from a view of globalisation that takes the form of a ‘process- 
without-a-subject’. As a ‘thing-in-itself, the question does not arise as to what drives 
the process itself. This remains essentially obscure, and so fits in nicely with the 
electoral concerns addressed above.
It will be remembered that the aim is to resolve the following problems: first, placate 
the party (by sustaining a credible left of centre ‘ideology’) and yet appeal to a broad 
constituency of interests that encompasses working and middle class elements; 
second, do this whilst remaining credible in the eyes of ‘the city’ and ‘finance capital’ 
(with their preference for budgetary austerity and free trade); third, appear to be 
economically ‘competent’ (keep taxes down); and fourth, ultimately, sustain this 
position, i.e. develop a strategy that permanently captures the middle ground.
As a ‘process-without-a-subject’, a reified globalisation erases agency, with the result 
that multi-nationals for example, remain, in the words of Fairclough, like ‘ghosts in 
the machine’. 55 In their place, ‘technology’, ‘capital’, and ‘globalisation’ are 
represented as the agents driving forward changes and thus become the key agents in 
this movement (hence denoting a strategy of nominalization and passivisation). In the 
Blair discourse, globalisation already exists - ‘it’, therefore can be thought of as the 
causal starting point. One need not say that New Labour accepts the essential tenets 
of the conservative (meaning neo-liberal) position.
55 Norman Fairclough, New Labour New Language? (London: Routledge, 2000), p.23.
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Typical in this regard is the following statement; “[p]eople underestimate the impact 
of globalisation. Technology is rewriting the rules of business and the rules of 
trade.. .”56 Of c ourse, ‘ technology’ i s n ot r ewriting the rules o f  b usiness and trade. 
Concerning trade, the rules governing trade are negotiated, drafted and codified by 
specific agents ultimately acting on the behalf of the state. Indeed, and as will be 
explored in the next chapter, this position has since Seattle become increasingly clear, 
with considerable attention being drawn to the activities of hitherto little known 
institutions like the World Trade Organisation and International Monetary Fund.57
Related to this, is the significance posited to the fact that, “[technology and capital 
are mobile.”58 Of course, in a simple sense, this at best may be said to be partially 
true. But, and as has been discussed, that technology and capital are ‘mobile’ is at 
best a problematic assertion, from which little can be gleaned in terms of significance 
in itself, both in terms of ‘scope for action’, and national difference, i.e. the ‘facts’ do 
not ‘ speak for themselves’. ‘ Capital’, can b e distinguished b etween short-term and 
long-term, or between productive and speculative flows. However, in making such a 
distinction, a significant move is made in recognition of the possibility of curtailing 
the distorting and negative impact of speculative short-term flows.59 Such recognition, 
as s uggested h ere, i s i mpermissible given t hat t he c ity o f  London i tself c ontains a 
large chunk of the very institutions that do so well from the speculative short-term 
movements o f ‘capital’.60
56 Tony Blair, ‘Shaping a Pivotal Role for Britain in the World’, speech to Guildhall, London, 22nd 
November 1999.
57 These issues will be directly addressed in the next chapter,
58 Blair, ‘Shaping a Pivotal Role for Britain in the World’, op.cit.
59 On this see George Soros, Towards an Open Society: The Crisis o f Global Capitalism Reconsidered. 
(New York: Public Affairs, 1998).
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Thus a nominalised discourse in this respect plays an important part in obfuscating 
the issue, which in turn draws attention away from the neo-liberal nature of the 
project promoted in the name of globalisation. The particular understanding of 
globalisation, and the associated strategies, can thus be interpreted in an ideological 
fashion in that avoiding a more critical stance allows the processes to become more 
deeply embedded.
Universalisation and Unification
Another important feature of Blair’s domestic position on globalisation relates to the 
idea that all are united in the face of the challenge that it represents. This is a central 
feature of the New Labour claim to represent the needs o f all people, and its 
significance derives from the idea of a ‘one nation’ centrist politics.
Globalisation gives the impression of unity, not only in moving beyond the structural 
critique of market societies that create winners and losers, but also in terms of having 
to remain ‘ahead of the race’. As discussed in chapter four, the domestic implications 
imputed to globalisation provides no analysis to suggest that globalisation entails 
losers as well as winners. This constitutes a key assumption relating to globalisation, 
in that all are potential winners. To reinforce this position however, New Labour also 
postulate that essentially we all share the experience, i.e. we are all collectively 
affected; all ‘coping with the same issues’.
Unification in the context implied here, refers to how a sense of unity, regardless of 
actual division or difference is established and sustained at the symbolic level. There
60 Many have discussed the viability o f a ‘Tobin tax’ in this regard, though Straw has himself written 
off the viability o f  such an idea.
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are o f  course n ot o nly d omestic b ut a Iso i ntemational e lements t o t  his. W ithin t he 
domestic context however, the most significant instance of unification relates to the 
manner in which New Labour supplant ideology with national interest in order to 
posit an argument that replaces the possibility of systemic disunity, with a discourse 
of inclusion at the national level in the face of global forces. This allows for the idea 
that ‘we’ must all play our part in order to stay ahead of the race, to remain 
‘competitive’ is both an individual and national obligation, with competitivity 
meaning ‘adaptable’ to change, ‘on its own terms’.
Thus, a particular set of assumptions surrounding the idea of globalisation clears the 
ground for a view of a united people all implicated in a metaphoric ‘race’. This 
metaphor allows for a narrative that stresses ‘team spirit’ and community, with the 
result that differences appear to be reconciled. The possibility of systemic disunity 
does not now exist, as Blair, in his reading of globalisation, avoids the need for any 
deeper critique of capitalism or the market. Instead, the force of the argument rests, 
not upon the analysis, but on the common sense assumption of what the alternative 
would be. The spectre of foreign competition now unifies the country in the face of 
the challenge. The interests of British business and the British people are one in the 
same.
This is combined with a strategy of universalization. Universalization, here listed as 
a strategy of symbolic construction associated with legitimisation, refers to how 
“institutional arrangements which serve the interests of some individuals are 
represented as serving the interests of all”.61 In this context it can be seen that
61 Thompson, Ideology and Modem Culture, op.cit., p.61.
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globalisation plays an important role in universalising a set of arrangements that 
favour the City (budgetary austerity, free trade, price stability). Universalisation of 
these norms, allows New Labour to avoid any over identification with any particular 
(class, gender, regional) group.
In the New Labour analysis, universalisation operates via globalisation by creating 
the illusion that in certain fundamental respects, different groups experience change 
in the same way, be they governments, classes, cultures, nations, individuals or 
genders. This follows from the reified understanding of globalisation as a ‘thing-in- 
itself, which avoids the possibility that workers who are unskilled or only semi­
skilled, working perhaps under ‘flexible’, part-time or temporary contracts, may have 
to disproportionately pay the price of being ‘adaptable’, now meaning flexible. Just as 
some are more equal than others, so some may have to be more adaptable too.
In adopting a particular version of globalisation, the broader New Labour discourse is 
able to gloss over many tricky issues that might otherwise obstruct the party in its 
aspiration to remain in power more permanently. Blair avoids dealing with, or even 
having to recognise these issues, with the effect that he can appear to be all things to 
all people. Thus at the deepest level, ‘globalisation’ plays its part in obscuring the 
idea that politics begins from the basis of conflicting interests; that conflicts of 
interest are somehow inherent to a world of scarce resources and conflicting values.
Secondly, this operates in the following terms: thanks to the imperatives of a reified 
‘globalisation’, credibility determines the need for budgetary constraint, free trade 
and price stability. Thus depoliticised, and denoting a strategy of legitimisation, Blair
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is instead able to represent these policies as unavoidable, and as such supplant the 
idea that they constitute difficult options with the idea that they are rational, obvious 
options -  now in the national interest. In this position we can in turn interpret a 
strategy of naturalisation, rationalisation, fragmentation and importantly unification.
Thus when arguing that we are all having to confront globalisation, Blair uses a 
strategy of universalisation. This approach - given meaning in light of an erroneous 
set of perceptions concerning the nature of the global economy and how it operates - 
is nonetheless reinforced by a strategy of passivisation. That is, where New Labour 
discusses increased mobility of capital flows with ever significant ‘exit’ options 
(ignoring who holds these funds, and avoiding a recognition of the heavy reliance on 
‘finance capital’ for investment projects or the role of multi-national companies), the 
discourse utilises a strategy of passivisation -  conceptually embodied in the idea of 
globalisation as a ‘process-without-a-subject’.
This is further reinforced by the ‘paratactic’ approach that is used in order to 
substantiate the significance of globalisation (listing ‘facts’ as if  equivalent without 
having to link them in a deeper context of cause and effect), which can be interpreted 
as another instance of reification. The fact that ‘globalisation’ explains this position, 
effectively forecloses ‘debate’ on the matter, and as such, is then able to draw 
strength from the ‘common sense’ assumptions prevalent and attached to the term at 
the time of espousing such views. This can now be interpreted as an instance of 
legitimisation, because it functions to silence the alternative possibility of a more 
orthodox leftist policy.
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Rationalisation also occurs in this respect, in that it is held that there is now no 
alternative to the forces associated with globalisation because they are ultimately 
inevitable. The conservative alternative becomes, by definition, ‘irrational’; 
‘conservatism’ and ‘protectionism’ become one and the same, ‘modernisation’ and 
‘progress’ forming the other end of the antithesis. This can also be interpreted as an 
instance offragmentation, specifically expurgation.
Finally, each of these strategies, in as much as they constitute modus operandi of 
ideology, and as strategies of symbolic construction, thereby potentially play their 
part in producing a reality in this image. As a result, we can interpret the domestic 
significance of ‘globalisation’ as operating not merely as a smoke screen, but in fact 
as a means of entrenching New Labour in power in the long-term. Nonetheless, the 
above is only half the picture. As discussed in chapter six, the domestic argument by 
its nature leads to foreign policy becoming a central site, whereby key issues, 
unresolved at the domestic level, are dealt with collectively. That is, to be successful, 
that is to allow for a domestic third way as a long-term possibility, necessitates that 
ideological strategies also operate ‘effectively’ at the international level. It is to this 
that I now turn.
Re-Interpreting the Significance of Globalisation in light of the National Interest 
In their assessment of New Labour’s attempt to articulate a ‘Third Way’ in foreign 
policy, Dunne and Wheeler favourably conclude that perhaps the most significant 
aspect relates to the changing way in which ministers now employ language. In this 
respect there has occurred a ‘marked shift’, one that in time will function to
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reconstitute that which is permissible from that which is not. According to Dunne and 
Wheeler:
The constitutive role that language plays in international relations can be seen 
from the fact that other governments take seriously what is said to them and 
about them. . . i n  every epoch... [ language] i s c entral i n shaping a range o f  
permissible actions.62
Though this is an important point to make, there is also a negative side to this analysis 
that goes largely unrecognised. This follows from the fact that language does not 
simply reflect a reality pre-ordained, as a result meaning is also inextricably bound up 
with questions of power and interests.
Thus, in line with this view, an alternative perspective is possible, reflecting the fact 
that the particular language evoked by New Labour allows for a set of interests to be 
realised whilst nonetheless remaining undisclosed, interests which in their turn give 
rise to a set of outcomes that might in fact be judged as unfavourable by the above 
authors. Indeed, it is increasingly clear that one ought to adopt a more cynical stance 
towards the sort of ‘language’ being used.
In challenging Dunne and Wheeler’s assessment, Buller and Harrison point out that 
even “if language does indeed possess such capacity [a constitutive role], evidence 
that this change in discourse has been translated into actual decisions on the ground is 
less impressive”.63 According to Buller and Harrison, “[f]rom an empirical point of 
view, Wheeler and Dunne overestimate the amount of policy change that has taken
62 Tim Dunne & Nicholas Wheeler, ‘Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign 
Policy’, International Affairs, Vol.74, No 4, 1998, p.851. See also Tim Dunne, ‘The Social 
Construction o f International Society’, European Journal o f  International Relations, V ol.l, No.3, 1995, 
pp367-389.
63 Jim Buller & Vicky Harrison, ‘New Labour as a ‘Good International Citizen’: Normative Theory 
and UK Foreign Policy’, in Little & Wickham-Jones, New Labour’s Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.80.
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place”.64 The authors point out that “[c]hanges in discourse need to be accompanied 
by an awareness of material constraints on policy prescriptions and a willingness to 
contemplate significant institutional reform”.65 They take the example of arms 
exports and the issue of human rights, asking why it is that institutional changes (in 
line with the new rhetoric) are not made to ensure that the Department of Trade and 
Industry do not themselves have the power to green light arms exports on the basis of 
their own determination as to ethical justification?
The above point, in line with the analysis of the previous chapter, suggests that 
economic concerns considered to be in the national interest in fact rub against and 
take precedence over an avowed concern with human rights (hence explaining why 
the necessary institutional changes are not forthcoming). Therefore, pursuing 
economic interests, at the same time as raising as a central policy a concern for 
human rights, remain if not antithetical then certainly problematic.66
And yet, within the discourse, and following a particular understanding of 
globalisation, such a tension can at least be fudged. How it is fudged, the problems 
that this vitiates -  that is the interests this serves - again allow for an interpretation of 
ideology in examining the significance of globalisation to New Labour, but now with 
respect to foreign policy. I therefore now turn to offer an account of this ‘reality’ 
(denoting the problems to be vitiated), before re-examining the rhetoric (how it is 
denied), in order to make an assessment as to the significance of globalisation in this 
light (denoting the interests this serves). In reinterpreting the rhetoric I argue that a 
need to articulate a moral and more idealistic policy is achieved whilst remaining
64 Ibid.
65 Buller & Harrision, New Labour as Good International Citizen, op.cit., p.82.
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largely ‘realist’ in practice. In  so doing, self-interest remains paramount, occurring 
even though it does not approximate a global or universal interest, as Cook and Blair 
would have us believe. I begin by examining the concern to export the idea of further 
liberalisation, manifested, as it is, through the idea of a third way in international 
affairs, though obscured through its association with globalisation.
Promulgating an agenda o f Openness
A central British foreign policy preoccupation for New Labour, centres on the 
importance of liberalisation. This is reflected in a candid recognition of the benefits to 
the United Kingdom of ‘globalisation’ (liberalisation). According to the foreign 
office:
The UK economy is benefiting disproportionately from globalisation. We are 
the world’s fourth largest trading nation and second largest foreign investor. 
Trade is worth nearly 60% of our GDP, more than France, Germany or Italy 
and twice that of the US or Japan. Inward investment into the UK created 70, 
000 jobs last year. And we are particularly strong in business and financial 
services, telecoms and media- sectors which thrive on globalisation.67
However, from the analysis of the previous chapter, we can see that in promoting an 
agenda of liberalisation, New Labour face the difficulty of having to convince both a 
domestic left of centre constituency, as well as the broader international community, 
that as a process it is something that is universally favourable and in the interests of 
all. In this respect, Blair and Cook must avoid certain problems, most importantly: the 
idea that liberalisation, openness and deregulation do not undermine state autonomy 
in a deleterious manner o r represent a cultural and political threat; that it does not 
reflect the interests of the (economically) powerful states, or manifest and reinforce
66 See chapter 5.
67 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Key Foreign Policy Themes- Global Economic Issues: What’s 
New About Globalisation?, 26th September 2001. http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/kevthemehome.asD733.
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itself through certain institutional arrangements dictated by a minority; and that it is 
not in fact detrimental to development or human rights.
The particular understanding of globalisation plays an ideological role in this context, 
supplanting the term liberalisation for globalisation with great effect. Such a synonym 
allows New Labour to more effectively promulgate a particular view of contemporary 
change as neutral (as ‘thing-in-itself), denoting as a result reification. It allows for 
the impression that it is nonetheless progressive (‘liberal’), denoting a strategy of 
dissimulation. And finally it is presented as globally (universally) favourable 
(rejecting the view that it is underpinned by a set of institutional arrangements that 
reflect powerful interests), thereby denoting a strategy of universalisation and 
unification (effected by the same experience).
The impression is that a policy of acceptance to the inevitable forces of globalisation 
(instead of contingent forces of liberalisation, denoting a strategy of passivisation) is 
morally desirable because in the interests of all, allowing the weaker nation-states the 
opportunity to benefit and the ability to determine their own futures (i.e. retain a 
degree of independence and control).
In order to reinforce a particular set of consequences concerning globalisation, a 
process of reasoning {rationalisation) is adopted, which attempts to persuade other 
nation-states, that globalisation also serves their interests. All states, it is held, 
understand themselves to be grappling with the same thing, and all find themselves in 
the same situation {standardisation). Globalisation takes on the status of being a 
permanent and natural feature of the global system {reification). This thereby gives
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rise to the view that, like the ‘rising sun’ or the laws of physics, resistance is futile 
because non-sensical (legitimisation). However, in order to reinforce this position, the 
logic that unfolds from the new context must be obvious 0naturalisation), requiring 
that the relations of domination that sustain this particular set of processes be ‘denied, 
concealed or obscured’ (dissimulation, nominalisation/passivisatiori).
Each of these strategies are therefore amenable to being interpreted a s ideological. 
The version of both Cook and Blair stresses how globalisation generates risks, which 
unify in terms of experience on entities that are essentially the same. This allows 
Blair to posit, ‘we are all coping with the same issues’. Thus, perhaps the key element 
to selling ‘liberalisation’ in this narrative, relates to the legitimacy derived from 
approaching globalisation as something existing ‘out there’. From this reified premise, 
much of the subsequent argument follows. Distinct from complex accounts, Blair’s 
version ignores the dialectical conclusions that follow from greater 
interconnectedness, as well as the constitutive dimension. Thus the role power plays 
in constituting a set of processes favourable to some is avoided as an issue, in favour 
of an orientation that stresses its disembodied nature. Hence ‘globalisation’ performs 
the central task of unifying via a universalising objective experience.
But on the flip side, and reinforcing the aspiration to encourage further liberalisation 
and openness on the part of others, New Labour portray those who do not fall within 
this category, (that is opposed to further liberalisation) as either ‘irrational’ and 
conservative (presented as if  denying the inevitable), or despotic (‘rogue’) regimes. 
Moreover, to return to these policies is to court the possibility of dragging the world 
into a situation, the only parallels of which are with the 1930s. So we see that the
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significance of this particular orientation is that in the first instance, it clears the way 
for an unproblematic set of assertions related to the universally favourable set of 
trends actual and theoretical that currently denote the process of globalisation 
(liberalisation). Through a strategy of displacement, globalisation is associated with, 
amongst other things, liberalisation (liberalism), development, and progress.68 On the 
negative side, and denoting a strategy of fragmentation, its antithesis is ‘isolation’, 
‘protectionism’ and conservatism, both with a small and big ‘c’. Legitimacy is arrived 
at, thanks in part to a reified understanding, further reinforced by a particular form of 
reasoning.
And yet, as argued in each of the above, ‘globalisation’ is not able to take this role. 
First, the tenet that ‘globalisation’ generates ‘progress’ and ‘development’ essentially 
rests upon the view that globalisation generates economic growth. In turn, this view is 
premised on the idea that it is as a process -  determining as it does greater openness 
and greater liberalisation - that growth follows. However, in light of a consideration 
of agency, such a position becomes increasingly difficult to sustain. As will be 
examined in the next chapter, governments determine the rules, and states begin from 
differing situations. As some are more powerful than others, and assuming that each 
acts according to its own (at times differing) interests, the outcomes of these 
negotiations can inevitably be expected to reflect the interests of the most powerful.69 
‘Globalisation’ cannot therefore be thought of as a neutral panacea in this respect. It 
in effect hides what is really going on ‘under the surface’. And yet a reified 
‘globalisation’, constituted following the ongoing negotiations above, benefits as a 
result of what it erases, functioning to make more palatable the actual nature of
68 See chapter two.
69 One obvious consequence being the high rates o f protection that remains in the agricultural sector.
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contemporary processes that are seen to  disproportionately favour the U K  national 
interest.
Globalisation, the principle o f 'Non-Interference and the ‘idea o f community'.
It is not only in pursuing an agenda of liberalisation that we are able to interpret an 
ideological role to globalisation. An important ideological function can also be 
interpreted in the manner in which the ‘international community’ as an idea is 
underpinned in terms of the imperatives generated as a result of ‘globalisation’. As 
with the domestic realm, reinforcing one’s position by reference to the idea of a 
community of shared interests, located in terms of a shared ‘objective’ situation - all 
wrestling with the same issues -  contribute as a means to validate intervention on the 
basis of shared moral premises.
Addressing an emergency debate at the House of Commons on the 23rd March 1999, 
Blair sought to justify intervention in Kosovo on the basis of three points: firstly, 
diplomatically, all attempts at a solution had been exhausted; secondly, morally, the 
West was obliged to act in the face of such ‘barbarism’; and thirdly, legally, military 
intervention was nontheless legitimate. In time however, and as a result of dissent as 
to the validity of the legal and diplomatic arguments, it was the moral aim that 
surfaced as the key factor in explaining and justifying the campaign.71 Writing in the
70 Tony Blair, ‘Full text to Prime Minister’s speech to the nation on Kosovo, The Guardian 27th March 
1999. Quoted in Will Bartlett, ‘Simply the Right Thing to Do: Labour Goes to War’, in Little & 
Wickham-Jones, New Labour’s Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 137. For a thorough account o f Britain’s role 
in the Kosovo campaign, see Louise Richardson, ‘A Force for Good in the World? Britain’s Role in 
the Kosovo Crisis’, in Pierre Martin & Mark R. Brawley (eds.), Alliance Politics. Kosovo, and 
NATO’s War: Allied Force or Forced Allies? (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).
71 Legalistically, significant question marks remained (though were dismissed as invalid by the 
government). Views differed within NATO and the UN Security Council, with Russia and China 
implacably opposed. Nonetheless NATO Secretary General, evoking resolutions 1160 and 1199, 
argued that there was sufficient legal basis legitimating the threat and use o f force. See Alan K. 
Henrikson, ‘The Constraint o f Legitimacy: The Legal and Institutional Framework o f  Euro-Atlantic
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Sun newspaper on the 5th April, Blair argued that “[t]his is now a battle of good 
against evil...our cause is  just. In the battle between good and evil, we are on the 
right side. And we will win”.72
Enter globalisation. Blair’s Chicago speech centres on the implications of
globalisation for the international community. In the speech Blair specifically
articulates a ‘new doctrine’, which qualifies the principle of non-interference. Its
timing however, is central - delivered in the midst of the Kosovo air campaign, at a
time when Blair was the chief ‘hawk’, dismayed at the apparent unwillingness of
NATO to commit ground troops;74
Twenty years ago we would not have been fighting in Kosovo. We would 
have turned our backs on it. The fact that we are engaged is the result of a 
wide range of changes -  the end of the cold war, changing technology, the 
spread of democracy. But it is bigger than that. I believe the world has 
changed in a more fundamental way. Globalisation has transformed 
economies and our working practices. But globalisation is not just economic, 
it is also a political and security phenomenon.75
Thus globalisation takes on the status of ‘fundament’. Extending beyond a 
formulation that had hitherto predominantly focussed on the economic implications
Security’, in Martin & Brawley, Alliance Politics, op.cit., pp41- 55. Diplomatically, many questioned 
the strategy at Rambouillet, which demanded a settlement that would have allowed NATO uninhibited 
access not just in Kosovo but the entire republic: “[t]he argument is that the United States never 
intended to reach agreement there but rather simply intended to attain international legitimacy for a 
military strike against M ilosevic.. .No leader o f the Serbs could possibly accept the terms presented to 
them, which were significantly harsher than those imposed after the bombing campaign”. Richardson, 
A Force fo r  Good in the World? op.cit., p.147. See also Robert Frisk, ‘The Trojan Horse that ‘Started’ 
a 79-Day War’, The Independent, November 26th 1999, p.20.
72 Tony Blair, The Sun, 5th April 1999. Such sentiments were also echoed in his ‘Chicago speech’: 
“[t]his is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values”. Tony Blair, ‘Doctrine o f the 
International Community’, speech to the Club o f Chicago, 22nd April 1999.
73 To qualify the principle o f non-interference, Blair suggests that five conditions must first be met: 
“[f]irst, are we sure o f our case? War is an imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress, but 
armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing with dictators. Second, have we exhausted all 
diplomatic options? We should always give peace every chance, as we have in the case o f Kosovo. 
Third, on the basis o f a practical assessment o f the situation, are there military operations we can 
sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term?.. And finally, do we have 
national interests involved?”, Blair, ‘Doctrine o f the International Community’, op.cit.
74 See Rentuol, Tony Blair, op.cit.
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(in other words moving away from the domestic implications of globalisation), Blair 
adopts a more capacious conceptualisation, in order to draw out the security 
implications of the process. This, it can be seen, then provides the moral impetus to 
justify intervention. The idea of ‘community’ ranks as central, underpinning each of 
the caveats for intervening. That is, central to the argument is the idea of the pre­
existence of a ‘we’ group, made meaningful in part, thanks to the version of 
globalisation adumbrated and shared by the audience.77
The key a ssertion is that morals are from the outset shared, but further entrenched 
thanks to the collective set of interests that unfold out of the globalisation process. 
We might say in this respect that legitimacy is secured by universalisation, and 
backed b y f  ragmentation, f  unctioning i n t he d iscourse i n s uch a w ay as t o s ilence 
problematic factors that would otherwise undermine the argument, but which 
nonetheless must be addressed should this position be tenable. Centrally, in avoiding 
a dialectical appreciation of globalisation, instead assuming a view of the process as 
bringing us closer together, Blair can assume that the ‘community’ is a very real 
entity, from which values can legitimately be expected to emanate.
In fact the above considerations, that is the need to sell liberalisation and openness as 
well as entrench a particular universally held set of values, can be located within a 
deeper and more long-term attempt to assimilate the differing national interests closer 
to an essentially unchanged British interest.
75 Blair, ‘Doctrine o f the International Community’, op.cit.
76 See Christopher Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twentvfirst Century: NATO and the 
management o f Risk. Adelphi Paper, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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The Need fo r an Idealist and Realist Policy
Each of the above - liberalisation, intervention, community - can better be evaluated 
in a broader sense. That is, the real significance of globalisation, in terms of the 
particular orientation on liberalisation, intervention, and human rights, all reflect a 
long-standing difficulty for Labour. In addition to and in conjunction with the need to 
overcome opposing interests to secure election, this long-standing difficulty concerns 
an ongoing requirement to pursue an overtly ‘moral’ foreign policy that avoids the 
appearance of being avowedly ‘realist’ in practice.
As Vickers points out, historically, and unlike the Conservatives, the Labour party 
has faced a number of problems with regards to foreign policy that can be explained 
in terms peculiar to it.78 Specifically, Labour has had to grapple with the problem of 
articulating a moral purpose to policy, having to convince a domestic constituency of
7 0its ethical worth. In explaining this, Vickers’ draws attention in particular to two 
factors. The first derives from the fact that ‘Labour’ contains within its ranks a wide 
spectrum of political opinions and groupings, including Fabians, ethical and Christian 
socialists, pacifists and trade unionists. The party, as a result, holds to a host of 
positions concerning the appropriate direction and role of foreign policy.
For some, resting their position on the basis of a class analysis has led to the 
importance of stressing ‘internationalism’, i.e., class solidarity.80 This has resulted in
77 On the idea that this therefore gives rise to a need for universal values see the discussion in chapter 
five.
78 Rhiannon Vickers, ‘Labour’s Search for a Third Way in Foreign Policy’, in Little & Wickham-Jones, 
New Labour’s Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp33-48.
79 See Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour People: Leaders and Lieutenants. Hardie to Kinnock. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 154.
80 See Dan Keohane, ‘Labour’s International Policy: A Story o f Conflict and Contention’, in Brian 
Brivati & Richard Heffeman (eds.), The Labour Party: A Centenary History. (Basingstoke: ManMillan 
Press Ltd., 2000), pp363-382.
236
the abrogation of interests when articulated in purely ‘national’ terms, and instilled a 
general scepticism o f  ‘ realist’ interpretations o f  the international system, favouring 
instead a more economically based systemic analyses.81
We can therefore begin to locate a concern to promulgate an agenda of openness and 
liberalisation against this backdrop, seeing that it presents difficulties in that it must 
be sold internationally (in order that it becomes and remains a ‘reality’), whilst also 
remaining palatable to a potentially sceptical domestic audience -  attuned to the 
negative (as well as positive) consequences of such actors as Multi-National 
companies, institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and 
more generally the process of liberalisation and deregulation. Thus, and unlike the 
Conservatives, Labour face the difficulty of dealing with a position that stresses 
international social justice (a desire to promulgate human rights) and the inequities of 
unfettered markets, while nevertheless pursuing liberalisation and free trade.
An additional consideration draws attention to a strong ‘liberal’ influence running 
through the party, giving rise to a consistent belief in the import of international 
organisations and the achievement of international justice in delivering peaceable co­
operative relations. This has meant that, where possible, state actions must act in 
accordance with and under the auspices of the ‘international community’, lending a 
particular significance to the role and function of international organisations such as 
the League of Nations and the United Nations. It is this that partly explains the desire 
on the part of Blair to seek to reinforce the idea of ‘community’ between states. In the
81 Influential texts that have shaped policy in this respect, include Norman Angell, The Great Illusion. 
(London: Heinemann, 1933 (1910)). John Hobson, Imperialism: A Study. (London: Unwin Hyman, 
1988 (1905)).
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case of Kosovo this did not prove particularly problematic. However, in the case of 
Iraq for example, justifying intervention proved far more difficult.
Finally, Vickers also points to a significant pacifistic strain in the party, deriving from 
the ethical socialism of many of its members, which helps explain such policies as 
unilateralism in the 1980s, and the tacit support of a policy of appeasement in the 
1930s.82
A second factor, accounting for Labour’s tendency to “search for a foreign policy that
involves more than the protection of national interests”, derives from the fact that
Labour have actually been out of power for extensive periods during the twentieth
century.83 As a result:
Labour’s foreign policy has developed while the party has been in opposition 
rather than in power. As such, it has developed more as a response to the 
internal d ynamics o f  t he p arty, t he t ensions b etween 1 eft a nd r ight f  actions, 
rather than as a response to international events.84
This helps to explain, in particular, Cook’s position. As Wickham-Jones has 
suggested, one can in part understand the ethical dimension in terms of Cook’s desire
o r
to grab the headlines in order to make a name for himself in government. It also 
draws attention to the inexperience that naturally befalls New Labour, and thus 
possibly explains their ‘idealism’ in part. Fundamentally however, it explains the
82 For example, following the disastrous electoral defeat o f 1931, Labour elected as its leader the 
pacifist George Lansbury.
3 Vickers, Labour’s Search fo r  a Third Way in Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.34.
84 Ibid.
85 Wickham-Jones, ‘Labour Party Politics and Foreign Policy’, in Little & Wickham-Jones, New 
Labour Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 107. Interestingly, the problematic nature o f  the ethical dimension as 
promulgated by Cook ultimately gave rise to its quiet dismissal. On this see Paul Williams, ‘The Rise 
and Fall o f the ‘Ethical Dimension’, Cambridge Review o f  International Affairs, Vol. 15, Number 1, 
2002, pp53-63.
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difficulties faced as a result of confronting good intentions with the actual 
circumstances.
Thus, and taken together, a set of complicating factors has meant that, unlike the 
Conservatives, the Labour party has tended to be squeamish about the language and 
practice of realpolitik. Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that when in power, 
successive statesmen have in effect fallen into line with this approach. As Vicker’s 
points out, “Labour’s foreign policy in office has tended to side with realism rather
• * o / cthan idealism”. This all draws attention to the possibility of a gap existing between 
the practitioners in power, and the broader party and voting public at large, which in 
its turn also suggests the need for a bridge of sorts.87
And so we can return to the understanding of globalisation. As with the domestic 
realm, it is possible to re-interpret their particular understanding of globalisation in 
light of the function that it plays in smoothing over these difficulties, nominally 
bridging a potential disjuncture between idealist intentions and ‘reality’ (traditional 
foreign policy practices). It is not the intention here to suggest an objective realm ‘out 
there’ that then determines a particular set of actions. Rather, I argue that a more 
cynical ‘national interest’ continues to play a role, except that now it can be presented, 
on a rhetorical level, along more idealist lines. And it is in this respect that we can 
reappraise the view that the national and global interest now coincide because of
86 Vickers, Labour’s Search fo r  a Third Way in Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.34. See also Martin Lawrence 
& John Garret, British Foreign Policy: Challenges and Choices for the Twentvfirst Century. (London: 
Pinter, 1997).
87 This is well illustrated in assessing the position taken by Atlee and Bevin immediately following the 
war. In contrast to the wishes of many in the party, Bevin and Atlee nevertheless “focussed on the 
national interest in a world dominated by power politics”. Hence, at the risk o f profoundly alienating 
the Soviets, Bevin nonetheless pushed forward the formation o f NATO. Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: 
Foreign Secretary. 1945-1951. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p.66. Quoted in Keohane, 
Labour’s International Policy, op.cit., p.371.
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globalisation, that ‘globalisation’ gives rise to universal values, and why globalisation 
ontologically, takes the status of a ‘thing-in-itself, thus erasing agency and thereby 
masking issues of power (who shapes the process, determines its meaning and thus 
reproduces a set of processes in a particular form).
In each of the above, the realist position is apparently subverted -  whilst in no way 
altering the content of foreign policy radically. The pursuit of the national interest -  
unchanged in any significant respects from the Major period - is now nonetheless part 
of a third way, one that favours the interests of all.
Conclusion
The significance of globalisation (judged in terms of its implications) has become one 
way in which New Labour has been judged and understood in a comparative context. 
Views differ. In this chapter however, I have approached the significance of 
‘globalisation’ in a different way. Based on a particular methodological orientation 
and oriented in terms of a particular set of contextual postulates I have attempted to 
make sense of ‘globalisation’ as a ‘facilitator’, in the sense that it facilitates the 
construction of a possible reality.
In the introduction to the thesis I suggested that Blair and New Labour are in effect 
‘walking a tightrope’. The Blair project reflects in many respects the most 
contemporary (and successful) attempt at confronting a problem faced by all previous 
Labour administrations. The metaphor of a balancing act is appropriate in that in the 
context of a first past the post system New Labour, in order to get elected, must 
balance between the perceived interests of an ‘old Labour’ electorate and party,
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committed to a particular set of policies, and an increasingly significant middle class 
electorate, suspicious of (and at times at odds with) this more traditional set of group 
interests.
One p articularly stark example, as argued, reflects the need to  retain credibility in  
terms of the ‘City’ and ‘finance capital’, (requiring in its contemporary form, 
budgetary austerity, free trade and price stability) and yet committing itself to 
‘values’ of the left and interests of the ‘North’. Crude though this schema may be, it is 
real, and recognised in the thinking of Blair. Third Way theory, I argue, constitutes 
this function. It utilises the contemporary preoccupation with ‘globalisation’ in an 
attempt to rhetorically (and therefore in time actually) resolve these concerns. I t is 
then, a contemporary attempt to pull off the needed balancing act; designed to 
mitigate and transcend, validated according to new times, and robust enough it 
believes, to offer a new way, it nonetheless can be evaluated in terms of the desire to 
hold on to power.
And whilst this gives rise to the need for a mechanism to resolve certain dilemmas at 
the domestic level, paralleling this, a particular take on globalisation also allows for 
the r esolution o f  c ertain d ilemmas a 11 he i ntemational 1 evel. H ere, i t i s p ossible t o 
understand the utility of globalisation in terms of the function it plays in obscuring 
otherwise problematic issues that centre on the need for an overtly ‘moral’ foreign 
policy; and the need to sell a selective liberalisation and to convince others of the 
worthiness of a particular take on this process.
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However the key point is that globalisation is not just a convenient smoke screen, but 
also something more. It constitutes a tool, whereby a set of circumstances can be 
actualised; hence the idea of globalisation as ‘facilitator’. Nevertheless, as has been 
stressed throughout, timing and circumstances remain as central features when 
coming to terms with the function and significance of globalisation. In the final 
chapter, I now move beyond the above, to map out the future significance of 
globalisation to the party, taking into account the shifting set of positions on 
globalisation that are increasingly crystallising in the public domain, in an attempt to 
evaluate the impact that this will have for the possibility of reification and 
legitimisation occurring in the longer term.
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Chapter 7
Contesting The Future Significance of Globalisation: The Challenge
of the New Social Movements
“Globalisation is not a given, like the weather. It functions according to a set o f rules 
designed and negotiated by economic actors such as governments and businesses. 
The outcome o f  such negotiations inevitably reflects the relative economic and 
political power o f the actors involved”.1
“There is a current o f  fear flowing through most countries o f the world at the 
changes being brought by globalisation ”2
Introduction
In the previous chapters, I have examined the significance and function that a 
particular understanding of globalisation has had in the New Labour discourse. I have 
questioned this understanding and drawn attention to certain strategies, which in 
explaining its application can be interpreted as ideological - accounting for its 
reproduction in a particular form in the British context. In doing so, I have avoided 
relying upon an essentialist view of globalisation, instead drawing on the important 
discussions in the academic literature in a largely negative way, that is to say, I have 
used this literature to debunk the particular account offered by Tony Blair and Robin 
Cook.
However, in addition there remains a more ‘positive’ side to the contribution of the 
literature, in that it has helped crystallise a new opposition that has found expression
1 Duncan Green & Claire Melamed, ‘A Human Development Approach to Globalisation’, joint 
submission to the government White Paper on Globalisation and Development, Christian Aid/ CAFOD, 
June 2000. http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/indepth/0006glob/global2.htm. p.2.
2 Clare Short, ‘Advancing the World Trade debate: Beyond Seattle’, speech at the Commonwealth 
Trade Congress, 30th May 2000.
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mainly through the efforts of a mistakenly named though highly influential ‘anti- 
globalisation’ movement. In this chapter, I therefore examine the significance of this 
movement, and assess the future consequences that it will have for the significance of 
‘globalisation’ for New Labour.
To do this, I begin the chapter with a brief outline of what the movement, disparate 
and fragile as it is, has achieved. I assess its significance, concentrating in the main on 
the reformist elements. I argue that with respect to ‘globalisation’, their chief 
contribution has been to disclose certain underlying mechanisms and power interests, 
in practice identifying agency within its processes. The effect of this is to undermine 
a key attribute of ‘globalisation’; its obscure and obfuscating nature.3 However, this is 
coupled with a set of popular concerns for development and poverty alleviation. As a 
result, the movement’s claims take on a particular moral and political force, not only 
challenging the progressive and desirable assumptions often ascribed to the process, 
but also offering a critique that in some ways particularly appeals to those on the 
‘left’, generally more sceptical about the benefits of the free market and of 
liberalisation in general. It is in this respect that the movement is particularly 
important.
I then turn to the speeches that begin to pick up on these themes. In the case of New 
Labour, the likes of Robin Cook, Gordon Brown and Claire Short all begin to modify 
the New Labour view in light of this changing outlook. This modified approach 
begins to develop towards the end of 1999, in particular in response to the events of 
Seattle. As an alternative, it is characterised by an emphasis being laid on the
3 James Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome. Transformation and Resistance (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000).
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importance of responsibility, fairness, and the need not just to respond to 
globalisation, but also to manage the process along particular lines, and with 
particular interests in mind.
Finally, in evaluating this, I point out how these ideas potentially represent a 
fundamental break in thinking, irreconcilable with the New Labour account hitherto 
examined, concluding in this respect that ‘globalisation’ may come to haunt New 
Labour as it evolves in a potentially subversive direction, one that fundamentally 
undermines the contentions of Blair and his particular form of Third Way thinking. 
However, I conclude, though possible, this is only one of a number of possibilities, 
and as such the context still holds out the possibility of pursuing an agenda that still 
disproportionably favours the British national interest (to do with further 
liberalisation), as well as New Labour.
The Challenge o f  The Anti-Globalisation ‘Movement’: Unpacking the Process and 
Debunking the Logic
An important element to my analysis has been the significance pertaining to the 
hegemonic u nderstanding o f  globalisation. T his p oints n ot j ust t o t he f  act t hat o ne 
version has been dominant over time, but also how a particular version can seem 
obvious, how it can go unquestioned in the discourse. Though globalisation has for 
New Labour hitherto functioned to validate and legitimate a set of positions, it has 
itself gone largely unquestioned. The New Labour position has explicitly benefited 
from this, in that difficulties that the Labour party may have faced, both at the 
domestic and international level, have been avoided. In line with the hermeneutic 
method, the overall impact of this, at least within the context of the UK, has been to
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reproduce ‘globalisation’ as if it were in fact as Blair had originally understood it, i.e. 
it has been ‘reified’.
However the vague understanding largely prevalent at the time of election in 1997 is 
now becoming increasingly fraught, jeopardising the possibility for reification in the 
future. This is not simply as a result of the literature on globalisation calling into 
question their view, but also thanks to an influential set of positions often collectively 
dubbed as the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement.4
Though containing disparate groups, each with differing and sometimes contradictory 
agendas (hence in Hertz’s view best described as ‘moment’), this collective has 
nonetheless s hifted t he t erms o f  t he d ebate, a nd d isrupted t hat w hich o nee s eemed 
obvious.5 Thus the significance of this counter movement derives not so much from 
the cogency of their arguments, which had in the main already been addressed in the 
globalisation literature, but from the fact that their challenge has captured a broader 
public imagination. That is, they have managed to overturn the possibility of elites 
relying on any ‘common sense’ view on the topic, with all that that entails.
Their influence is therefore particularly acute, given that many of these groups 
function as professional lobbyists and campaigners. And so whereas an academic text 
can to an extent be ignored or brushed under the carpet, such possibilities remain
4 Alternative names include ‘civil society movement’, ‘the global justice movement’, ‘global social 
movement’ and ‘ the anti-capitalist movement’.
5 The fact that they represent a ‘moment’ stems from the coincidence o f interests, all being unified in 
the face o f a common opposition to ‘globalisation’ selectively understood.
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considerably more limited, given, as Cook has recognised, membership of NGO’s in 
Britain outnumbers political party membership.6
Additionally, the concerns expressed by many of these movements, focussed in the 
main on poverty eradication, development and the environment, have also meant that 
individuals such as Clare Short at the Department for International Development 
(DFID) have had to confront their ideas on an almost daily basis. Finally, this is also 
significant given New Labour’s avowed commitment to meeting certain International 
Development Targets (IDTs) by 2015.7
This all draws the party into a series of challenging issue areas that are profoundly 
tied into discussion on the particular nature and form of globalisation. In order to 
make further sense of the challenge that this change represents, I begin by identifying 
the various strands of this counter movement and the key events that may be said to 
have given rise to it. To do this I refer to the work of Green and Griffith, and Desai 
and Said. Both distinguish three sub-groups. Focussing in particular on the so-called 
‘anti-globalisation’ groups, NGO policy analysts Green and Griffiths, distinguish
o
between ‘statists’, ‘reformists’ and those in favour o f ‘alternatives’.
6 According to Cook, “[t]here are... in Britain five times as many members o f environmental NGOs as 
there are members o f political parties. Pmdent politicians treat them with respect”. Robin Cook, ‘The 
Challenges o f Globalisation’, speech to the Trilateral Commission at the Institute o f Strategic Studies, 
London, 9th March 2001.
7 These commitments include: reducing the proportion o f people living in poverty by half by 2015; 
ensuring universal primary school provision by 2015; the reduction in infant, child and maternal 
mortality; and a commitment to growth policies that are ‘environmentally sustainable’.
8 Duncan Green & Mathew Griffith, ‘Globalization and its Discontents’, International Affairs, Vol.78, 
N o.l, 2002, pp49-68. See also Meghnad Desai & Yahia Said, ‘The New Anti-Capitalist Movement: 
Money and Global Civil Society’, in Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius & Mary Kaldor, (eds.), Global 
Civil Society 2001. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp51-78. Desai and Said refer to four 
groups: ‘isolationists’; ‘alternatives’; ‘reformists’; and ‘supporters’.
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The ‘anti-globalisation '  myth.
Green and Griffiths understand globalisation to mean “the increasing 
interconnectedness of individuals, groups, companies and countries”, and, as a result, 
do not believe that such a broad set of trends ought necessarily to be resisted.9 This is 
important, in that in explaining the nature of the counter-globalisation movement, the 
authors concern themselves with the resistances that have developed in response to 
particular aspects to the current form that globalisation takes. This they dub 
‘corporate’, or ‘neo-liberal’ globalisation. It is only in recognition of this that one can 
make sense of a ‘counter’ or ‘anti’ movement.
Tracing the origins of this movement, the authors point to a series of key events and 
perceptions, which they suggest have functioned as a sort of unifying glue. The 
authors begin by pointing to the near default of the Mexican peso in 1982, which, 
they argue, prompted the end of “import substituting industrialization” as a valid 
development strategy, and concomitantly presaged “the political influence of the IMF, 
World Bank and international capital markets”.10 This increased the influence of 
these institutions, and led to an ability on their part, to initiate far reaching ‘structural 
adjustment’ programmes in line with a particular neoliberal understanding of 
development, one that arguably remains prevalent to this day.11
With the fall of the Berlin Wall however, Green and Griffiths also point to a crisis of 
sorts that developed amongst the left, a crisis that occurred at the very time that the
9 Green & Griffiths, Globalization and its Discontents, op.cit., p.51.
10 Ibid.
11 ‘Structural adjustment’, refers to a set o f economic measures implemented in return for debt relief 
and financial assistance. In line with neoliberal tenets, these measures invariably involve: liberalising 
markets, privatisation, and cutting government spending. See Tony Killick, IMF Programmes in 
Developing Countries: Design and Impact. (London: Routledge, 1995).
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ideas of the New Right had risen to ascendancy. A weak ‘left’, and a strong ‘new 
right’ resulted in a dominant version of the “global market based on the aggressive 
economic model of Anglo-Saxon capitalism”. 12 ‘Globalization’, “quickly became 
shorthand for this model of expansion - a heady and complex mix of technological, 
economic, political and cultural change”.13 Hence “the origins of the movement are 
rooted in and in large part unified by this period of globalisation”.14
This draws attention to the significance of the strong thesis, in that it is this view that 
the anti-‘globalisation’ movement coalesce around. The relationship is symbiotic: 
“[a]s globalization consolidated and expanded its influence, disquiet over its nature 
and i mpact g rew i n m any i nitially d isconnected a renas i n b oth t he d eveloping a nd 
developed worlds”.15 Of particular concern was the impression that globalisation was 
eroding national sovereignty, drawing “attention to the undemocratic and closed 
nature of increasingly powerful global institutions and the influence and lack of 
accountability of global corporations”.16 Whereas the strong thesis applauded such 
developments, the counter movements drew the exact opposite conclusion, expressing 
a concern not mirrored in the New Labour discourse, but one nonetheless animated by 
leftist ideals.
Following the Asian crisis of 1997, confidence in neoliberal solutions, and the 
progressive assumptions underlying a particular version of globalisation -  calling for 
greater openness and deregulation as a result of a harmony of interests -  therefore
12 Green & Griffiths, Globalization and its Discontents, op.cit., p.51. The ‘left’ in Europe had in fact 
been in a crisis o f sorts from the early eighties, as illustrated by Francoise Mitterand’s disastrous effort 
at Keynesian inspired reflationary tactics in 1981.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p.57.
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became increasingly tenuous and suspect.17 This was further exacerbated as a result
of the “catastrophe of free market reform in Russia”18 Each combined to reinforce a
concern about the efficacy “of structural adjustment programmes, and trade
liberalization” more generally.19 Green and Griffith sum up the conjunction:
[ijncreasing corporate power and social inequality catalysed the traditional left 
and a whole host of other left-of-centre actors. Structural adjustment 
programmes and growing Southern marginalization and inequality radicalized 
civil society and some political parties in the developing world.20
However, though ‘civil society’ was becoming increasingly radicalised, it was not 
until the end of 1999 that their influence in relation to globalisation was to become of 
central significance. In particular, two events are notable: Seattle (and the subsequent 
‘anti-globalisation’ demonstrations), and in relation to New Labour, the publication of 
the Globalisation and Development White Paper.
The general impact of Seattle to date remains a largely under-researched area. 
However, at least in the immediate aftermath of the demonstrations, it can be seen as 
acting as a sort of wake up call. According to the International Herald Tribune, in 
their leader ‘Seattle Protests Open Up the Globalisation Debate’:
16 Ibid., p.52.
17 For example, Fareed Zakaria points out that since the 1997 crisis, the Indonesian economy has 
almost halved. By way o f a contrast, Malaysia, in adopting a more protectionist strategy - 
implementing a policy o f capital controls - has managed to buck this trend. The lesson drawn from this 
by many Indonesians, according to Fareed, is that they should have “defied the IMF”. See Fareed 
Zakaria, ‘Back to the future: globalization grows up and gets political’, International Herald Tribune, 
January 3rd 2001, p.6.
18 Green & Griffiths, Globalization and its Discontents, op.cit., p.52. See also John Price, ‘Asian 
Economic Turmoil: A Crisis o f Globalization’, in Stephen McBride & John Wiseman, (eds.), 
Globalization and its Discontents. (London: MacMillan, 2000), pp187-199. According to the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “since liberalisation began in Russia in 1989, inequality 
has doubled, wages [have] fallen [sic] by almost half, and male life expectancy has declined by more 
than four years to sixty years”. Human Development Report, (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 
1999) p.85. Quoted in Green & Melamed, A Human Development Approach to Globalisation, op.cit.,
p.28.
9 Green and Griffiths, Globalization and its Discontents, op.cit., p.57.
20 Ibid., p.53.
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If any clear message came through the clouds of tear gas and the broken glass 
here this week, it was that the terms of the debate about free trade have 
changed. It is no longer a debate about trade at all, but rather a debate about 
globalization, a process that many now understand affects not only traditional 
economic factors such as jobs and incomes but also the food they eat, the air 
they breath, the quality of medical care and the social and cultural milieu in 
which they live. The trade debate, once the province of a tight group of 
technocrats, business leaders, trade lawyers and academics, has now spilled 
out onto the public streets and private living rooms.21
In the British context, general concerns amongst reformist groups about globalisation 
was not mitigated following the publication of the White Paper on Globalisation and 
Development. During the consultation period of 2000, Green and Griffiths point out 
NGOs such as Christian Aid, CAFOD and Oxfam began to develop their critique of 
the interpretation of globalisation offered by New Labour.
On the basis of this ‘debate’, NGO groups began to question the assumption that 
globalisation leads to development via liberalisation, recognising that it was in fact a 
proposition based on the ‘sketchiest of evidence’. Indeed, “[f]or many NGO’s the 
empirical flimsiness of the intellectual case for liberalization was one of the main 
revelations of the White Paper”.23 Significantly, it became increasingly clear as a 
result of this, that what was being contested, for example vis-a-vis the government on 
the drafting of the White Paper was, in effect, the *'future direction o f  
globalization” 24
21 Steven Pearlstein, ‘Seattle Protests Open Up the Globalisation Debate’, International Herald Tribune, 
December 4-5, 1999.
22 Two key texts submitted to the government during the ‘consultation’ process, were: Oxfam’s fifty 
six page exegesis entitled ‘Globalisation’, Submission to the Government’s White Paper on 
Globalisation, Oxfam Policy Paper, May 2000; and, Chritian Aid and CAFOD’s joint submission, ‘A 
Human Development Approach to Globalisation’, also fifty six pages in length, www.christian- 
aid.org.uk/indepth/0006glob2.htm. See also Oxfam Parliamentary Briefing, ‘The White Paper on 
Globalisation’, Number 12, December 2000.
23 Green and Griffiths, Globalization and its Discontents, op.cit., p.59.
24 Ibid., p.54. Emphasis added.
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This is reflected in the statement by Christian Aid/ CAFOD. Understanding
globalisation to mean “a process of increasing interconnectedness of individuals,
groups, companies and countries”, the statement continues:
the debate [on globalisation] should not be about whether we are pro or anti­
globalisation. Some form of globalisation is given. But globalisation is not the 
same as the weather -  it can be managed}5
This is important because it not only points to a number of erroneous and perhaps 
ideological elements to the counter positions often adumbrated vis-a-vis this 
‘movement of movements’, but because it also draws attention to a change in 
orientation that potential ‘management’ suggests. What was not being opposed was 
‘globalisation’.26
Green and Griffiths point out that though the primary agent unifying many of these 
groupings comes from an ‘opposition’ to many o f  the assumptions associated with 
globalisation, the vast bulk of the movement is nonetheless not ‘anti-globalisation’ 
per se. Desai and Said agree, observing about this broad coalition of groups that they 
in fact:
rarely attack globalisation as such, targeting instead corporate globalisation, 
global capitalism, the neo-liberal order, multi-national companies, 
international financial institutions (IFIs), and trade agreements. Whatever the 
target, however, these protests are often branded as anti-globalisation.27
25 Green & Melamed, A Human Development Approach to Globalisation, op.cit., p.2, emphasis added. 
This definition is markedly different from the definition offered in 1997. Here the same NGO 
understand globalisation to mean: “the integration o f local and national economies into a global 
economy. The process is driven by new technologies and by the lowering o f economic barriers”. 
Mathew Lockwood & Peter Madden, ‘Closer Together, Further Apart: A  Discussion Paper on 
Globalisation’, September 1997, Christian Aid/ CAFOD. See appendix 1. www.christian- 
aid.org.uk/indepth/9707clos/closer.htm. This highlights the increased recognition o f the limited 
definition (paralleling the strong thesis) hitherto adopted, and how this understanding has radically 
changed over the period o f just two years.
26 Christian Aid is not alone in their concern to move beyond the idea o f an either/ or position for or 
against globalisation. As Mike Bygrave in his examination o f the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement after 
September 11 points out, the “ ‘anti-globalisation movement’ turns out to be a name invented by 
journalists that has stuck. A ll... activists reject it, not least because it offers ammunition to opponents”. 
Mike Bygrave, ‘Where did all the Protesters Go?’ The Observer, 14th July 2002.
27 Desai & Said, The New Anti-Capitalist Movement, op.cit., p .51.
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This not only draws attention to the erroneous labeling of the group, but also 
highlights the importance of making a distinction concerning the plural positions that 
make up this so-called anti-globalisation movement. According to Green and 
Griffiths, the so-called anti-globalisation movement, “is neither solidly anti­
globalization, nor a single movement”.28 Though there are “some overlapping aims”, 
so there are “significant cleavages”.29 To make sense of this plurality, the authors 
make a tripartite distinction, distinguishing between ‘statists’, ‘alternatives’ and 
‘reformists’.30
The first group, ‘the statists’, reject globalisation, understanding it to be simply 
corporate globalisation, and instead favour a return to the state. Compiled in the main 
of groups of the ‘traditional left’, and though still ‘internationalist’, this grouping 
nonetheless seeks domestic protection via erecting barriers to trade and competition. 
Globalisation, on this view, is set up as the antithesis of state control. Thus adopting a 
strong thesis understanding, the approach promotes a reversal of this trend.
The ‘alternatives’ are considered to be the most difficult group to define. Though 
highly visible (Seattle, Gothenburg, Genoa), they are generally “small, decentralized 
and strongly ‘anticorporate’”, and often violent.31 They are nonetheless significant in 
that they are often what the media associate with the anti-globalisers.
28 Green & Griffiths, Globalisation and its Discontents, op.cit., p.50.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p.55.
31 Ibid.
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The final group Green and Griffith identify are the ‘reformists’, which “make up the 
majority of formally structured groups involved in the movement, or at least dominate 
the thinking of their leaderships”.32 In this chapter, it is the ‘reformists’ that are 
considered most significant in the context of thinking about globalisation in the UK, 
as it is they who have the broadest membership, and the strongest influence on policy 
formulation, and it is they who seek to overturn (without dropping the term itself) the 
dominant understanding of globalisation.33
So in what way has this movement been influential? I suggest that three areas are of 
particular significance when judged against the New Labour position.34 First, this 
movement has challenged the assumption that liberalisation (and therefore 
globalisation) leads to development, challenging the idea that its current form is 
necessarily progressive, desirable or in the interests of all - ideas that all reside at the 
heart of the New Labour account. This challenge involves tackling the three mantras 
of the strong globalisation thesis: that free trade, freedom of investment, and freedom 
of capital are beneficial and in the interests of all, suggesting in its place the 
continued validity of ‘protecting’ one’s economy in certain instances; depending on 
the particular national circumstances.
Second, the reform movement is also significant because it shines a spotlight on the 
operations of key agents and their views (thus unmasking and politicising the process), 
in order to explain how the current processes associated with globalisation are
32 Ibid.
33 This category broadly encompasses Christian Aid/ CAFOD, Oxfam, Amnesty International, The 
World Development Movement, Greenpeace and Friends o f the Earth, though by no means assumes 
that their policies are identical.
341 do not attempt an exhaustive account, rather simply draw attention to what I believe are the key 
parts o f their challenge.
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constituted. This all follows from a third key contribution: the de-bunking of the idea 
of globalisation as a ‘thing-in-itself. This reorients the role of governments away 
from responding to globalisation (as ‘thing-in-itself), towards managing a contingent 
set o f  p rocesses, a nd i n t he c ase o f  t he U K, m anaging t hese p rocesses i n o rder t o 
realise the IDTs.
In contrast to the New Labour view of the inevitability of free trade coming about 
because it is the only route for any country in the face of globalisation, from the 
perspective of an interest in development and poverty alleviation/ eradication, the 
reformist movement instead places its emphasis on ‘fair trade’. According to the 
reformist position, liberalisation does not in and of itself deliver economic growth. It 
therefore does not necessarily imply development as the process is considered to be 
profoundly inequitable. Such a sentiment came to the fore during the consultation 
period of 2000.
Stressing the idea that ‘openness’ is in certain instances deleterious, this contrary 
position moves away from a ‘one size fits all’ approach (something implied in the 
initial structural adjustment programmes, and strongly criticised in the sceptical 
critique of globalisation). Instead an increasing recognition of the validity of 
protectionism is recognised, for example in relation to the cultivation of infant
^7industries and the need for more interventionist industrial policies. From where does 
this derive?
35 This however, does not include any challenge to the idea o f a free movement o f labour.
36 See Oxfam Policy Paper, ‘Globalisation submission to the Government’s White Paper on 
Globalisation, op.cit.
37 See UNCTAD Trade Development Report, (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1999), p.131.
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At the most fundamental level, the reformists argue that there is in fact little evidence
proving that liberalisation leads to development via economic growth. Citing the
World Bank’s draft report 2000/01 Christian Aid point out that:
Whether growth translates into significant reductions in poverty depends on a 
number of factors. The degree of inequality in society matters. Studies find 
that the responsiveness of income poverty to growth increases significantly as 
inequality is lower. Initial levels of inequality in assets (land and education) 
also determine the poverty impact of growth, as do gender and ethnic 
inequalities.38
This point is reflected in the work of two leading trade economists, Rodriguez and 
Rodrik. They point out “there has been a tendency in academic and policy discussion 
to greatly overstate the systematic evidence m favour of trade openness”. What is 
more, research suggests that this applies not only in the short run, but also the long 
run.40 This limitation is mirrored in the New Labour position. According to Simms, 
this is because of “...a blind spot where more critical research emerges from UN 
trade, environment and development agencies.”41 The point is made that hitherto, 
DFID has tended to rely on World Bank and International Monetary Fund sources.
The final peace of the jigsaw, explaining the emphasis being laid on ‘fair’ as opposed 
to ‘free’ trade, holds that if liberalisation is to facilitate economic growth then there 
must also occur a degree of redistribution.42 In other words, it is held that questions
38 World Bank Report (Draft), World Bank, (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2000), paragraph 13
39 Francisco Rodriguez & Dani Rodrik, ‘Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Sceptic’s Guide to the 
Cross-National Evidence’, National Bureau o f Economic Research Working Paper, 7081, April 1999, 
p.39. Quoted in Green & Melemad, A Human Development Approach to Globalisation, op.cit., p.26.
0 See Mathias Lundberg & Llyn Squire, ‘The Simultaneous Evolution o f Growth and Inequality’, 
World Bank Mimeo, 1999. Quoted in Green & Melemad, A Human Development Approach to 
Globalisation, op.cit., p.28.
41 Andrew Simms, ‘Time to Say a Daily Prayer for the Global Economy’, special supplement, 
Globalisation: A Report to Accompany the New White Paper on Eliminating World Poverty,
(produced in association with the Department for Trade and Industry). The Independent, 12th Dec 2000, 
p.9.
42 For example, Oxfam states “globalisation.. .is redistributing wealth and opportunity in the wrong 
direction, from the poor to the rich. This is morally indefensible, economically inefficient, and socially 
unsustainable... [w]hat is needed is a system o f global governance capable o f managing a process of
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relating to equity must be factored in if development is to be achieved.43 As Green
and Melemed point out; “equity and redistribution are increasingly recognised as the
‘missing link’ between globalisation and poverty reduction”.44 Citing evidence from
the World Bank, they continue:
Improved equity not only leads to faster poverty reduction for a given amount 
of growth, but also leads to faster growth. What is good for poor people is 
good for the economy as a whole. Yet up to now, globalisation has frequently 
been linked to increasing inequality.45
Given their commitment to the IDTs, this poses a particular challenge to New Labour. 
As the World Bank points out, “if  growth rates and levels of inequality continue 
unchanged, the headcount index of $1 per day poverty will fall from 24 per cent to 22 
per cent -  far short of halving world poverty by 2015” 46 Thus the very targets that 
New Labour are committed to achieving are only attainable in light of a degree of 
redistribution.
Finally, in highlighting the need for ‘fair’ as opposed to simply ‘free’ trade, the 
reformist position also stresses agency in the constitution of the process, lending a 
negative interpretation to the role of corporations, the EMF, World Bank, and more
globalisation with redistribution in favour o f the poor.” Oxfam Policy Paper, 'Globalisation 
submission to the Government’s White Paper on Globalisation, op.cit., pp8-9.
43 According to the World Bank, “[t]he costs o f adjusting to greater openness are borne exclusively by 
the poor, regardless o f how long the adjustment takes. In addition, the consequences o f terms o f  trade 
changes are far greater for the poor than for the middle or wealthy classes. The poor are far more 
vulnerable to shifts in relative international prices, and this vulnerability is magnified by the country’s 
openness to trade”. Lundberg & Squire, The Simultaneous Evolution o f  Growth and Inequality, op.cit. 
See also Oxfam Briefing Paper, ‘Harnessing Trade for Development’, 2001. 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/trade/trade.html
44 Green & Melemed, A Human development Approach to Globalisation, op.cit., p.2
45 Ibid. The particular evidence that they cite refers to the projections contained in the World Bank’s 
Global Economic Prospects 2000. The position is premised on the fact that if  the IDT targets that the 
UK have committed themselves to meeting are to be met, then the increasing inequality currently 
underway must be curtailed. Quoting the UNDP Human Development Report 1999, they point to a 
worsening situation in Eastern Europe, China, Indonesia and Thailand. UNCTAD Trade and 
Development Report, (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1999), p.36. See also Oxfam Policy 
Papers, ‘Growth with Equity is Good for the Poor’, June 2000. 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/equity/equityOO.htm
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generally ‘Western’ interests in authoring particular trade and investment 
agreements.47 The effect of this is to politicise the process along negative as opposed 
to positive lines.
So in addition to calls for a degree of ‘redistribution’, the likes of Oxfam are also led
to call for a radical restructuring of the above international organisations. The
argument is made that if globalisation is to be just and in the interests of all (hence
not to be resisted), then first and foremost a more equal and fair voice must be given
to all major players and stakeholders, particularly the developing countries, but also
non-governmental and grass roots organisations. This therefore precludes the
possibility of simply ‘embracing’ the process. On this view, the inequitable outcomes
associated with the particular form that ‘globalisation’ currently takes can largely be
explained in terms of the key players who have had the power to determine its form.
As quoted at the top of the chapter, the view is taken that what is currently denoted as
being globalisation is in fact the result of:
a set of rules designed and negotiated by economic actors such as 
governments and businesses. The outcome of such negotiations inevitably 
reflects the relative economic and political power of the actors involved.48
The aim is therefore to give lie to the idea that the ‘agreements’ arrived at at the 
international level arise out of a natural harmony of interests of all of the signatory 
states, or come about as the inevitable response to a new context. Christian aid point 
out that:
46 World Bank, ‘Global Economic Prospects 2000’. Quoted in Christian Aid, Closer Together Further 
Apart, op.cit., p.8.
4 This is because it is these institutions that explain the current set o f  processes associated with the 
kind o f globalisation that is criticised. See Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents. (London: 
Allen Lane, 2002).
48 Green & Melamed, A Human Development Approach to Globalisation, op.cit.
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[o]ver half of the least-developed country members of the WTO have no 
representation in Geneva...[t]hose developing countries that do...often have 
only one person responsible for all negotiations...where there can be more 
than 40 meetings a week. By contrast, the US has over 250 negotiators.49
According to Oxfam, this unsurprisingly explains why “current WTO trade rules 
favour the interests of the rich and powerful at the expense of people living in 
poverty”.50 What is needed therefore, are for the rules of the game to be rewritten in 
order that the majority ‘poor’ benefit.51
So in summary, there are a number of significant features to the reformist ‘anti- 
current) globalisation’ argument. To begin with they effectively debunk the idea of 
inevitability in the face of globalisation. This brings into the spotlight the conduct and 
intentions of agents who had hitherto remained as obscure ‘ghosts in the machine’, 
lending a m ore p olitical d imension t o the d iscussion o f  ‘ globalisation’: ‘it’ c an n o 
longer be evoked to explain, but once more must be subject to explanation. Actors 
within the process are held up to scrutiny and judged in terms of their particular 
interests. The concern becomes not what globalisation is, but what it should be.
In demanding a managerial and constitutive role to be played by government, the 
reformists a Iso c all for greater e quity. W ith t he n eed f  or a ltemative ‘voices’ t o b e
49 Christian Aid, ‘Fair Shares? Transnational Companies, the WTO and the World’s Poorest 
Communities’. September 1999. www.chrsitian-aid.org.uk/indepth/9911 fair/fairshar.htm.
50 Accordingly, “[w]orld trade mles have been developed by the rich and powerful on the basis o f their 
narrow commercial interests. Rich countries and powerful corporations have captured a 
disproportionate share o f the benefits o f trade, leaving developing countries and poor people worse off. 
Trade mles should be judged on their contribution to poverty reduction, respect for human rights, and 
environmental sustainability”. Oxfam Briefing Paper, ‘Harnessing Trade for Development’, 2000. 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policv/papers/trade/trade.html
51 In an open letter calling for institutional changes to the WTO for example, a number o f NGOs called 
for a series o f reforms in order to overcome certain ‘systemic inequalities and imbalances’ within the 
institution. Joint NGO Open Letter on Institutional Refoms in The WTO, October 2001. Friends o f the 
Earth, Oxfam International, Action Aid, World Wildlife Fund, www.actionaid.org. For a more specific 
list o f the sort o f grievances that the NGOs have in mind see Oxfam Policy Papers, ‘Eight Broken
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heard, a challenge is therefore presented to New Labour that is particularly acute 
given that, as stated in the previous chapter, they are particularly susceptible to the 
need for voicing not only a moral dimension to foreign policy, but also to be seen to 
be credible in the eyes of the left. The increasingly polemical connotations attached to 
the current set of manifestations dubbed globalisation therefore challenges the 
possibility of a position being staked that represents a move beyond left and right, 
realist and idealist.
Responding to the Challenge.
Given the significance that globalisation plays in the discourse, it is crucial that New 
Labour are able to either counter or incorporate any challenge to the idea of 
globalisation to which they hold. No longer able to rely on an uncontroversial and 
obscure understanding of globalisation to legitimate their position, increasingly, New 
Labour has had to confront this challenge. However, a complexity, generated out of 
the amorphous and evolutionary nature of this shift in understanding of globalisation, 
means that any clear interpretation is not possible. I suggest that currently a number 
of trends co-exist at odds with one another.
First, there occurs a tendency to dismiss the challenge posed by these groups, 
denoting in an ideological vain expurgation o f the other. In this sense, Blair dismisses 
participants in this counter trend as a ‘travelling circus of anarchists’, motivated by 
arguments that are ‘spurious’. The assumption here is that ‘globalisation’ remains 
significant for the same reasons posited from the beginning, and that the challenge is 
largely muddle-headed and incorrect.
Promises: Why the WTO isn’t Working for the World’s Poor’, 2001. 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policv/papers/8broken/8broken.html
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Alternatively, one can also interpret a strategy of differentiation, in which this 
counter-movement is split. Thus weakened, it looses some of its significance, and 
constitutes a diminished threat. It is this secondary strategy that comes into play ever 
more seriously as New Labour alter their position on globalisation in line with the 
arguments proffered by many of the dissenters on ‘globalisation’ (traditionally 
understood). This is a perilous position however, in that it may have the effect of 
entirely undermining the Third Way argument, which has hitherto rested upon a 
particular understanding of globalisation. This altered version challenges the 
possibility of a ‘third way’ (domestic and foreign). It challenges the view that 
globalisation entails a ‘logic’ that must be accepted on its own terms, and it questions 
deeper (masked) assumptions relating to neutrality, progress, liberalisation, 
unification and (benign) agency. Should New Labour incorporate the arguments 
forwarded by the reformists, they will therefore be forced to contradict earlier 
positions staked in light of their understanding of globalisation.
This all points to the future possibility of a third strategy: that the term will over time 
be dropped as explanans, reflecting its increasingly problematical associations and 
connotations. Either way, we see that the future function and significance of 
globalisation is likely to be significantly altered. In order to understand the 
significance of globalisation in light of the development of these recent movements, it 
is worth developing a schematic set of logical scenarios:
52 See chapter two.
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Assessing the significance o f  globalisation in light o f  new movements. Fig. 1.
Original New Labour understanding o f  Globalisation
I
Challenge o f  new movements
Drop the term
Deny validity o f  challenge incorporate new understanding
i I
Continue with unmodified Third Way Reject Third Way \ Modify Third Way
In the above figure I have sketched out the potential future consequences of an altered 
understanding of globalisation following the challenge of the new social movements.
I argue that there are potentially three possible scenarios. In examining the impact up
until 2001/2, one may tentatively argue that the direction, as determined by the actual
response so far registered, suggests one of two possible outcomes - either ‘rejection of
a third way’, reflecting a return to a more traditional leftist approach, or
‘modification’ of what the ‘third way’ programme is. This reflects ambivalence
amongst key members still as yet uncertain as to the profundity of the challenge, and
the future opportunities the term affords, as well, it might be suggested, as reflecting
the internal balance of power of the key members of the cabinet.
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Meeting the Challenge through Expurgation.
Capturing the sense in which we may say New Labour opts for a strategy of 
expurgation in the face of the globalisation protests is the following statement from 
Stephen Byers:
[w]e need to be in no doubt. The backlash against globalisation is real and it is 
gaining power and momentum. An unholy coalition has been cobbled together. 
Media aware pressure groups and old-fashioned protectionists stand together 
shoulder to shoulder. Last December from the convention centre in Seattle 
through the clouds of tear gas I could see red-neck steel workers from 
Philadelphia walking alongside anarchists. Grandmothers dressed as turtles 
alongside unemployed textile workers from downtown Seattle.53
Byers, in a few brief sentences, is able to convey the image of the Seattle protesters as 
constituting an ‘unholy’ coalition, encompassing anarchists, ‘red necks’, 
protectionists and the unemployed (not to mention grandmothers dressed as turtles). 
This passage is designed to convey a threatening image in order that we might unify 
behind his alternative vision.
According to Byers, the appropriate response is to “to do far more to make the case 
for free trade so that our people can realise the opportunities and benefits that 
globalisation has to offer.”54 This is because, “free trade” and therefore globalisation, 
“causes and boosts economic growth. It is about greater competition, which weakens 
the power of vested interests. It provides greater opportunities and improved 
standards of living for the millions rather than provide privileges for a few.”55
Thus Byers holds to the traditional line that globalisation, as liberalisation, causes and 
boosts economic growth, with the effect that it weakens (rather than reflects) the
53 Stephen Byers, ‘Globalisation and Free Trade’, London Business School, August 4th 2000.
54 Ibid.
55 TUi,-1
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power of vested interests. Addressing the House of Commons immediately following 
Seattle, Byers posits that; “[t]he lesson and the reality is that throughout our history in 
whatever country, free trade has been a bringer of prosperity.” 56
There are a number of elements to Byers response that warrant mention in this respect. 
Firstly, and contrary to the protesters view, Byers stresses the importance of free trade, 
which is considered to be universally favourable. However, and crucially, in doing so 
Byers nonetheless also recognises, in partial recognition of what the reformists would 
refer to as fair trade, that the WTO must be reformed, as it is the WTO that will
cn
increasingly function to “harness the benefits of free trade”.
Discussing possible reforms, Byers suggests that “[w]e should make WTO documents 
publicly available and develop effective mechanisms to consult more widely. There 
should be far greater transparency over dispute settlement. We should consider 
establishing a better mechanism to allow non-governmental organisations to express
CO
their views. We need to change the WTO decision-making structure...” For Byers, 
perhaps surprisingly, this restructuring extends to the possibility of having “some 
form of parliamentary assembly to allow a greater degree of accountability”.59
In the aftermath of Seattle, and mirroring Byer’s concerns, Blair states the following:
There is no point in pretending that the events in Seattle were not a setback for 
the cause of global free trade. But what should our mature conclusion be, now 
that we have had the time to reflect on what happened? Our conclusion should 
not be that open markets and free trade are wrong. The worst thing we could 
do for developing countries would be to shelve the trade liberalisation agenda 
and sit back while trade barriers were re-erected around the globe. The right
56 Stephen Byers, Hansard, 9th December 1999, p. 1030. Emphasis added.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., p. 1026.
59 Ibid., p. 1026.
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conclusion is that we have an enormous job to do to convince the sincere and 
well-motivated opponents of the WTO agenda that the WTO can be, indeed is, 
a friend of development, and that far from impoverishing the world’s poorer 
countries, trade liberalisation is the only route to the kind o f  economic growth 
needed to bring their prosperity closer to that of the major developed 
economies.60
Two things are particularly notable about the above passage. The first is recognition 
of the significance of the WTO, and the need to highlight how it is in fact a friend of 
development. The second is the fact that Blair concentrates on liberalisation as the 
path to development. Blair ignores the issue of equity and redistribution, the likely 
difficulties of ever liberalising certain agricultural markets, or the problems 
associated with overcoming the difficulties of declining terms of trade.
Clare Short, frustrated by the direction that she felt counter debates relating to
globalisation and development were taking at Seattle, also initially considered the
protagonists as being ‘misguided white middle-class activists’. According to Short,
“[i]t would have been truly terrible if the noises from Seattle with their largely
muddle headed determination to ‘save the developing world from development’ were
to outweigh the voices of developing countries themselves”.61 In order to secure
development, globalisation must not be resisted:
If we are to secure this prize, we must challenge the siren voice of the 
protesters of Seattle and Prague. Many of them mean well, but the dominant 
voice is anti-developmental and calls for protectionism and the tearing down 
of international institutions. The last time those views prevailed was the 1930s,
fS)and we know where that led.
60 Tony Blair, ‘Managing Change: A National and International Agenda o f Reform’, speech to the 
World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, 28th January 2000. Emphasis added.
61 Clare Short, ‘Advancing the World Trade Debate: Beyond Seattle’, op.cit.
62 Clare Short, ‘Making Globalisation Work for the Poor: The European Union’s Contribution’, speech 
to the Maision de l ’Europe, Bmssels, 28th February 2001.
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As should be clear from the analysis in the variety of movements and positions 
contained under the misnomer ‘anti-globalisation’, Short’s position is untenable. 
Along with Byers and Blair, the strategy avoids recognising the inherent variations in 
these groups thus avoiding the sophistication and soundness of many of the protesters 
arguments. In so doing it is possible to interpret the ideological strategy of 
expurgation, whereby the entire challenge is dismissively subsumed under a 
particular (and unjustified) pejorative category. Presented as if  a potential threat, the 
approach is to stick to the original significance of globalisation.
The central strategy in this type of argument derives from the ability of New Labour 
to present the protesters under the category ‘anti-globalisation’. In this respect, it is in 
the interests of New Labour to perpetuate this myth because it allows for a negative 
and dismissive approach to then be taken to the content of the protester’s claims. In 
being collectively tarred with the same brush, they take on the character of 
conservative ‘reactionaries’, anti-liberals, anarchists and anti-capitalists. To listen to 
them would by implication mean courting a view that would lead to a return to the 
‘1930s’. Their cause can, as a result, be portrayed as ‘spurious’, muddle headed, 
irrational, and regressive. Thus, by erasing the plurality and complexity of these 
movements, the valid concerns contained and silenced under this banner can be more 
easily dismissed.
The extent to which this strategy wins over therefore plays a part in determining the 
subsequent significance and forms that ‘globalisation’ takes. Domestically, it holds 
out the possibility of the perpetuation of a particular set of processes the reformists 
dub corporate globalisation. But it also potentially determines the future orientation
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for New Labour, in this case allowing for the continuation of claims to be able to 
articulate a third way in both the international and domestic realm. Should the 
strategy succeed, then this understanding of globalisation will continue to be the 
determining factor in explaining the Third Way. ‘Globalisation’ will continue to be a 
process that demands a particular kind of response, one whose status (because 
pragmatic) is emptied of ‘ideological’ content. Thus it will continue to play a role in 
entrenching the party in power.
However, it is unlikely that this initial reaction to the protest movements’ arguments 
was anything other than temporary. Rather, judging by the subsequent response of 
key New Labour members, and given the robustness of many of the reformist’s 
arguments (not to mention the publicity that they have generated), the strategy of 
expurgation (dismissal) has been replaced.
This is reflected in an alternative approach being taken. As Gordon Brown comments:
while thirty years ago, twenty years ago, perhaps even ten years ago, the 
disagreement between pro- and anti-globalisation campaigners would have 
been so fundamental that no meeting of minds would have been possible, 
today many people who are wrongly labelled ‘anti-globalisation campaigners’ 
-  and who rightly campaign for trade on fair terms for developing countries -  
would also acknowledge: the importance of markets; the pivotal role of 
private capital... making global development work in the interests of the 
excluded.
Brown makes this statement whilst nonetheless stating the following:
Some critics say the issue is whether we should have globalisation or not. In 
fact, the issue is whether we manage globalisation well or badly, fairly or 
unfairly. And we have a choice. Globalisation can be for the people or against 
the people. Just as in any national economy economic integration can bring 
stability or instability, prosperity or stagnation, the inclusion of people or their 
exclusion, so too in the global economy. Managed badly, globalisation would
63 Gordon Brown, speech to the Federal Reserve Bank, New York, 16th November 2001.
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leave whole economies and millions of people in the developing world 
marginalised. Managed wisely, globalisation can and will lift millions out of 
poverty, and become the high road to a just and inclusive global economy.64
Thus expurgation (dismissal), though possible, in view of the broad chorus of 
criticisms and the general soundness of the arguments, becomes increasingly difficult 
to maintain. Differentiation, on the other hand, allows for a separation of the plurality 
of groups, and thereby offers the possibility of splintering any movement of 
movements (thereby if not setting them against one another, then at least silencing 
that which unifies them in opposition). This strategy, I argue, becomes increasingly 
significant.
Meeting the Challenge through Dissimulation.
It is unfair to merely deride New Labour for a strategy of outright dismissal and 
expurgation. As already discussed, even whilst deriding the majority at Seattle as if 
misguided, Byers and Short nonetheless take seriously the issue of institutional 
reform. Most do recognise many of the valid concerns that are often aired amongst 
those at least contained in the reformist category. To the extent that this is the case, 
the moves taken in the direction of recognising some of these positions might be said 
to mark a shift in policy and thus also in outlook concerning globalisation. The effect 
almost inevitably involves a radical change to the future function and significance of 
globalisation, given, as Blair has stated, globalisation operates as the ‘driving force’ 
of the Third Way.
In response to increasing equivocation on the original understanding of globalisation, 
a number of key themes have arisen in the discourse, promulgated most vociferously
64 Ibid.
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by Robin Cook, Clare Short, and Gordon Brown. In contrast to a stress being laid on 
the appropriate way to respond, a different position has developed that tentatively 
advocates the need to manage globalisation, to exercise a degree of caution in its 
wake, promoting the need for responsibility, fairness, and redistribution. Whereas 
hitherto, ‘globalisation’ has largely been thought of in economic terms, generally 
synonymous with liberalisation, it now becomes something else, more to do with 
increased interconnectedness in all respects. I t is more a condition in which action 
must take place, rather than a process itself.
As a result, and as recognised by the more complex formulations of globalisation, the 
process becomes contingent because vulnerable. This translates to mean that if it is to 
be perpetuated in time then it must be ‘managed’, which is significant in that 
managing globalisation requires a decidedly political position to first be taken; one 
that in this case means, i f  it is to benefit all (and it is assumed it can), i t must be 
accompanied by a policy of redistribution along more equitable lines. This all 
represents a considerable step away from a position that stresses the possibility of a 
non-ideological universal and pragmatic response. No longer is it possible to assume 
an underlying harmony of interests whereby all are affected in roughly the same way, 
with development and growth coming about as a result of further liberalisation and 
openness.
This is recognised by Cook in one of his last speeches as foreign secretary, in which 
he stresses the need for a ‘consensus’ to develop on an appropriate approach to 
globalisation in order that all do and can benefit. In so doing, and in reaction to the 
events in Seattle, Cook takes on board the idea that globalisation is in some way
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‘vulnerable’ (as opposed to the idea that it is like the sun rising each morning). In a
departure from earlier formulations that stressed the need to respond and cope with
the changes accompanying globalisation, Cook instead begins to focus increasingly
on the importance of having a hand in determining the very nature that globalisation
takes via a more active form of agency. According to Cook:
Globalisation.. .is vulnerable precisely because it is often perceived by its 
critics as the globalisation of investment and of trade. If we are able to defeat 
those critics, we can do so only by building a wider consensus that 
globalisation must be much more than just a global economy.65
In addition to the importance of human rights, universal values and global interests, 
Cook now also stresses the need for responsibility and fairness as important 
considerations in governing the actions of states. Cook, in effect, recognises the 
deleterious consequences that follow from the fact that certain states have 
disproportionately benefited from globalisation.66 He argues that if  the international 
community is to perpetuate the benefits of globalisation, then so it must actively 
intervene to ‘manage’ the process. This intervention moves away from the belief that 
globalisation is inherently progressive, in favour of a recognition that it is also, in its 
current form, potentially negative.
The politicised nature that unfolds from this logic can be witnessed in the nature of 
the analogy that Cook now draws. A parallel is drawn with the immediate period 
following World War Two, where the welfare state was constructed at the same time 
as a boon in levels of international trade and investment. According to Cook, during 
this period an implicit social compact with the people and the government was 
entered into, one in which free and universal education and health provisions,
65 Robin Cook, ‘The Challenge o f Globalisation’, speech to the Trilateral Commission, International 
Institute o f Strategic Studies, 9th March 2001.
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pensions and unemployment benefits were all provided for. Cook now suggests that 
this must occur at the global level. A sort of global compact needs to be reached, and 
British foreign policy must reflect the concern to realise just such a state of affairs. In 
this Cookean formulation, globalisation is reduced to the economic -  international 
trade and investment - with a new political global agenda needed by way of a 
response. Thus the domestic analogy is given profound significance for a leftist 
foreign policy agenda. The claim is that if economics has gone global then so must 
politics.67
Recognising that the benefits have hitherto been unevenly spread, Cook posits that:
Globalisation is not to blame for this unfairness, but nor will globalisation 
alone remove the unfairness unless we consciously adopt Global Fairness as a 
deliberate objective. There is much that can be done.68
In more substantive terms the policies suggested by Cook include: increasing
development aid, with the funds being allocated to those most in need; reducing the
level of indebtedness of developing c ountries; and improving the terms o f  trade in
favour of those countries exporting from developing countries. Cook points out that:
The collapse of the Seattle talks arose in large part from the feeling among the 
developing countries that their priorities were not high on the agenda and that 
their voice was not influential in the Council Chamber. Yet, it would be a 
tragedy for those same developing countries if  we were not to take forward a 
further World Trade Round. Halving trade tariffs worldwide would boost 
developing countries’ incomes by three times the total development aid 
flows.*
66 See chapter 6.
67 This is also reflected in the position o f Short: “for too long the politics o f globalisation have lagged 
behind the economics. If the economy is truly global, our politics must be global too”. Clare Short, 
‘Globalisation: Meeting the Challenge’, speech to the Fabian Society, 23rd Jan 1999. According to 
Brown, “just as in any national economy economic integration can bring stability or instability.. .the 
inclusion o f people or their exclusion, so too in the global economy”, speech to the Federal Reserve, 
16th Nov 2001, op.cit.
68 Robin Cook, ‘The Challenge of Globalisation’, op.cit.
69 Ibid.
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Cook advocates that, “free trade for the industrialised products of the developed 
world must be matched by fairer access for the agricultural products, textile, and
7 0clothing of the developed world”. He does this even though, as discussed in the 
previous section, such a policy would in effect worsen the terms of trade: reflecting
71the income inelasticity of agricultural products. Should such a policy not be 
forthcoming, or further complicated by calls for minimum labour and environmental 
standards, so such a view will be increasingly unsustainable.72 As with Byers, Cook 
also identifies the WTO as central in ensuring the International Development Targets.
Another important component for the development of a new consensus is the 
exercising of ‘global responsibility’, central to the development of which is the need 
for corporate good citizenship. Cook argues that a more enlightened consumer and 
company will be more discerning both in its treatment of employers, and in its 
recognition of a broader constituency of stakeholders. Thus chiming with earlier 
discussions o f  Stakeholder capitalism, an ideapopular w ith the 1 ikes o f  Cook (but 
nonetheless quietly dismissed in 1996), a focus is laid on ideas to do with corporate 
social responsibility as a means of determining socially desirable outcomes.
Thus, C ook’s v ersion c an b e s een a s r eflecting a t ransition i n t hinking b eyond t he 
position that characterises the period 1998/99. However, and following his move 
from the foreign office at the beginning of 2001, Cook does not build on these matters. 
Nonetheless, Cook is not alone. Clare Short has also developed thinking on
70 Ibid.
71 See chapter 6.
72 This turns on the seemingly intractable difficulty o f what constitutes a ‘barrier to trade’, for example 
is labelling on GM crops a ‘barrier’; do certain minimum labour rights constitute a barrier?
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globalisation along these lines, and specifically in line with her department’s 
commitment to the IDT targets. It is therefore to Short that I now turn.
For Short, writing in 1999, “globalisation - driven by technological change but
unleashing as it has massive and rapid movement of capital around the world - is
probably as big a historical shift as was industrialisation”.73 Writing with a concern
for development, and having committed the government to meeting the IDT targets,
Short posits, “it is wrong to see globalisation as either wholly positive or wholly
negative”.74 Those who see it in the former light are those on the right:
To them, globalisation means nothing less than Thatcherism writ large -  the 
application of laissez faire economics to the global economy. Minimal 
government, minimal regulation - a belief that market forces left entirely to 
their own devices will produce economic prosperity for all.75
Those on the ‘conservative left’ that view globalisation negatively, holding on to a 
belief that it should “be restricted on all points”, are also wrong. This reinforces the 
initial point made in reference to the strategy of fragmentation, in which Short 
purposely oversimplifies the case, as if discussion of globalisation has hitherto taken 
the form of either a new right belief in the unfettered market writ large, or a complete 
scepticism whereby all aspects of globalisation (presumably as understood by the 
former) should be resisted.77
Short unsurprisingly argues that both views are inadequate. For Short, “[t]here is no 
question that globalisation is generating new wealth and rising incomes. Many people
73 Short, ‘Globalisation: Meeting the Challenge’, op.cit.
74 Ibid
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 This mirrors the strategy adopted by Blair, keen to construct the duality o f openness or 
closure/protectionism.
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are benefiting from this process. And globalisation represents a huge opportunity to 
lift more people out of poverty at a much faster pace”.78 Thus, in agreement with 
Blair, judged overall, Short is unequivocal in her commitment that globalisation 
(liberalisation) represents an opportunity and is, as a process, a potential salvation.
Yet, though optimistic, Short nonetheless is forced to develop a more subtle analysis, 
stressing not only the gains to be attained from globalisation, but the imperatives that 
follow certain challenges associated with globalisation and development. It is in this 
respect that she can be viewed as slightly at odds with Blair.
Given the concerns that follow from the brief that she is given, Short is unavoidably 
led to conclude that globalisation has the potential to “generate massive instability”.79 
This she believes was illustrated in the case of East Asia and Russia in 1997 and 1998. 
Drawing the same conclusions as the reformist position, Short points out that though 
globalisation delivers greater wealth, it occurs at a time when “inequalities in wealth 
and income are growing”.80 If the IDT targets are to be met, it is therefore recognised 
that it is necessary to “manage globalisation in a way that maximises its benefits for 
all; above all, in a way which reduces abject poverty through ensuring a fairer
Q 1
allocation of income, both within and between countries”.
The sort of measures Short has in mind were most comprehensively spelled out 
throughout 2000 and 2001, not only in the White Paper published by the department 
in the Autumn of 2000, but also in a number of key speeches on globalisation
78 Short, ‘Globalisation: Meeting the Challenge’, op.cit.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
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delivered by Short throughout the period.82 The White Paper itself makes two key 
policy commitments: firstly “that the UK government will work with others to 
manage globalisation so that poverty is systematically reduced and the international 
development targets are achieved”; and secondly, the government will “promote 
economic growth that is equitable and environmentally sustainable”.83 The result of 
this orientation is that New Labour must confront many of the challenges put forward 
by the various movements, as outlined earlier.
Globalisation takes a central place in thinking about development for Short because 
“in a globalising world eliminating poverty is more important than ever before”.84 As 
with Cook, Short draws attention to the fact that if globalisation is to be perpetuated, 
a number of issues need to be addressed. Firstly, though a prerequisite of 
development is seen to be economic growth, this is not a sufficient condition alone. 
Recognising the reformist arguments, Short acknowledges that, “evidence shows that 
we cannot achieve systemic and sustained poverty reduction without economic
o r
growth. But economic growth alone is not enough. We need growth and equity”. 
This constitutes a shift away from Blair’s position, as an emphasis is laid on 
redistribution and a more interventionist stance vis-a-vis the market.
82 Department For International Development, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation 
Work for the Poor. White Paper on International Development, London, Cmncl. 5006, December 2000. 
In addition to those already cited, see Clare Short, ‘Making Globalisation Work for the Poor: A Role 
for the United Nations’, speech at the Rockefeller Foundation, New York, 1st February 2001; Clare 
Short, ‘Globalisation, Trade and Development in the Least Developed Countries’, speech at the 
Ministerial Roundtable on Trade and the Least developed Countries, London, 19th March 2001; Clare 
Short, ‘Shaping Globalisation to Benefit All- Better Health for the Poor and Global Public Goods’, 
Geneva, 19* October 2001.
83 Short, ‘Globalisation Trade and Development in the Least Developed Countries’, op.cit.
84 Short, ‘Making Globalisation Work for the Poor: The European Union’s Contribution’, op.cit.
85 Ibid.
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This response is quite crucial, and in a number of respects constitutes a very 
significant acknowledgement of many of the challenges articulated by the sceptics 
and given expression by the new social movements, because it challenges the 
assumption of an underlying natural harmony of interests associated with 
globalisation (reflected in the need to manage (constitute) globalisation). What is 
more, it questions any ‘global logic* of further liberalisation and openness (reflected 
in the call for intervention and redistribution), and problematises the possibility 
afforded by the new context associated with globalisation for a politics that 
transcends ‘left’ and ‘right’ traditionally understood. However, the nature of Short’s 
response i s n ot t o d evelop a ny o f  t he a bove i mplications i n o rder to e  hallenge t he 
above assumptions, but rather to play down the deeper significance of this recognition, 
favouring instead a relatively modest set of suggestions in response to the challenge.
For Short, eliminating poverty is crucial to globalisation, and requires a degree of 
intervention on the part of the international community along particular lines. States 
must be more effective and efficient, and they must provide adequate education and 
health care provision for their people. However, in that eliminating poverty involves 
the entire international community, it is also important that “fair international rules 
and strong international institutions” are created.86 The crux of the matter with respect 
to the international community is that they create “representative institutions, in
0*7
which all can pursue their interests equally”. Therefore we see that Short still 
assumes that all interests can be pursued equally, and that rules can reflect the 
concerns of all the signatories.
86 Ibid.
87 t v ; a
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This view however, seems somewhat unrealistic, and generally reflects the New 
Labour orientation to globalisation throughout the period. Thus, though there exists a 
shift of sorts, it is limited in significance given the fact that the solution arguably 
remains largely unrealistic (because unrealisable). Though Short, Byers and Cook are 
all prepared to shine a spotlight on the current set up of the World Bank and IMF, 
their argument continues to rest upon the unlikely possibility of significantly 
reconfiguring power and of making a reality of tariff reductions in the area of 
agriculture. Short settles for the view that the solution can be arrived at by ‘capacity 
building’; that is by enabling those without a voice to get their position heard and 
better articulated.
Nevertheless, without such willingness on the part of the US to alter the IMF or 
World Bank, not to mention the European Union to dismantle the common 
agricultural policy and the US to reduce its agricultural subsidies, all talk in this 
respect remains just that. The result of this is that ‘globalisation’ potentially 
undermines itself so conceived by Short and Cook, and determines a return to a 1930s 
type situation, where greater poverty, shrinking economies and environmental 
problems are just as likely.
And returning to the point made at the beginning; this stance may lend itself to an 
interpretation of ideology. In taking this approach, Short, and New Labour, are able to 
make the right noises and appear to push for a changing agenda in response to the 
calls of the reformists, and in the process co-opt their position to the extent that it no 
longer constitutes a significant threat. This is nonetheless done in the full knowledge
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that in fact most of the c hanges c ailed for remain pipe dreams, unrealisable in the 
short term.
Nevertheless, this should not detract from the significance of the challenge because 
the arguments forwarded by the party must now be made in a changed context, one 
that no longer is able to evoke ‘globalisation’ in quite the same way, either 
domestically or abroad. Certainly, the idea of exporting a ‘third way’ internationally 
falters. Nevertheless, how this will play out in the future currently remains open to 
question.
Conclusion: Assessing the Function and Significance of Globalisation in light of the 
Challenge of the New Social Movements.
So how do we approach and answer the question of what the function, significance 
and limitations of globalisation are given the challenge of the new social movements?
To begin with, a number of caveats must be made. First, it is important to distinguish 
the p lurality of t he p ositions t hat fall w ithin t his c ategory. I h ave argued tjiat i t i s 
incorrect to talk of an anti-globalisation movement. Better, we should distinguish 
between more or less influential sets of arguments that can in fact be categorised 
according to a shared antipathy to a particular (perceived to be dominant) 
understanding of globalisation; the strong thesis. I have concentrated on a particular 
set of positions that fall within this category, the ‘reformist position’.
This however draws attention to a problem of sorts for this reformist position, in that, 
to the extent that it is unified in a negative sense (all against something, rather than all
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for something), then their success may also be their downfall. It is therefore important 
not to assume a simple linear set of conclusions as to the future significance of the 
reformists, and thus the future significance of globalisation in the New Labour 
discourse.
That said, the arguments that characterise the reformist position have been influential, 
not least in that they concentrate their efforts on reform rather than revolution. In 
rethinking the relation between globalisation and development they are led to 
examine how ‘globalisation’ gives rise to a particular set of outcomes, which, they 
suggest, and in line with the constitutive method, can be explained in terms of the 
way in which it is understood. And it is that that binds them closely to New Labour, 
because both are committed to  the IDTs as an achievable goal. It also binds them 
closely t o N ew Labour because b oth t alk o f  g lobalisation a s a p otential p anacea -  
though coming from very different orientations on its nature and consequences.
Thus the reformist position constitutes an important challenge. At the abstract level, 
and in conjunction with the second wave approaches to globalisation, it has debunked 
and unmasked the idea that globalisation is inevitable. In  identifying agency it has 
forced a position that proffers managing the processes that give rise to greater 
interconnectedness, but along lines that stress redistribution; requiring in  their turn 
institutional power reconfigurations. In shining this spotlight on the mechanics of the 
processes hitherto understood as globalisation, the reformist position fundamentally 
challenges the limited view of globalisation being either neutral, progressive, 
universally favourable, entailing a certain logic (deregulation and openness), or 
requiring a set of pragmatic (non-ideological) responses. Deeper still, the challenge
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gives lie to the idea that it is a ‘thing-in-itself and thus a ‘process without a subject’, 
or a process that benefits all because it spreads on the basis of an underlying harmony 
of interests.
But perhaps the key challenge stems from the concern for development and the fact 
that current trends are unlikely to enable the IDTs to be met. Given the above, the 
possibility of demarcating a particular domestic and foreign policy, and lending it a 
particular status in light of globalisation, begins to falter.
Domestically, this might not prove particularly significant given New Labour’s 
continued (as of 2003) electoral dominance. Where this is the case, then the need to 
underpin their position with an approach that ‘balances’ interests, retaining the middle 
ground, is less problematic. However in the longer term it may well challenge the 
possibility of globalisation underpinning and giving a particular status to the Third 
Way.
In foreign policy terms the challenge of the reformist position in appropriating a new 
vision of globalisation is highly significant, calling into question the desirability of 
liberalisation. Given the unlikelihood of liberalisation occurring in the European or 
North A merican agricultural s ectors, c ompounded b y t he w orsening t erms o f t  rade 
experienced by many developing countries, plus key trends suggesting greater 
inequality, the reformist position will play an increasingly significant role in 
highlighting the difficulties in meeting the IDTs. As a result, the possibility of 
pursuing an agenda concerned with promoting further liberalisation abroad as a 
collectively desirable and largely unavoidable thing may prove increasingly difficult.
280
This may increasingly encroach into the possibility of articulating a moral purpose to 
foreign policy, returning policy to a more parochially declared set of concerns.
Up for question then is the idea of a harmony of interests residing around further 
liberalisation. The particular original New Labour formulation of globalisation, as 
‘out-there’ presenting a similar set of challenges and responses, requiring the 
‘pooling’ of sovereignty in order to regain control, is questioned. Importantly, the 
process is politicised, ‘left’ and ‘right’ is reintroduced on the issues of free trade and 
growth, as well as reintroducing ‘national interests’ as potentially being in conflict. 
Power and politicisation thus become increasingly unavoidable features that underpin 
current processes of change that New Labour can no longer avoid.
However, and finally, though representing a challenge, this does not preclude the 
possibility of the term being further manipulated. That is, New Labour can still 
actively seek to promote many of the remedial policies touched upon in the chapter, 
knowing that they will ultimately not be realised. Of course this may be an overly 
cynical position to take, but nevertheless one should not right it off as a strategy of 
sorts. One can still be seen to be doing the right thing, that is remain a ‘force for the 
good’ in the world, whilst nonetheless not jeopardising one’s traditional national 
interests.
What is clear however, is that ‘globalisation’ has become an increasingly politicised 
hot potato, whose function will, over time, change. And given the nature of the 
remedial measures proffered in order to maintain globalisation over the longue duree, 
it seems that that ‘third way’ will increasingly resemble a more politicised (and thus
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less pragmatic) programme designed to deal with the nature of contemporary change. 
Centrally, this potentially suggests one of two directions: that globalisation challenges 
in such a way that it radicalises the Labour party -  pushing it further to the left by 
undermining the underlying assumptions of the third way; or that globalisation is 
dropped, giving rise to a significant gap in making sense of the future of Labour and 
left thinking in the unified way in which it has currently been formulated.
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Conclusion
“Will New Labour’s eventual construction be admired, like Norman Foster’s 
Reichstag modernisation in Berlin, fo r  the radical functionality concealed within a 
conservative exterior; or will it be remembered like Antonio Gaudi’s fabulous 
cathedral in Barcelona: breathtakingly radical in appearance, but behind the 
entertaining fagade just another monument to the forces o f  conservatism? ”}
I now return to address the central question of this thesis, namely: what has been the 
function, significance and limitations of ‘globalisation’ in the context of thinking 
about and understanding New Labour? In answering this question, I structure the 
conclusion by addressing the following questions: one, how should we understand 
globalisation; two, how does New Labour understand globalisation; three, is this 
understanding correct; and four, how do we account for and ultimately judge their 
understanding? Taken together this also provides one way to assess New Labour 
more generally. Thus, and finally, I consider whether, given the particular 
understanding of change, the project ought ultimately to be understood as being either 
a conservative fa?ade or an intelligently discrete but nonetheless radical programme 
for change.
First, in addressing the issue of what ‘globalisation’ itself is, the argument presented 
here approached this question by first dwelling on the meta-theoretical assumptions 
governing my orientation; drawing attention to the possibility of a plural set of 
meanings that can rightfully be attached to the term.
1 Ludlum, Stephen. ‘New Labour: What’s Published is What Counts’, British Journal o f  Politics and 
International Relations, Vol.2, No.2, June 2000, p.275.
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I have delineated two approaches: understanding ‘globalisation’ as either an 
explanatory tool, separate from, though making sense of, the empirical world ‘out 
there’, ultimately true (correct) or false; or alternatively, ‘globalisation’ as an idea 
(therefore still a tool), yet now in some way implicated in the construction of the 
empirical realm it seeks to understand. On this latter view, the ‘empirical’ is 
essentially contaminated by the ideational, with the effect that ‘truth’ is never final 
because always in the process of being altered as those ideas themselves change.
I have argued for the second of these positions. However in so doing, I have not 
dismissed the fact that the former approach has something useful to say. In one sense, 
they are not at odds. ‘Globalisation’ can - indeed does - in part explain the world ‘out 
there’. Nonetheless, we must be careful about what we mean, and what w e imply, 
when making such a statement. I have argued against a naive positivism, whereby the 
reality exists separately from the ideas which function to explain this reality. There is 
no convenient distinction that can therefore be made between the ‘subject’, be it New 
Labour or ‘globalisation’ on the one hand, and the ‘object’, be it ‘globalisation’ or 
‘the world out there’, on the other. Instead, the correct orientation suggests a more 
complex intersubjective position, thereby implying that we cannot approach 
‘globalisation’ in abstract either as a ‘thing’ or as ‘idea’.
The conclusion drawn on this point governs the approach taken in assessing its 
significance. I have argued that understanding what ‘globalisation’ is, inevitably 
draws us into a consideration of the concrete circumstances in which the term 
functions. That is, we need to consider how it is understood, by whom, and in what
284
circumstances. In making sense of the consequences ‘it’ has, we need to consider why 
a particular understanding predominates, and is able to remain dominant over time.
This has been the argument made in chapters 2 and 3. When we talk of understanding 
in this respect, we are talking about ‘meaning’; the meaning ascribed to events, 
actions, and the connections that link them. Thus when we talk about what 
globalisation is we enter the realm of what it means. What it means to people, 
subsequently determines praxis, thereby playing its part in the construction of a 
particular reality.
From chapter 2, it was also held that meaning plays itself out in the context of a field 
of contestation, and as a result is inextricably linked to the issue of power. Though 
meaning constitutes the world, understanding is neither arbitrary (vitiating the 
relativist argument), nor neutral - in the sense that it does not escape certain 
‘dominant’ interests. And from this, where meaning might at one level be said to 
serve particular dominant interests, then so we may begin to interpret ‘ideology’, here 
understood as ‘meaning in the service of power’.
But to understand something as being ‘ideological’ is not to talk in monolithic terms. 
Rather, a more nuanced approach is suggested here, where modus operandi are 
identified, and validated as such, against the backdrop of an argument that points to a 
particular set of interests. Directing a critique of ‘globalisation’ therefore entails that 
we set our sites far beyond the narrow focus of ‘globalisation’ itself. We are 
inevitably drawn into a consideration of the milieu. We are forced to examine 
particular agents central in the construction of any particular meaning. We are forced
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to examine their arguments, and the reasoning adopted. We must in addition, consider 
the structural setting in which this is all played out. Combined, this encompasses the 
three phases of the depth hermeneutic technique.
Importantly though, we begin by considering the ‘soundness’ of the argument - by 
which I take to mean its factual content. Hence we ought not to dismiss the 
‘positivistic’ approach to globalisation outright. In what might be understood as the 
‘negative’ positivistic contribution of the globalisation literature drawn from the 
exegesis in chapter 3, in positing what ‘globalisation’ is not (arrived at in part from 
one positivist position challenging another), important insights were gleaned. In the 
context here, it was seen that the literature contributed to the development of the term 
along more complex and dialectical lines, away from the initial strong thesis seen to 
be so crucial in the New Labour approach itself. In doing so, important insights were 
arrived at concerning the nature of such imputed entities as the ‘global economy’ and 
the ‘ global 1 ogic’ s een by s ome t o b e s o ‘ obvious’. Empirical j udgement therefore 
plays an important and crucial role in this context, it effectively questions the ‘facts’ 
so closely and obliquely bound up with a particular understanding of globalisation.
The sceptical critique was taken as being crucial in this respect, drawing attention to 
the scope that remains to any government grappling with contemporary changes. The 
challenge drew attention to the ‘myths’ surrounding the term, and opened up the idea 
that ‘globalisation’ is in a sense a ‘discourse’ that erroneously lays claim to a reality 
that is unsupportable at the empirical level. Combined with the contributions made by 
more complex variants, those for example associated with Scholte and Held, we see
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that the term is an essentially contested one, and to the extent that it explains anything 
at all, it is in a way far removed from its original populist understanding.
The argument nevertheless, moves beyond the writing associated with both the 
sceptics and complex writers. Recognising that ‘ globalisation’ is indeed a complex 
concept, the point is made that considerations as to its consequences and significance 
cannot be conducted separately from the context in which it is articulated, or 
evaluated separately from a consideration of power and agency in constituting reality 
through processes of reification and legitimisation. And this moves us on to the 
second and third questions, so central to the thesis.
As part of the depth hermeneutic orientation, we are led to focus in on the arguments 
-  the function globalisation plays -  in the New Labour corpus; to ask what does 
globalisation explain for New Labour? In the initial examination of the function, 
significance and limitations of globalisation in chapter 4, I drew attention to the fact 
that it begins with a focus that is ‘domestic’, drawing attention to the fact that the 
function and significance of ‘globalisation’ changes over time. To begin, I focussed 
on how Tony Blair makes extensive use of the idea of globalisation over the period 
1996 through to 1999 to underpin and explain a number of ideas.
First, the argument draws on a particular and voguish version of ‘globalisation’, one 
that closely parallels the ‘strong thesis’ examined in chapter 3. Over this period, and 
ontologically, ‘globalisation’ remains an essentially obscure process in the discourse, 
a ‘process-without-a-subject’ and a ‘thing-in-itself; though something largely 
synonymous with liberalisation nonetheless. This, it was seen, allowed for the
287
avoidance of developing too deep an analysis on the contemporary context. That is, it 
enables the party to avoid having to develop a critique of the capitalist context. Rather, 
the significance of globalisation is ‘obviously’ profound, as are its consequences, and 
a particular approach to globalisation -  the strong thesis -  determines the nature of 
this response. The programme, it was seen, is presented as ‘pragmatic’, and 
conducted in a ‘post-ideological’ context because the policies are geared towards 
meeting the unavoidable necessities accompanying the globalisation process. The 
agenda itself, geared towards keeping the country ahead of the race, whilst 
nonetheless accepting the disciplines of the global economy and working firmly 
within the obvious parameters that this sets, leads to a focus being placed on the 
‘supply-side’: flexibility and training; competitiveness and facilitation; market 
‘friendly’ measures. This combines to constitute a ‘third way’; a novel political 
programme beyond left and right traditionally understood.
Second, Blair and New Labour ‘benefits’ from this - implying an ideological 
interpretation - in that this version can be connected with the overriding concern over 
this period to gain and retain power. ‘Globalisation’, plays its part in overcoming a 
particular set of constraints specific to the Labour party operating in the context of the 
UK in 1997. These constraints, by no means novel, centre on the need to capture in a 
more permanent fashion, the ‘middle ground’. This could be understood as 
‘problematic’ however, in light of certain characteristics specific to the UK economy, 
and as a result of electoral preferences following the previous Conservative terms in 
power - which, when judged in combination with what it is to be of the left, are 
perhaps antithetical. Reifying ‘globalisation’, and legitimising a particular position,
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all serve as invaluable aids to overcoming these apparently intractable difficulties, 
and thus facilitate the possibility of securing these ends.
Third, this orientation, largely successful in realising its initial aims, nonetheless 
generates requirements and contains anomalies, which subsequently places foreign 
policy as a central ‘site’. This draws attention to a further set of conclusions on 
‘globalisation’ as a concept necessarily employed in a context over time. Its novelty, 
its obscure nature, its amenability to manipulation, its plural meanings and 
associations, all mean that its ‘nature’ is not entirely coherent.
To begin with, essential elements to be found in the initial understanding are adopted 
and translated for thinking about foreign policy. The conceptualisation of 
globalisation as a ‘thing-in-itself, it was seen, allows for assumptions as to the 
universal predicament that it confronts all states. This similar predicament 
universalises the solution, and makes meaningful talk of a symbiosis of the national 
and global interest. A ‘harmony of interests’ resides in the approach, assuming that 
the unavoidable logic attending to the process favours a closer association of states, 
thereby precluding the idea of opposing interests developing out of the very processes 
of change currently made manifest in a particular form. This draws attention to the 
liberal assumptions that reflect the partial conflation of globalisation with 
‘liberalisation’ first identified in the domestic exegesis. The closer integration 
accompanying globalisation is assumed to function to encourage peaceable relations 
and collective solutions.
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But the arguments are forced to take on a particular form, one that resolves tensions 
inherent to the domestic ‘third way’. Globalisation underpins and drives the idea of a 
‘third way’ in politics, but in order to be a realisable goal, all countries (or at least the 
sizeable majority) must all be singing from the same hymn sheet. Reification is, in the 
long term, a requisite of success, and only possible if the community of states all 
accept the same strictures, and adhere to the same ontology. There is then, an organic 
whole here. The domestic and international are not discrete realms, conveniently 
separate and exclusive of one another, each with their own logics, but are instead 
profoundly tied into one another along particular lines.
Thus two forces coincide in the second phase of arguments presented by Cook and 
Blair. One, the legacy of the domestic exegesis extends in a logical fashion to 
encompass and force on the foreign policy agenda issues unresolved at the domestic 
level. This in part, shapes the metaphors and the argumentative form adopted when 
then applied to foreign policy. But, this occurs whilst also having to sell these very 
ideas to the international community.
This also determines the subsequent significance o f  globalisation. A few examples 
illustrate this point. In the discourse, the argument is made that: liberalisation is not 
only desirable for all, but also unavoidable nonetheless; though essential that the UK 
remain ahead of the race, globalisation is nevertheless not a threat, but an opportunity 
for all states (though all cannot logically remain ahead of the race). Though benefiting 
from a ‘pivotal status’ as a result of the UK’s historical past, the argument is made 
that ‘pooling’ sovereignty is something the whole community nonetheless can benefit 
from, allowing all to have a say in shaping and determining the trajectory
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globalisation takes. ‘Globalisation’ is the harbinger of a new global interest (the same 
as the British interest), and it creates the latent possibility of entrenching a universal 
set of interests, thereby clearing the way to intervene and to promulgate both 
commercial and human rights interests. Again, an ideological aspect permeates the 
argument. Here, the desire to export a ‘third way’ in international relations can be 
located, not only in terms of the requirements inherent to the domestic agenda, but 
also in terms of the need to articulate a moral purpose to foreign policy - whilst 
nonetheless not compromising traditional national interests. Through ‘globalisation’, 
the discourse is apparently able to articulate an idealist and realist position.
This also helps make sense of more recent responses to the process. These, I have 
suggested, reflect and respond to the evolving position on ‘globalisation’ -  which 
when charted, suggest a moving away from the idea of it as a necessarily favourable, 
neutral (universally experienced in the same way) ‘process-without-a-subject’. Each 
of these morphings is highly significant, and in as much as they are reflected in the 
speeches of New Labour, precipitate a move away from the assumptions of a 
deterministic approach to globalisation, in favour of recognition of the need to 
‘manage’ it. They thereby alter the possibility for reification and legitimisation, and 
thus change the conditions for a future interpretation.
In response, it is in fact possible to interpret a reversion (rather than ‘fourth way’), 
away from the idea that it is neutral or that it allows for a depoliticised pragmatic 
agenda, towards a more old-fashioned interventionist set of positions being read off 
the context. As was examined in the previous chapter, the nature of the arguments 
centring on ‘globalisation’, as expressed by so many NGOs, calls for intervention: to
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redistribute in order to balance inequalities; calling for ‘fair* not ‘free’ trade; and 
demanding a reconfiguration of power amongst existing international organisations. 
Thus, as with the original domestic arguments that animated the reformist left in the 
earlier part of the twentieth century, equity is once more bound up with current 
processes of modernisation, fixed more firmly within the spectrum of the left and 
right, and discussed in terms of the inequities of the unfettered market. Unsurprisingly, 
this then begins to infect the New Labour position.
So, as ‘globalisation’ becomes less ‘obscure’, it becomes less amenable to the sort of 
obvious manipulation witnessed in the early years o f its usage. ‘Globalisation’, now 
takes on a potentially subversive direction, drawing attention to a significant 
limitation to the New Labour understanding. An idea originally evoked in order to 
underpin a political project, now demands of that project an agenda potentially 
contradictory to the one originally taken, and thus, holds to the possibility of losing 
out on the reifying and legitimising properties so expedient in the latter part of the 
1990s.
This returns the argument full circle, to reflect once more, on the key features 
outlined in the methodological and meta-theoretical sections of the thesis. Power, 
context, and interests again all come to the fore. How they play out will in the end 
determine the future of ‘globalisation’: as a political concept evoked as explanans; as 
an idea amenable to manipulation; and as a facilitator, potentially constituting a 
particular reality. Perhaps most significant, is the role and position of Blair himself. 
As his position alters, then so will the future significance of the idea. If Blair weakens, 
the term is destined, if not to be dropped, then certainly to no longer play such a
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central role in the discourse. But Blair isn’t the only consideration. Another important 
factor will centre on the perceptions about what future policies are needed for a 
successful election, and indeed the hunger amongst the party to remain in power.
However, as argued in chapter 7, though the significance of globalisation is certainly 
changing, there still remains ideological possibilities for the term, not least judged in 
terms of the possibilities it affords for making largely unrealisable and thus empty 
goals concerning the future role and function of international organisations like the 
IMF and World Bank.
And so the ideas surrounding globalisation may retain there hold. Nevertheless, the 
author cannot but feel that the peculiar set of circumstances over the period 1996 to 
2001 are now significantly changed. The idea, whose time had come, did indeed play 
a very central and significant function. But this is likely to have only been but a 
moment in time, and it is unlikely that the reifying and legitimising consequences will 
remain as long-term features of either the British or international political landscape. 
We may indeed live in a different world from that experienced just ten years before, 
but politics remains an issue dealing with conflictual relations, the outcomes of which 
at any one time are ultimately shaped by power.
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